The impact of foreign aid and donations to Palestine on development of its economy under alternative Israeli- Palestinian economic interaction regimes by Shoukair, Sharbel
  
The Impact of Foreign Aid and Donations to 
Palestine on Development of its Economy under 










The thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Portsmouth. 
 
 
Submitted to the University of Portsmouth 









The main goal of the thesis is to examine whether the Palestinian economy suffers from 
"Dutch Disease" symptoms, and if so what are its sources. Dutch Disease has been 
widely used to explain why foreign development aid can be ineffective in generating 
economic growth, even though it can break the vicious cycle of low income, low 
saving, low investment, low sustainable growth and even negative growth. In most 
cases, the disease is due to appreciation of local currency. However, the Palestinians 
use the Israeli Shekel and also the Jordanian Dinar and the Egyptian Lira. Thus, the 
sources of the symptoms of the Dutch Disease in the Palestinian economy might be 
explained by the influx of foreign aid arising because of terror attacks and retaliations 
and the economic policy and constraints that are imposed mainly by Israel.  
 
The theoretical and empirical efforts of the thesis to determine the causality direction 
between foreign aid and growth include the following: 
 
I. The national accounting identities are used to express the gross domestic 
product (GDP) in terms of foreign currency and the proportion between import 
and uses. I found empirically that due to the political- economic constraints in 
the case of the Palestinian economy, the factors mentioned above are almost 
entirely exogenous and, under the existing economic- political constraints, 
foreign development aid had only a small chance to significantly boost the 
tradable sectors. 
 
II. I separated the national accounting figures of the Palestinian economy into two 
sub periods, 1968 to 1993 and 1994 to 2007. In the first period the Israeli 
convenient policy was to employ the Palestinians in Israel rather than to 
encourage the development of the Palestinian economy. The first Intifada 
erupted in 1987 and led to years of terror attacks and retaliations and also caused 
a significant reduction of GDP. Over the period 1968 to 1993 the average 
annual foreign aid was less than 20% of that for the period 1994 to 2007. Thus, 
terror and the economic and political policy of Israel are the main factors for 
the disease in this period.  
 
    
 II 
Terror clashes and economic-political constraints persisted also in the second 
period of post "Oslo peace accord", but in that period the foreign aid soared up 
to 64% of GDP in 2007. The per capita GDP in 2007 decreased to almost the 
same level of GDP per capita twenty years ago, unemployment soared, export 
(about 90% to Israel) remained relatively negligible while the weight of the 
tradable sectors went down and weight of the non-tradable sectors rose. These 
findings fit the symptoms of Dutch Disease's. The main question remains - did 
the unprecedented foreign aid replace the economic efforts of the Palestinians, 
or did the foreign aid only solve the humanitarian disaster? 
 
III. In order to answer this previous question, I regressed the annual growth of GDP 
on previous, current and next year foreign aid and found that the annual GDP 
growth is significantly correlated only with the current year foreign aid. This 
finding indicates that both directions of causality hold and foreign development 
aid cannot boost GDP unless the political-economic constraints are removed, 
and Israel becomes a positive player in the Palestinian economy. 
 
In sum, the original contribution of the thesis is four-fold. First, to the best of my 
knowledge, for the first time macro data of almost forty years on the Palestinian 
economy has been collected and analyzed. It was not an easy task, due to collection 
difficulties at the first Intifada period and the 1994 transfer of statistical bureaus from 
Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Thus, 
I had to also estimate data from the first Intifada period and smooth conflicting figures 
between 1993 and 1994.  
 
Second, to my best knowledge this is the first work that has expressed and analyzed 
GDP in terms of foreign currency constraints. This approach adds a unique economic 
insight, since almost all sources of foreign currency are exogenous in the special case 
of the Palestinian economy. 
 
Third, for the first time the Dutch Disease symptoms of the Palestinian economy and 
its major factors are theoretically and empirically analysed. The symptoms at the period 
of high foreign aid were reflected in following four observations. First, increased 
unemployment; second, low growth of GDP; third, an increased share of the non-
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tradable sector and a decreased share of the tradable sector; and four, a decreasing 
proportion of exports out of GDP. 
 
Fourth, this is the first stock market event study that analyzed the impact of terror on 
the two sides of the barricade (Tel Aviv Stock Exchange vs. the Palestinian Security  
Exchange). The main findings of this analysis are as follows. Firstly, major terror attack 
events significantly depressed both stock markets; secondly, the Israeli stock market is 
more sensitive to terror attacks; thirdly, terror attacks affect negatively both economies 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 The Structure of this Chapter 
This chapter describes the research area and its academic and practical importance. 
This section reviews several of the major studies in this area, including studies related 
to the West Bank and Gaza. The second part of this chapter explores the unique 
background of this subject, which is critical to understanding the unique research 
questions and hypotheses. This section also includes basic information on the main 
characteristic of the Palestinian economy and the key historical events related to the 
Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The third section presents the research questions and the 
main hypotheses. The fourth section briefly presents the methodology of the study 
along with its empirical and theoretical shortcomings and the unique difficulties faced 
in obtaining reliable historical data. The final section of the introduction presents the 
overall structure of the thesis. 
  
1.2 Area of Research  
This thesis studies the impact of the flow of foreign currency from foreign aid and 
labour abroad on economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza and on the "Dutch 
disease" symptoms in this unique country. There is a vast body of evidence indicating 
that the massive flow of foreign currency from either natural resources or from abroad 
can lead to a regression of the industrial tradable sector relative to the non-tradable 
service sector. This phenomenon is referred to in the literature as "Dutch Disease"1. 
This area of research has a crucial academic and practical importance, as it is relevant 
to the growth goals of developing countries, the aspiration for equality among nations 
and humanitarian and moral issues. The ability to achieve the above goals is determined 
by the effectiveness of international aid. Unfortunately, as many conflicting factors 
theoretically and empirically impact the effectiveness of foreign aid, it is difficult to 
reach a final conclusion regarding the expected effectiveness of donations. The 
problems of growth and inequality among nations have been among the most important 
                                                 
1 The term "Dutch Disease" appears in the literature following the deterioration of the Dutch Industrial 
sector following the influx of petroleum dollars from the North Sea. Chapter 3 reviews the various 
studies that analyze the Dutch Disease phenomenon. For an additional review, see also Corden and 
Neary (1982). 
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economic, political, social and moral issues worldwide for many years. Theoretically, 
according to Solow’s (1956) neoclassical model, under conditions of free flow of 
capital and technology, the per capita GDP gap between two countries should diminish 
in a finite horizon and reach steady state. This result is in contrast to the hypothesis of 
Malthus (1798) that the marginal productivity of labour will decrease below a given 
level of capital. However, Malthus's theory has proven itself in many poor countries 
with fast growing populations and low levels of governance, education and technology. 
These poor countries became trapped in the vicious cycle of low saving and thus low 
investment, low capital and low growth. It seems that for these countries, foreign aid 
can break the vicious cycle of low saving and investment and close the "foreign 
currency gap" that prevents growth (Chenery and Strout (1966)). However, various 
studies that will be presented later claim that for many reasons; foreign aid may 
increase consumption, rather than increasing saving and growth. 
 
Both economic thinkers and social welfare scientists have claimed that foreign aid can 
be detrimental to productivity. The flow of gold to Spain in the 16th century helped 
develop the Catholic Church, but not the Spanish economy, which remained 
technologically behind relative to the economies in neighbouring countries 
(Drelichman 2003). Numerous studies examine the impact of aid on growth (see, for 
example, Maizels and Nissanke (1984), Levy (1988), Burnside and Dollar (2004) and 
Rajan and Subramanian (2005, 2006). There is an ongoing debate among researchers 
concerning the impact of aid on growth and the factors underlying positive and negative 
correlations that have been observed between the two. Durbarry, Gemmel and 
Greenaway (1998) claim that foreign aid can only have a limited positive impact on 
growth and that this depends on a number of factors, including the macroeconomic 
policy environment, income level, level of foreign aid and geographic location. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) conclude that the quality of institutions and the presence 
of a sound fiscal and monetary policy in developing countries determine aid 
effectiveness. Easterly (2003) disputed Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) claim and 
concluded that "how to achieve a beneficial aggregate impact of foreign aid remains a 
puzzle" (p.39). Rajan and Subramanian (2005) conducted a cross country analysis and 
did find that foreign aid was negatively correlated with growth, but they claimed that 
the direction of causality is unclear because poorer countries with low growth rates 
may attract higher amounts of aid. UNCTAD (2006-B) review much of the empirical  
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and theoretical debate on the effectiveness of aid. Djankov, Montello and Reynal-
Querol (2006, 2008) review many of these studies and claim that Dutch Disease is the 
"The Curse of Aid"2.  
 
The specific interest of this thesis is the unique case of the economy of the West Bank 
and Gaza. This economy is unique for many reasons. First, the West Bank and Gaza 
have spent the last 50 years in a major conflict with Israel, which controls the most 
important factors of the economy of the West Bank and Gaza, including energy, water, 
arable land, labour abroad, and the physical movements of people and merchandise 
inside and outside the country including export and import. The West Bank has no sea 
shore, airports and borders are controlled by Israel, and almost all import, export and 
labour abroad occur through and to Israel. Although Gaza has a sea shore, there are no 
sea or airports in Gaza due to the Israeli siege, and Gaza is also geographically and 
physically disconnected from the West Bank. Second, the West Bank and Gaza does 
not have a national currency, with transactions occurring in the Israeli Shekel, the 
Jordanian Dinar and the Egyptian Lira. Thus, in the case of the West Bank and Gaza, 
the potential for Dutch Disease is not due to local currency appreciation but most likely 
due to various political, economic and physical constraints that are mainly imposed by 
Israel. Third, this economy is very small, and the per capita income is very low3. 
Naturally, a small economy with no natural resources and a limited amount of water 
and arable land is highly dependent on international trade and labour mobility. 
However, imports and exports of products, services and labour are exogenously 
politically constrained, mainly by Israel. Fourth, the West Bank and Gaza has received 
an exceptionally high level of per capita foreign aid. Figure 1.1 below presents the 
2003-2011 per capita Official Development Aid (ODA). This figure shows that for a 
long period of time, the West Bank and Gaza received much higher aid relative to other 
poor countries. According to World Bank data, in 2011 the average ODA to less 
developed countries (according to UN classification) was on the average only USD 53, 
while the ODA to the West Bank and Gaza was USD 615. In fact, the West Bank and 
Gaza have a history of almost 50 years of dependence on external exogenous sources 
                                                 
2 The "Curse of Aid” is the name of their 2008 paper. 
3 According to the CIA World Fact Book, 2013 July 5th update, the 2011 estimated GDP of the West 
Bank and Gaza in Purchasing Power Parity terms is USD 8,022 billion (ranked 156th out of 229 
countries), and the 2008 per capita GDP estimate was only USD 2,900 (ranked 178th in the world). These 
low levels can be compared to those of Israel, with a 2011 GDP in Purchasing Power terms of USD 245 
Billion (ranked 51st in the world) and a per capita GDP of USD 32,800 (ranked 43rd in the world). 
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of foreign currency. From 1968-1993, (the pre "Oslo Peace Accord" period), the 
average annual per capita foreign currency financial transfers plus net capital transfers 
of USD 208 and the compensation from work abroad (most from Israel) of USD 340 
financed 68% of the imports, which reached USD 811. In that period, the exports 
financed 32% of the imports, on average. From 1994-2007, the post Oslo period, the 
average annual per capita financial transfers and capital transfers tripled to USD 667, 
but compensation from work abroad was cut by 50% to an annual per capita amount of 
USD 1694. In the post Oslo period, the above two sources of foreign currency financed 
80% of the imports, which increased to an average per capita amount of USD 1045. 
During the post Oslo period of 1994-2007, the exports deteriorated to an average annual 
per capita amount of only USD 208, and those exports financed only 20% of the 
imports (compared with 32% before the Oslo period)5.  
 
Figure 1.1 Per Capita Official Development Aid (ODA) to the West Bank and  
                  Gaza and 36 Low Income Countries, 2003-2011 (in current USD)  
 
  
 Source: World Bank Data; Development Indicators July 2013. 
 
The thesis examines whether these differences in exports and imports between the two 
periods constitute Dutch Disease. There are many historical examples of countries that 
were infected by Dutch Disease (See Table 3.1 in chapter 3 p.110). There is a vast body 
of literature related to the impact of foreign aid on tradable sectors and export in 
                                                 
4 According to Table 5.7 in Chapter 5 p.153, 89% of the compensation from work abroad from 1999-
2007 was from Israel. 
 
5 All USD numbers above are in real CPI terms of 2004 and are taken from Table 5.2 in Chapter 5 p.146. 
West Bank and Gaza 
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general, especially in developing countries. Recently, Rajan and Subramanian (2011) 
provided cross country data demonstrating that aid inflows have systematic adverse 
effects on country competitiveness by resulting in real exchange rate appreciation. 
Other studies report conflicting results6.  
 
Only a few studies have examined the impact of donations on economic growth in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Le More (2005) focuses on the effect of the struggle, using 
the Palestinian-Israeli dispute as an example for the claim that much more effort should 
be put into solving the dispute before aid can be effective7. Lasensky and Grace (2006) 
question the impact of aid on the economy of Palestine as well as on the path to peace. 
Hever (2006) supports the claim that the basic purpose of the donor countries was the 
development and economic independence of the Palestinians. UNCTAD (2006-A) 
reviewed the impact of aid in the West Bank and Gaza. However, development and 
economic independence have not been achieved due to the political situation. Petri 
(1997) also views the West Bank and Gaza as victims of Dutch Disease. He observes: 
            "An especially dramatic example of the Dutch Disease at work is 
provided by the structure of the Palestinian economy in the early 
1990s. Despite its very small economic size, the West Bank and Gaza 
exported only 14 per cent of its output. These exports paid for only 
one-fifth of imports, with the remaining 80 per cent financed by wages 
earned in Israel. As a result, the West Bank and Gaza’s productive 
resources at home were engaged mostly in non-traded sectors, with 
tradable accounting for only 8 per cent of outputs. Nevertheless, wage 
rates were higher than those in neighbouring Jordan or Egypt. As the 
effects of Israeli border closures demonstrate, the shift to alternative 
foreign-exchange generating activities is difficult because the 
economy lacks a base for producing tradable sectors" (p. 25).   
 
The claims in the literature that the West Bank and Gaza is infected by Dutch Disease 
are presented without any systematic academic study to support these claims. Recently, 
Cali (2011) indicated in a preliminary unpublished working paper that under military 
occupation, foreign aid cannot support growth. Similarly to Le More (2005), Cali also 
claims that aid only supports the continuation of Israeli control over the West Bank. 
Cali claims that under the occupation, additional aid leads to the Dutch Disease 
symptoms of lower export and the deterioration of the tradable sector. The report of the 
                                                 
6 See for example: Kang, Prati and Rebucci (2013), Rajan and Subramanian (2005), Nkusu (2004), Vos 
(1992), Rob (1998), Adenauer and Vagassky (1998), Bandara (1995) Benjamin, Devarajan and Weiner 
(1989), Cordon (1984), Torvik (2001, 2002) Elbadawi (1999). 
 
7 This claim is in line with the main claim of this thesis.   
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD (2006-A), claimed 
that:  
      "On the supply side, induced higher wages in the domestic economy 
that do not reflect domestic productivity gains dampen agriculture and 
industrial production. This is due to higher production costs, falling 
profitability and loss of competitiveness in foreign markets. Thus, 
from both sides, demand and supply, the impact of exporting labour 
to Israel gives rise to a dynamic similar to the “Dutch Disease”. This 
dynamic has reinforced adverse path dependence, distorting the 
development of the Palestinian economy, and inhibiting its growth" 
(p.13).  
The above claim made by the UNCTAD (2006-A) report is supported by a flow chart 
of the economic distorting and non-distorting factors that are embodied in aid (see p. 
14 of the report). An appendix in UNCTAD (2006-A) provides only a highly simplified 
Cobb-Douglas production model. 
Before I present my specific research questions and hypotheses, I would like to present 
the basic economic background as this information is important for understanding the 
research questions and hypotheses of this work.   
1.3 Background 
More than sixty years since the establishment of the state of Israel, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has not subsided and continues to affect the economies and daily 
lives of both sides. Current and future generations of Palestinians and Israelis will 
continue to suffer, and there seems to be no end in sight to the conflict. The Oslo 
Accords (1993) appeared to represent progress towards peace. Hopes were high on both 
sides, as was the disappointment following the collapse of the Oslo Accords with the 
onset of the second Intifada8 in 2000. 
The conflict has an enormous economic cost for both sides. In July 2002, the Israel’s 
Ministry of Finance estimated that the 2000 Intifada alone cost the Israeli economy 
more than US $10 billion9.   
                                                 
8 The Arabic word for “uprising”. The term Intifada is used to designate the violent Palestinian 
resistance to Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. The first Intifada occurred in 1988. The 
second Intifada began in September 2000 after the breakdown of peace negotiations between Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority. 
 
9 This amount is almost 10% of the annual GDP of Israel in Purchasing Power terms, which was US 
110.2 billion in the year 2000 (source: Index Mundy report, based on the CIA World Fact book, January 
2011).  
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The impact of the second Intifada on the Palestinian economy has been devastating. In 
constant prices of 2004, the per capita GNP decreased 39.3% from USD 2008 in 1999 
to USD 1218 in 2002, most likely mostly because of the second Intifada. This low level 
is only slightly below the 1974 per capita GNP (in constant prices) of USD 1237. The 
only other period with a significant decline in per capita GNP was the period of the 
first Intifada that erupted in December 1987 and continued up to Madrid Conference 
in October 1991. According to my estimates, the per capita GNP was USD 1849 in 
1987, fell by -8.43% to USD 1693 in 1988, and remained almost the same until 1991. 
The two Intifada periods are the only two periods in which there were significant and 
lasting decreases in the per capita GNP. The per capita exports in the second Intifada 
period fell from USD 278 in 1999 to only USD 141 in 2002 (-49%). During these years, 
per capita imports decreased from USD 1379 to USD 987 (-28%) but income from 
labour abroad fell from USD 294 to USD 86 (-71%). As almost all exports, imports 
and wages from abroad are to and from Israel, the reduction in the GNP in the Intifada 
period is mainly related to the difficult economic-political relationships with Israel 
during the Intifada periods. 
 
1.3.1 Unique Features of the Palestinian Economy  
It is difficult to speak about Palestine as an independent economic entity. Throughout 
modern history, Palestine has been administered by foreign entities, even after the 
dissolution of the British Mandate in 1948. Until 1967, the West Bank economy was 
integrated into that of Jordan, while Gaza's economy was tied to Egypt. Since 1967, the 
Palestinian economy has been merged with that of Israel in a de-facto customs union 
unilaterally imposed by Israel. The Palestinian economy is not only highly dependent 
on neighbouring Israel, but is in large part defined and controlled by Israel. The flow 
of imports and exports to and from the Palestinian Authority is entirely controlled by 
Israel.  
The Palestinian Authority has neither air nor sea ports. Virtually all land borders are 
under Israeli control. Prior to 1967, exports from the West Bank and Gaza were 
negligible and almost entirely destined for Jordan and Egypt, countries with which 
Israel was at war during much of the post-1967 era. Thus, it is not surprising that Israel 
is virtually the Palestinian Authority’s sole trading partner today. 
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The Palestinian Authority has no independent currency and a poorly developed 
financial services sector. Agriculture is limited by a lack of water and arable land. The 
natural resources of the Palestinian Authority are limited to the stone industry. The high 
potential of the tourism industry cannot be fully realised under the current conflict 
situation. 
 
Unlike most other countries, for many years the GDP of the West Bank and Gaza was 
significantly lower than the GNP due to the impact of the export of Palestinian labour 
to Israel. For most of the 1970s and 1980s, the contribution of revenues from foreign 
wages abroad to Palestinian GDP hovered approximately 30%, peaking on the eve of 
the first Intifada in 1987 at 43%. Since Oslo and particularly since the second Intifada, 
which is also called the "Al Aqsa Intifada", the dependency on employment in Israel 
has decreased significantly, reaching a low of 6% of GDP in 2004. 
 
In light of this situation and the high birth rate, it should not be surprising to find a high 
unemployment rate (especially in Gaza) and a particularly high dependency on foreign 
aid and charitable donations. The efforts of the Palestinians to disengage from the 
Israeli economy by developing an independent economy can damage the Palestinian 
economy from the growth potential embodied in the positive economic relationship 
with Israel. 
 
1.3.2 Historical Review 
The course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the major variable determining the 
effectiveness of economic policy and foreign aid in promoting Palestinian economic 
development. Any reliable projection of the impact of policy and aid should specify 
alternative scenarios regarding the development of this conflict and its resolution and 
the probability that these alternative scenarios will occur. Thus, a short review of the 
conflict is essential for understanding the current situation as well as the viability of the 
future scenarios10. 
 
The current conflict between Israel and Palestine is a reflection of the inability to find 
a peaceful way for the Jewish and Arab populations to co-exist. While the origins of 
                                                 
10 According to our model and the empirical findings of this thesis, the future positive impact of 
foreign aid on economic growth is highly dependent on the political agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinians. 
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the conflict can be traced to the Nineteenth Century, the Balfour declaration of 1917 is 
a point of reference for Jewish settlement in Palestine and Arab opposition to that 
settlement.  
 
In 1948, the Jewish people realised their claimed rights to political sovereignty and 
established the State of Israel. The establishment of Israel in territories west of the 
Jordan River accomplished Israeli goals while depriving Palestinians of their claimed 
right to sovereignty over the same land. In 1948, many Palestinians became refugees 
in the West Bank and Gaza, which were controlled by Jordan and Egypt, respectively, 
prior to 1967. Since then, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled from the Israeli 
territory to the West Bank and Gaza. Some fled to neighbouring Arab countries and 
others overseas, creating a Palestinian Diaspora throughout the rest of the world. 
 
In 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, compelling many Palestinians to 
flee. The maps of the West Bank and Gaza and Israel, including the so-called "green 
line” indicating borders prior to the occupation, are rendered below. 
 
This conflict continues to affect daily life and the economics of both sides. From an 
economic standpoint, the Palestinians are more deeply affected by the conflict. 
Although the Palestinians have set up independent political and social institutions with 
the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the road toward political normalisation, 
a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for economic development, is long and 
tortuous. 
 
Table 1.1 summarises the chronology of the political conflict. Although this conflict 
has roots spanning thousands of years, this table begins with the Balfour Declaration11 
                                                 
11 The Balfour Declaration (dated 2 November 1917) was a letter from the United Kingdom's Foreign 
Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron Rothschild (Walter Rothschild, 2nd Baron Rothschild), a leader 
of the British Jewish community, for transmission to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland: 
"His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the 
Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any 
other country."  
The text of the letter was published in the press one week later, on 9 November 1917.[2] The "Balfour 
Declaration" was later incorporated into the Sèvres peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire and the 
Mandate for Palestine. 
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and ends 60 years after the establishment of the State of Israel. The Balfour Declaration 
represents the first official British recognition of the Zionists' strive for a "Home land 
in Palestine for the Jewish people." From that point on, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
has intensified, reaching peaks in 1948 and 1967. The Maps of Israel and the West 
Bank and Gaza following the 1948 cease fire borders agreements and before and after 
1967 are presented in Figures 1.2 and 1.3. 
 
Figure 1.2 Map of the West Bank and Gaza 
 
Note: The red lines specify the 1967 borders between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. 
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Figure 1.3 The Border Lines of Israel and Surrounding Countries Before and  















1949 Armistice Lines following first Arab- Israeli war (1947-49).       Areas that were attached to Israel 
Following 1967 war.  
   Source: http://www.masada2000.org/historical.html 
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Year Event Outcome 
1917 Balfour Declaration Arab opposition. The beginning of the 
Arab/Jewish conflict. 
1918 Allied forces occupy Palestine Britain began working on fulfilling the Balfour 
declaration. 
1919 - First Palestinian National Congress in 
Jerusalem. 
- Peace conference decides to send 
international commission to Palestine 
(King-Crane) 
Balfour Declaration rejected.  
England and France declined to participate. The 
commission advised to drop the idea of a Jewish 
commonwealth in Palestine. 
1922 - 1st White Paper: Sir W. Churchill 
excluded Trans- Jordan from the scope 
of the Balfour declaration. 
- First British census of Palestine. 
Total population of Palestine: 757,182 
78% Muslims, 11% Jews, 9.6% Christians 
1923 British Mandate for Palestine comes 




4th wave of Zionist immigrants Jewish population grew to compose 16%. 
1929 Palestinian riots expand to several towns. Clashes resulting in 133 Jews killed, 339 
wounded; 116 Arabs killed, 232 wounded 
1931 Second British census Total population of Palestine: 1,035,154; 
73.4% Muslims, 16.9% Jews, 8.6% Christians. 
1936 Great Arab Revolt begins (1936-1939). 
 
More than 5,000 Arabs, 400 Jews, and 200 
British were killed; disengagement of the 
Jewish and Arab self-sustaining economies. 
1947 UN General Assembly recommends  
partition plan by 33 to 13 votes 
Agreed by Jews but strongly opposed by 
Palestinian Arabs. 
 
1948 Israel declares independence; Arab states 
declare war against Israel. 
Israel gains control of 77% of British 
Mandatory Palestine. Jordan and Egypt hold the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip respectively; 
Jerusalem divided. 




Israel occupies West Bank, Gaza Strip, 
Egyptian Sinai, and Syrian Golan Heights, 
expands Jerusalem boundaries and extends 
Israeli law over East Jerusalem. 500,000 more 
Palestinians are displaced. Birth of the PLO. 
    
 13 




1987 First Intifada Cemented the Palestinians identity. 
Brought Palestinian discussion back to the 
UN. 
Led to the Madrid Conference. 
1993 Oslo Peace Accords Israel recognized PLO. Palestinians achieved 
limited autonomy. Arafat returned to 
Palestine. 
1994 Establishment of the Palestinian Authority  
1996 Beginning of disintegration of peace 
process under the Oslo Accords 
 
1998 Renegotiation of Oslo Interim Agreement 
culminating in Wye River Memorandum 
 
2000 Camp David Summit. 
The Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa) 
The Palestinians rejected the offer 
2002 "Road map to peace" initiative The parties have not complied with the 
requirements of Phase 1 of the Road Map 
2004 Death of Yasser Arafat  
2006 Hamas wins majority in PA parliament Complicated efforts for peace negotiations 
2007 Hamas claims full control over Gaza Strip 
Annapolis conference 
Hamas rejects Abbass authority. Intense 
fighting leaves the West Bank under 
Mahmoud Abbass, and Gaza Strip under 
Hamas. 
Mutual agreement for two-state solution as 
framework for peace settlement. 
Resumption of peace talks. 
2008 Operation Cast Lead – Israeli military 
campaign in Gaza Strip to stop Hamas 
rocket attaches on southern Israel. 
Hamas blames Israel for not lifting the Gaza 
Strip blockade. 14 Israelis and estimated 1,300 
Palestinians killed. 
Cessation of peace talks. 
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1.3.3 Socio-Economic Profile of the West Bank and Gaza 
To better understand the economic history and potential of the West Bank and Gaza, 
as well the hypotheses presented in this thesis, a concise socio-economic overview is 
provided in Tables 1.2-1.3 and Figure 1.4 below, leading to the following observations. 
First, the annual population growth rate is extremely high. According to Table 1.2 and 
Figure 1.4, the average annual growth of the population is 3.37%. This high rate 
includes a 17.7% increase in 199412. The high population growth rate results from the 
difficulty to immigrate and the relationships between poverty, tradition, and birth rates.  
Even excluding 1994, the average annual growth of the population is 3%, about three 
times higher than worldwide annual growth13. The 2013 estimated population growth 
rate is 2%, placing it in the high global quartile13. The implied result of this extremely 
high population growth is the additional difficulty to increase or even maintain per 
capita GDP and GNP. Second, living conditions have dramatically improved since 
1970. There are now refrigerators in each house. The number of hospital beds per 1000 
people remains low14 and it is 1.26 per 1000 in 201315. Life expectancy increased 
dramatically from 56 years to 72 years in 2007 and to 75 years in 2013 (92nd in the 
world)16. Note also that the expected number of school years in the West Bank and 
Gaza is relatively high compared to other neighbouring countries. For example, in the 
West Bank and Gaza, the 2013 school life expectancy is 13 for men and 14 for women, 
compared to 15 and 16 in Israel, 12 and 13 in Jordan, 12 and 11 in Syria and 11 and 9 
in Iraq.17 Israel is very successful in the high tech industry. The school life expectancy 
figures for the West Bank and Gaza indicate that with proper cooperation with Israel 
                                                 
12 The increase in 1994 was partially due to a political change in the definition of Palestinians. The Israeli 
Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) excluded about 300,000 inhabitants of east Jerusalem from the 
Palestinian population, and in 1994, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) included those 
inhabitants as well as many labour immigrants out of the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, following 
the Oslo peace accord, many Palestinians returned from abroad back to the West Bank and Gaza. Finally, 
some part time inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza considered "tourists" or non-citizens are 
considered as citizens by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).  
 
13 See CIA World Fact book updated August 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/we.html. 
 





16 See: CIA World Fact book updated August 2013.  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html. 
 
17 See CIA World Fact Book August 2013.  
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and other countries, the Palestinians have the potential to develop a successful high 
tech industry as well.  
 
Table 1.2   Key Socio-economic Indicators for West Bank and Gaza, 1970-2007    
                   (selected years) 
 
Sources: Figures from 1994 onward are based on data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of   
   Statistics’ National Accounting Statistics. Figures up to 1993 are based on data from the Israel  
   Central Bureau of Statistics.  
 
Year 1721 1980 1987 1994 1999 2002 2007 
Population (000s) 970 1,172 1,408 2,111 2,633 2,884 3,357 
Population in West Bank  
(without Jerusalem) 
603 721 853 1,252 1,562 1,701 1,962 
Population in Gaza  367 451 555 859 1,071 1,183 1,395 
Population Density (capita/ km2) in  
West Bank (Total Area 5,655 km2) 
106.6 127.5 150.8 221.4 276.2 300.8 346.9 
Population Density (people/ km2) in 
Gaza (Total Area of 365 km2) 
1,005.5 1,235.6 1,520 2,353.4 2,934.2 3,241.1 3,821.9 
Life expectancy in the 
West Bank and Gaza (Years) 
56 61 65 66 - - 72 
Households with electricity (%) 30 66 75 85 97 100 100 
Households with refrigerators (%) 11 57 71 85 90 100 100 
Internet at home (%) - - - - 1.6 - 15.9 
Hospital beds per 1000 - 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 
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 Table 1.3 Key Economic Indicators for West Bank and Gaza, 1970-2007  
                 (selected years) 
    Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) up to 1993 and the Palestinian Central Bureau of   
    Statistics (PCBS) from 1994 onward, and Table 5.1 in Chapter 5, p.144. 
 
   Figure 1.4 Population and Population Growth between Selected Years in the  
                   West Bank and Gaza, 1970-2007 
 






























Year 1970 1980 1987 1994 1999 2002 2007 
GNP (2004 US Million $) 752 1,942 2,604 3,408 5,288 3,513 5,048 
GDP (2004 US Million $) 670 1536 1824 3014 4514 3265 4536 
GNP per capita (2004 US $) 775 1657 1849 1615 2008 1218 1504 
GDP per capita (2004 US $) 690 1311 1295 1428 1714 1132 1351 
Export (% of GNP) 16.6 22 17.8 13 13.8 11.6 11.9 
Export to Israel ( % of GNP) 7.67 14.4 14 12.2 13.4 10.4 10.6 
Import (% of GNP) 56 57.7 58 67.2 68.6 81.1 54.8 
Import from Israel (% of GNP) 46.8 50.6 53 59.9 52 44.5 40.2 
Foreign financial transfers plus 
net capital transfer (millions 
USD 2004 prices) 
213.8 287.9 267.4 1452.3 2124.3 2191.6 1655.9 
Employment in West Bank and 
Gaza (000s) 
173.3 218 278 316 502 406 565 
Employment in Israel (000s) 20.6 76 108.9 51.2 115 41.8 56 
Unemployment rate in Gaza (%) 6.4 3.1 1.6 24.9 18 39.1 32.1 
Unemployment rate in West 
Bank (%) 
3.2 1.8 2.5 17.4 13 30.9 20.6 
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Table 1.3 highlights the following important facts: first, the main period of growth in 
terms of GDP and GDP per capita is between 1970 and 1980. This is the period of the 
initially positive interaction between the Israeli and Palestinian economies. Since 1980 
and until 2007, the GDP increased from USD 1536 million to USD 4536 million, an 
average increase of 4% per year. However, the per capita real GDP remained almost 
the same, from USD 1311 in 1980 to USD 1351 in 2007. One explanation for this 
result is the 17% "increase" in population in 1994, which is basically due to "political" 
differences in the population census methods of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 
(ICBS) and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). However, even if we 
reduce the 1994 increase in population to 4%, the 1980-2007 average annual growth 
of per capita GDP is 0.54% per year, which is much lower than the annual average 
growth rate of 6.6% between 1970 and 1980. The poor results after 1980 may be due 
to the various constraints on the Palestinian economy, the policy of Israel of employing 
Palestinians in Israel rather than developing the economy of the West Bank and Gaza, 
and the devastating economic results of the uprisings in the first and especially in the 
second Intifada. It is interesting to note in Table 1.3 that in 1970, the ratio of GNP to 
GDP was 1.12 (752/670). In 1980, this ratio increased to 1.26, and in 1987 it was 1.42. 
The high level of GNP relative to GDP is due to Palestinians working in Israel and in 
the new Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Following the first Intifada, this 
ratio decreased to 1.13 in 1994, and then to 1.07 at the end of the second Intifada in 
2002.  
 
To prevent a major humanitarian disaster and the total collapse of the Palestinian 
economy, much of the income lost by the West Bank and Gaza from work in Israel 
had to be replaced by foreign aid, but foreign aid does not create jobs. The results of 
these dramatic changes can be seen in the last two lines in Table 1.3, presenting the 
unemployment rates. Unemployment has been a persistent problem in the West Bank 
and Gaza since the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987. The unemployment rate in 
the West Bank part of Palestine reached 20.6% in 2007, after peaking at approximately 
30% at the height of the Al Aqsa Intifada. The unemployment rate was higher in Gaza, 
at 32.1% in 2007 (peaking at approximately 40% in 2002). According to the 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 44.1% of the population of the West Bank 
participated in the labour force in 2007, while this figure was only 33% in Gaza. 
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Due to the conflict and the frequent recurrence of hostilities, the Palestinian economy 
has been under siege intermittently since the period of the first Intifada and since the 
second Intifada of 2000. This economic siege is reflected in the severe constraints 
placed on the movement of labour and goods within and outside the West Bank and 
Gaza. 
Unemployment rates were very low in the years 1970, 1980, and 1987. Since 1994, 
the unemployment rate has dramatically increased. Figure 1.5 provides better insight 
into the unemployment figures. 
 
Figure 1.5 Unemployment Rates in the West Bank and Gaza, 1968-2007 
 
Source: Table 5.4, in Chapter 5, p.149. 
 
Figure 1.5 demonstrates a decrease in unemployment during the initial period of 
integration with the Israeli economy. Then, the unemployment increased over the 
1980s until 1993. A dramatic increase was observed in 1994, the first year after the 
Oslo Accord and also the first year when all the statistical calculations were under the 
responsibility of the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics rather than the Israel Central 
Bureau of Statistics. Much of this increase in unemployment is related to the different 
measurement methods of the two Bureaus, as Israel had an incentive to present a more 
positive picture of reality, while the Palestinians had the opposite incentive. Thus, the 
accuracy of the unemployment data are questionable. Following the second Intifada of 
2000, unemployment increased again. While unemployment in the West Bank 











1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Unemployment in Gaza Unemployment in the West Bank
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According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) report in May 2011, the 
main reason for the low participation rate is the gender gap (see Figure 1.6 below).  The 
2006-2010 average participation rates, unemployment rates and gender gaps in the 
West Bank and Gaza are close to those in other Arab states. The unemployment rate of 
women in the West Bank and Gaza is relatively high, but similar to that of Jordan and 
Syria.  
 
Figure 1.6 Gender Gap in Labour Force Participation and Unemployment  
                   Rates, Average 2006-2010 
 
 
Source: ILO Department of statistics with the following explanation: 
This graph describes the gender gap both in labour force participation and unemployment rate. 
Horizontal axis shows both male unemployment and labour force participation, while left and right axis 
represent female unemployment and labour force participation respectively. The   two lines are 450 lines 
each with respect to an axis. 
On the right, the white points below the dashed line indicate that Women participation is extremely low 
compared with men's. On the left, the black points above the line show that unemployment for women 
is higher than for men in most of the countries. 
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Figure 1.6 reveals that the average unemployment of men over this period (2006 to 
2010) is the highest among Arab countries. This result is most likely due to the 
particular political constraints on the Palestinian economy. 
 
Another unique feature of the Palestinian economy is its small size. In 2007, the GNP 
of the Palestinian economy was US $5.05 billion and the GNP per capita was $1,504. 
Table 1.4 shows that at the turn of the century, the per capita GNP of the West Bank 
and Gaza was roughly equivalent to that of Jordan and to the average in the Middle 
East and North African countries. It is striking to note that in 2005, the per capita GNP 
of the West Bank and Gaza was about half of the average in Jordan, the Middle East 
and North Africa. This result is due to the negative 4.88% growth rate over the period 
2000 to 2005 and concurrently, the accelerated growth in other Middle East countries. 
These findings suggest that the opportunity cost of the Intifada to the West Bank and 
Gaza is about half of GNP.18  
 
Since the early 1970s, the GDP of the West Bank and Gaza has been consistently lower 
than the GNP, due initially to the massive employment of Palestinians in Israel and 
subsequently to foreign aid, donations and other unilateral capital transfers from 
abroad. The Palestinian economy is nascent, and its public and private sectors have 
little experience. There is no independent currency or central bank in the West Bank 
and Gaza, and there are no savings systems or retirement savings schemes. Commercial 
banking and other forms of financial mediation are severely underdeveloped after 
decades of restrictions and prohibitions placed on the development of local financial 
services. The stock market is only sixteen years old and has yet to develop its economic 







                                                 
18 This conclusion assumes that in the absence of the Intifada, the growth rate in terms of per capita 
GNP would have been equivalent to that of Jordan and to the average growth of the Middle Eastern and 
North African countries.  
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  Table 1.4 GNP and GNP Per Capita, Atlas Method (current US dollars) 
   Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database, April 2008. 
     
The above factors have created severe poverty and hardships, which are only partially 
relieved by the UNDP and the international donor system. Employment of Palestinians 
in Israel and later the foreign aid agencies have helped to provide and even to improve 
the basic necessities of normal life (See: Table 1.2). 
 
From 1970 to 2007, the per capita GNP of the West Bank and Gaza increased by 94% 
(approximately 1.8% a year). However, until the first Intifada in 1987, the average 
annual increase in GNP was 5.6%, and from 1987 to 2007 there was an average annual 
negative decrease of -1%19 in the per capita GNP, despite the massive amount of 
foreign aid after the Oslo Accord.  These results indicate that foreign financial aid and 
donations to Palestine that turned into a flood of aid following the Oslo Accord did not 
stimulate economic growth20 under the economic siege, and at best addressed the 
humanitarian disaster.  
                                                 
19 Note again that the population increased by more than 17% in 1994 due to "political" differences 
between the calculations of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) and the Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). Considering only 3%-4% population growth in 1994, the growth rate in 
this period is slightly above 0%.  
 
20 Some claim that a portion of these capital transfers are channeled to finance terrorism. This claim has 












GNP              
per capita 
 
West Bank and 
Gaza 
4.67 28580 9.95 28170 %9.88 -  
Jordan 8.6 28370 27.93 18970 %6.81  
Middle East and  
North Africa 
957.7 28690 661.81 18270 %5.75  
Israel 221.59 238870 276.78 278370 %1.09  
Lebanon 17.29 98580 11.81 58670 %9.97  
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Figure 1.7 below presents the IMF estimates (based on information from the Finance 
Ministry of the West Bank) on the composition of donors' aid, divided between 
development aid and recurrent aid. This figure shows that development aid was only 
greater than recurrent aid during the short period of 1995-1999. Donors' aid decreased 
to almost zero in the years 2000-2002 (the second Intifada period), increased to 5-10% 
of GDP in 2003-2009, and has been approximately 5% of GDP from 2010 to 2016 
(projected). The recurrent aid, which finances the government deficit, dropped from 
approximately 8% of GDP in 1994 to almost zero in the year 2000. Then, it soared to 
13% of GDP in 2001 and 2002 and to almost 30% of GDP in 2008. From 2011 to 2016 
(projected), it is more than double the amount of recurrent aid.  
 
The reduction of the per capita GNP and GDP of the West Bank and Gaza reflects the 
results of the first and second Intifada and the continuation of the severe political 
struggle. The years from 1980 to 1987 ended with the first Intifada, and the annual 
growth rate of GNP per capita was only 1.57% per year, compared to 7.9% in the years 
1970-1980. 
 
From 1987 to 1999 (encompassing the first Intifada), growth came to a virtual 
standstill. From 1999 to 2007 (during the second Intifada), the economy in terms of 
GNP per capita contracted by 3.5% per year, and the cumulative GNP per capita 
declined by 25.1%. Note that the actual deterioration of the economy following the 
Oslo Accords was not projected by economists who attempted to project the future of 
the Palestinian economy using the macroeconomic equilibrium model while assuming 
a non-hostile relationship with Israel21. 
 
                                                 
21 See for example Astrup. C. and S. Dessus (2002) and Cobhan and Kanafani (2004), which presented 
and reviewed many studies of the peace economy in Palestine. 
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Figure 1.7 Total Development Aid and Recurrent Aid as a Percentage of GDP  
                  for West Bank and Gaza  
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund-IMF (2013) "Recent Experience and Prospects of the Economy of 
the West Bank and Gaza ," Staff Report Prepared for the Meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee ,
Brussels, March  27 81027 , P.20. 
 
However, under a hostile relationship with Israel and in the presence of deep 
unemployment and the physical and political constraints on trade, export, and labour, 
macro equilibrium models are not able to provide reliable economic forecasts. 
 
From 1994 to 2007, following the Oslo Accords, net foreign and capital transfers to 
the West Bank and Gaza exceeded US $25.6 billion USD (in terms of 2004 prices)22. 
In the ten years between 1997 and 2007, foreign aid amounted to US $21.46 billion (in 
terms of 2004 prices) and constituted almost 43% of the GNP23. Over 10 years, the 
cumulative GNP growth was 19.6%, however per capita GNP dropped by 12.25% over 
that period. The average net foreign aid, as reflected in the gap of the balance of 
payments, exceeded 1.95 billion USD per annum in those years, or US $678 per capita.  
 
                                                 
22 This figure is obtained by calculating current transfers and financial and capital transfers following 
the Oslo Accords. See Table 5.1 in Chapter 5, p.144. 
 
23 Bettin and Zazzro (2012) find that remittances encourage growth in economies with well developed 
and efficient financial sector. 
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A more detailed distribution of foreign aid to the West Bank and Gaza is presented in 
Figure 1.8. These data demonstrate that most donors' aid had the goal of supporting 
the governmental deficit rather than developing the economy. This figure shows that 
the major uses of aid from 2002-2009 were humanitarian aid (average 21%), other 
social infrastructure & services (average 22%), and government & civil society (19%). 
The portion allocated to Economic Infrastructure and Production was very small. 
 
Figure 1.8 Destination of Donor Funding to the Palestinian Territories  
                  (percentage of total aid flows) 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2011), "Coping With Conflict: Poverty and Inclusion in the West Bank and Gaza "
October 2011, Chapter 6, P.122. 
 
1.4 The Main Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Given the unique problems and features of the Palestinian economy reviewed in the 
previous part of this chapter, the main research questions are as follows:  
A. What are the impacts of the problematic economic and political control of Israel 
over the West Bank and Gaza? 
B. Is the Palestinian Economy infected by Dutch Disease? 
C. If the answer to B is yes, when did the infection occur? Was it before the Oslo 
peace accord when the amount of foreign aid was relatively low but the labour 
exploitation by Israel was relatively high, or did the symptoms of Dutch Disease 
only appear after the Oslo accord when foreign aid tripled? 
D. If the answer to B is yes, then what are the sources of the infection? 
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- Is it due to the exploitation of Palestinian labour by Israel that harmed 
competitiveness and led to the under-development of the Palestinian industrial 
sector? 
- Is it due to the physical mobility constraints on labour and merchandise   
within and outside the West Bank and Gaza? 
- Is it due to military clashes with Israel and terror and anti-terror retaliation 
activities? 
- Is it due to the classical disincentive impact of foreign aid on self-efforts 
required for production and growth? 
E.  Is the future economic growth of the West Bank and Gaza seriously bounded due 
to the harsh military retaliations of both sides and terror and thus only viable 
under a peaceful political arrangement of "Two nations for two peoples" that 
may include or exclude economic cooperation with Israel? 
 
My preliminary hypotheses are as follows: 
I. The GDP and GNP of the Palestinian economy are determined almost entirely 
by exogenous factors such as exports and imports, work abroad and foreign aid. 
There are no land, air, or sea ports through which merchandise and labour can 
be transferred abroad. In essence, the West Bank and Gaza are under economic 
siege.  
II. The answers to the remaining research questions posed above should be 
positive. The support for this hypothesis is the previous related literature and 
the unique political background that leads to exogenous economic constraints, 
which are almost the only factors that determine GDP growth according to my 
hypothesis.   
 
The following discussion will present some additional reasons to support these 
hypotheses. The only period of high per capita GDP growth was the 1970s. From 1970 
to 1979, the annual average real growth in per capita GDP was 6.1%. During these first 
ten years of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the average per capita 
income from work abroad (in 2004 USD prices) was only USD 262 and the average 
foreign aid in terms of foreign transfers plus net capital transfers (FTR+NCT) was only 
USD 252. The high per capita growth in these initial years is most likely due to the 
positive impact of the new economic relationship with the much better developed 
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Israeli economy24. Over this decade, the growth in the West Bank and Gaza was much 
higher than that in the surrounding countries. Over the following decade (1980-1989), 
the per capita real GDP remained almost unchanged. The average annual per capita 
FTR+NCT during this period decreased from USD 252 to USD 178 (a decrease of -
29%), but compensation from work abroad during this period increased to an average 
annual amount of USD 434.4 (+66%)25. The poor GDP growth during this period along 
with the high level of work in Israel most likely indicates that the GDP of the West 
Bank and Gaza was negatively affected by Israel's policy of using Palestinians as low 
paid labourers in Israel rather than helping to develop a competitive industry in the 
West Bank and Gaza. Following the 1994 Oslo Accords, economic growth was 
extremely low and financial aid was extremely high. At this juncture it is worth noting 
that the major source of growth prior to the first Intifada of 1987 was most likely 
economic exchange with the strong economy of Israel. During those years, the lion’s 
share of Palestinian exports was to Israel, and the export of labour to Israel dramatically 
increased the GNP of the West Bank and Gaza. Figure 1.9 below presents the main per 
capita figures for the period 1968 to 2007. 
 
Figure 1.9 Per Capita GNP, Import, Export, Work Abroad and FTR+NCT* for  
                  Palestine from 1968 to 2007 (2004 constant prices in USD)  
 
 
*FTR+NCT is the foreign exchange gap, which is measured by import less export less work abroad. 
This gap is considered as the best approximation for total "foreign aid". 
 Source: Table 5.2, Chapter 5, p.146. 
                                                 
24 The numbers in this analysis are calculated from Table 5.2 in Chapter 5, p.146. 
25 See Table 5.2 in Chapter 5, p.146. 
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Figure 1.9 indicates that until 1982, the GNP, exports, labour abroad and imports 
increased almost steadily. Then, from 1982 and especially from the first Intifada that 
erupted at the end of 1987, there was mainly a decrease and turbulence that continued 
until the Oslo peace accord. During the period 1970-1993 foreign aid in terms of 
FTR+NCT was very low, and decreased over time. Despite the negative impact of the 
first Intifada at the end of 1987, from 1970-1993, the per capita GDP, GNP, labour 
abroad and imports tended to increase over the years. During that period, GNP was 
positively correlated with labour abroad (0.95), imports (0.77) and exports (0.46) but 
there was (insignificant) negative correlation with FTR+NCT (-0.29). During that 
period, the percentage change in imports was significantly negatively correlated with 
FTR+NCT (-0.41 with F=4.5 and p=0.047). This result most likely indicates that during 
that period, foreign aid was directed more to the non-tradable sectors that require less 
foreign currency. The positive correlation between foreign aid and the level of the non-
tradable sector is a well-known symptom of Dutch Disease. The second period of 1994-
2007 following the Oslo agreement was much more volatile, mainly due to the second 
Intifada. During that period, the per capita GNP was positively correlated with labour 
abroad (0.94), exports (0.94) and imports (0.73).  
 
During the second period, FTR+NCT was positively correlated with imports (0.58). 
The percentage change in FTR+NCT was also positively correlated with imports 
(0.71). However, even under the situation in which the per capita FTR+NCT is 
positively correlated with per capita imports and imports are positively correlated with 
GNP, there is no correlation between GNP and FTR+NCT. This result is most likely 
an indication of a negative impact of imports and foreign aid on local production. 
Economic growth stopped after the first Intifada. The income from labour in Israel was 
USD 554 per capita in 1987, decreasing to a per annum average of USD 187 per capita 
in 1994 and increasing to USD 240 per capita in the year 2000. This figure decreased 
dramatically following the second Intifada to an average of only USD 107 per capita 
over the period 2001 to 2007. Based on the previous results and analysis, my hypothesis 
is that foreign aid in the second period just replaced the income from work in Israel, 
and due to other symptoms of Dutch disease, foreign aid did not increase GDP. 
 
This discussion leads me to summarise the main claim of this thesis as follows. The 
economic developments of the tradable sectors of the economy are seriously impaired  
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by the exogenous constraints on exports as well as by the sources of foreign cash due 
to the high dependence on work in Israel up to the first Intifada and later the dependence 
on external aid and donations. During the first years after the occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza by Israel, the economy of the West Bank and Gaza developed quite 
rapidly. This development mainly occurred in the first ten years from 1968 to 1978. 
During this period, the annual growth rate in GDP was 7.4% per year. In the 8 years 
from 1978 to 1986, the annual growth rate of per capita GDP was almost zero. In this 
thesis, I claim that the rapid growth in the 1970s is due to the sudden positive impact 
of the connection with the strong economy of Israel, while the stagnation of the 1980s 
reflects the impact of constraints on exports as well as the fact that agricultural and 
industrial workers were employed in Israel and not in the West Bank and Gaza. This 
thesis will theoretically and empirically examine the above hypothesised sources of 
infection as well as possible cures once the flood of foreign aid is drained and the export 
constraints are removed. If the main claim is correct, it is expected that opening the 
Palestinian economy to free international trade is an essential step to generating growth. 
Without this opening, this thesis also claims that the massive amount of foreign aid can 
at best alleviate poverty but will remain ineffective in generating economic growth. In 
contrast, the massive amount of foreign aid may even contribute to decreasing growth. 
The ineffectiveness of foreign aid and donations is not unexpected, given the 
experience of other small developing countries. This ineffectiveness is especially true 
under political turmoil, which can breed corruption and decrease the effectiveness of 
foreign aid and short and long term capital investment26. The Palestinians are struggling 
for political independence and are also striving for economic independence, especially 
from Israel.  International trade is a requirement for growth in today’s global economy, 
especially for small countries with limited resources. Thus, it is critical that Palestinians 
do not try to develop an "independent autocratic economy" when granted an 
independent state. The thesis also claims that the economy of a small country, such as 
Palestine, cannot grow without free labour and trade relationships with the rest of the 
world, and especially with neighbouring Israel. The existing political restrictions on 
trade in and out of Palestine and restrictions on labour and natural resources curtail the 
                                                 
26 As noted before, there are allegations that donations finance part of the cost of terrorist activities.  
Formally, terror activities (others refer to these activities as part of a freedom struggle) do not generate 
GDP. However, terror money increases consumption, and part of this consumption increases local 
production, which then increases GDP. On the other hand, terrorism increases the economic constraints 
imposed by Israel, so that periods of high terrorist activity lead to lower GDP per capita (see Saleh 
2004).  
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positive potential impact of foreign direct investment and foreign aid on growth and 
socio-economic development. The long road towards peace or at least rational co-
existence with Israel must be travelled to enable the Palestinian economy to achieve a 
high rate of economic growth. My hypothesis is that the negative impact of the long-
term dependence on donations and foreign aid on the tradable sector will decrease the 
effectiveness of foreign aid, even in the years following any potential future peace 
accord. Therefore, a great deal of time and effort will be needed to propel the 
Palestinian economy away from its low current socio-economic status.  
 
1.5 Methodologies 
First, I directly express the relationship between the exogenous foreign currency 
constraints and GDP and GNP.  
In any economy, the GNP can be written as a function of the following parameters27: 
 






EX - Export of goods and services 
FTR- Financial transfers to the private and government sectors 
NCT- Net capital and financial accounts  
W- Salaries of residents from abroad and net income from abroad  
Y- Gross national product (GNP) 
 - Proportion of imports out of Total uses 
 
In a fully open and free market economy, Ex, W and  are endogenous parameters that 
are determined in equilibrium. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza, only β, the ratio 
of imports to total use (β), can be changed endogenously, but this occurs under highly 
restrictive assumptions as Ex, W and FTR+NCT are exogenous parameters in the case 
of the West Bank and Gaza according to my claim. If the export of merchandise or 
compensation for labour is restricted and foreign debt financing is limited because of 
the various risk factors in the region, then additional foreign currency from foreign aid 
is the only foreign currency available for additional imports. In addition, the restrictions 
                                                 
27 The development of this equation is presented in Chapter 4 and also in Kroll and Shoukair (2012). 
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on the export of merchandise and labour increase unemployment of labour and capital 
in the West Bank and Gaza.  
 
The remaining hypotheses are supported both by descriptive statistics of the temporal 
trends of the composition of economic sectors, exports, imports, unemployment and 
investment as well as by the causality analysis of multi-period and multivariate analysis 
that examines the impact of the main relevant macroeconomic factors affecting GDP 
and per capita GDP. 
 
Generating the time-series of the main macroeconomic data from 1968 to 2007 was not 
an easy task for the following main reasons. First, at the time of the first Intifada, the 
employees of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) had difficulties collecting 
field data, so unreliable figures had to be smoothed and data had to be incorporated 
from alternative sources28. Second, in 1994 the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(PCBS) replaced the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS). This replacement 
involved various political changes in the definitions of the Palestinian population and 
GDP. To overcome this difficulty, I divided the regression analysis into two periods, 
the first for the years 1968 to 1993 and the second from 1994 to 2007. Third, there is 
no national local currency for the West Bank and Gaza, and the actual currencies in use 
are the Israeli Shekel, the Jordanian Dinar and the Egyptian Lira. Thus, it is problematic 
to form a time series of data in real prices in terms of USD. Calculations for this were 
based on the Israeli Shekel. Fourth, the separation between Gaza and the West Bank in 
2007 when Hamas took control of Gaza made it difficult to obtain reliable data from 
Gaza, thus restricting the main regression analysis to this time.   
 
The data used to support these hypotheses are presented in Tables 5.1 to 5.10 of Chapter 
5. The time series regression is related to annual changes, rather than to absolute values, 
to decrease interdependence over time. The main regressions used import and export 
values estimated by exogenous regression models, rather than by the actual values of 
exports and imports, to overcome simultaneity biases. Additionally, in an effort to 
deduce causality from the regressions, the Granger's lag regression procedures for 
foreign aid was applied. 
 
                                                 
28 Mainly from Arnon, Luski, Spivak and Weinblatt (1997). 
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1.6 Conclusion of Chapter 1 and the Structure of the Thesis 
This introductory chapter established the academic and empirical motivation for the 
dissertation. It provides the important political and economical background of the very 
unique case of West Bank and Gaza. Given the empirical facts and previous literature, 
the chapter identifies the main questions and hypothesis and the methodology that will 
be used to test that hypothesis. The structure of thesis proceeds as outlined below. 
  
Chapter 2 presents a detailed description of Palestine’s complex political and economic 
history from the end of World War I to the present day. While many developing 
economies experience political and economic turmoil, the chronic uncertainty thrust 
upon the Palestinian economy by frequent regime changes render it unique in this 
regard. Thus, a rudimentary appreciation of history is necessary for the analysis of the 
current structure of the Palestinian economy.   
 
Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on development economics, 
focusing, inter alia, on the role of foreign aid in economic development and the 
diagnosis of “Dutch Disease” in developing economies.  
 
Chapter 4 sets out the specific theoretical definition of GNP in terms of exogenous 
factors and analyses the theoretical welfare implications of moving from one economic 
sector to another.29  
 
Chapter 5 describes the process of data compilation and the adjustments made to 
compensate for gaps and inconsistencies in the data.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the results of the econometric modelling, and also analyses the 
empirical findings and the contributions of this work to the existing literature. Policy 
recommendations are presented as well as final thoughts on the limitations of the model 
and possible future extensions of this research. 
 
Chapter  3 highlights the impact of political violence on Palestinian and Israeli financial 
markets. This chapter introduces a separate study conducted in conjunction with 
                                                 
29 The modeling was conducted in collaboration with Professor Yoram Kroll; my contribution to all 
facets of the research exceeded fifty percent. 
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Shmuel Hauser, Rafi Eldor and Yoram Kroll on the impact of terrorism on the Israeli 
and Palestinian stock exchanges30. The impact of the military clashes between Israel 
and the Palestinians as well as the physical and economic constraints imposed by Israel 
may partially explain the inability of the Palestinian economy to grow at a rate that fits 




                                                 
30 This chapter draws on the terror index developed by Hauser, Eldor and Kroll while the work presented 
in the thesis is my own. 
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Chapter 2 - A Detailed Discussion of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The Israel-Palestinian conflict involves many aspects, such as political, economic, 
geographic, cultural, ethnic, religious, social, moral, humanitarian, psychological and 
demographic. In this chapter I will begin the review from the 1917 Balfour Declaration 
of a home for the Jewish people. Appendix 2.1 provides cogent facts on this period. 
My review will focus on two aspects only: the political aspect and the economic aspect. 
As I will emphasize and claim later in the study, my contention is that politically 
complicated historical situations and events had a strong negative impact on the 
economy of the West Bank and Gaza. The type of solution to the conflict and its 
practical implementation are extremely important and relevant for the economic growth 
of the Palestinian economy. As Israel is the only neighbouring country that has a very 
strong and well developed economy, opening of the borders of the West Bank and Gaza 
to Israel and Jordan and allowing Palestinian sea and air ports or, alternatively, free use 
of the Israeli and Jordanian ports is vital for efficient export and import of merchandise 
by air and sea. Whether negative economic costs of military clashes are incurred also 
depends on the political solution.  
 
The historical review is separated into two subsections of political and economic 
history. In the economic history subsection I will assert the relevant connections 
between the political and economic aspects. 
 
This review draws heavily on Barguty (1988), Alsiudan (2004), Albargute and Totah 
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2.2 The Political History  
The current conflict between Israel and Palestine is a reflection of the inability to find 
a peaceful formula for co-existence accommodating the national aspirations of both the 
Jewish and Arab populations inhabiting modern-day Israel and Palestine. The roots of 
this conflict can be traced to antiquity, but the seeds of the recent conflict are found in 
the 1917 Balfour Declaration. This chapter outlines the history of the region in the 
Twentieth Century and the new Millennium, providing background for the discussion 
of the impact of the Al Aqsa Intifada on the current state of the Palestinian economy.  
 
For centuries Palestine has experienced a turbulent history of successive occupations. 
The most recent period of turbulence began early in the last century with the Balfour 
Declaration of November 1917, which formally recognized organized Jewish 
settlement in Palestine. The Declaration, a letter from Britain’s then foreign minister 
articulated Britain’s policy in favour of the establishment of a national home for Jews 
in Palestine while maintaining the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish residents. 
The exact wording of declaration is: 
"His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country". 
Source: http://zionism-israel.com/Balfour_Declaration_1917.htm 
 
Britain introduced and implemented military rule in Palestine until 1920. The British 
Mandate was subsequently ratified and approved by the League of Nations in 1922. 
The Mandate document empowered Britain to implement the Balfour Declaration and 
prepare the foundations for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine 
(Barguty 1988, p. 35).  
 
Palestinian Arabs opposed the Mandate document and the Balfour Declaration, 
particularly on the grounds that these documents referred to them as non-Jewish sects 
with civil and religious rights that had to be protected. The perceived 
disenfranchisement of Arab residents (92% of the population in the designated area) 
subsequently led to violent clashes. They found a contradiction between the Mandate 
document and Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter, which stipulates that the 
type of government and administration should reflect the wishes of the inhabitants 
(Barguty 1988, p. 281). Although the vast majority at the time, Arab Palestinians were 
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not consulted regarding their national aspirations, nor were they given a role in 
governing the country. Under these circumstances and in an atmosphere charged with 
anger, violence broke out in Jerusalem in 1920, and quickly spread to other cities, 
especially the city of Jaffa. In May 1921 intense fighting between Arabs and Jews took 
a heavy toll on both sides (Alsiudan 2004, p.232). 
 
In light of these events and in an attempt to appease the Arab community, the 
Mandatory government issued the First White Paper in 1922. This decree stipulated 
that it was not the intent of the Balfour Declaration to transform all of Palestine into a 
national home for the Jews nor was it to impose Jewish citizenship on all Palestinian 
residents. The Paper stated that Jewish immigration would be limited by the territory’s 
resources and economic capacity31.  
 
Jewish immigration continued throughout the 1920s at a pace that worried leaders of 
the Arab community. In addition, the Mandatory government maintained full control 
of all economic, social, health and educational services. While it enlisted the 
involvement of the Jewish Agency in this, it denied a similar role to Arab organizations 
(Barguty 1988, p.283).  
 
Violence erupted again in 1929, resulting in hundreds of Jewish and Arab casualties 
and leading to the establishment of the Shaw Committee to investigate these events. 
The Committee recommended that the government further clarify the rights of non-
Jews, place greater supervision and limitations on Jewish immigration and refrain from 
transferring ownership or selling land to the Jews (Barguty 1988, p.283). 
  
The Second White Paper (also known as the Passfield White Paper) was issued in 
October 1930. This statement of policy reiterated principles articulated in the previous 
1922 White Paper. It refused to adopt the constitutional format demanded by the Arabs, 
citing conflicts with Mandatory government obligations. At the same time, however, 
the 1930 White Paper acknowledged that the time had come to grant the Arab 
community some kind of autonomy. The paper also called for a cessation of Jewish 
immigration due to the shortage of land. Following the protest of Jewish leaders and 
                                                 
31 Source: text of the Churchill White Paper, 1922 at UNISPAL, 
 http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/F2CA0EE62B5680ED852570C000591BEB 
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subsequent negotiations between the Jewish Agency and the British government, in 
1931 British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, sent a letter to Dr. Haim Weizmann 
stating that the British government did not oppose the additional Jewish land 
acquisition and that it did not prohibit Jewish immigration. This enraged the Arab 
inhabitants who considered it a retreat from principles articulated in the Passfield White 
Paper. British ambiguity and seeming duplicity contributed significantly to the violent 
events in the decades that followed (Barguty 1988, p.286). 
 
During the period 1931 to 1935, Palestine underwent important economic changes 
reflected in the establishment of key corporate entities by Jewish investors and the 
undertaking of major infrastructure projects such as a seaport in Haifa, an oil pipeline 
to Iraq, potash mining at the Dead Sea and the establishment of the Palestine Electric 
Company. A financial sector also developed during this period. The number of banks 
serving the Jewish community grew and German restrictions on the export of Jewish 
capital led to the public sale of securities of Jewish enterprises and institutions in 
Palestine. The “Exchange Bureau for Securities” the predecessor of the Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange, was established in 1935 to enable trading in these securities32 . 
 
During this period, Jewish immigration accelerated in wake of the ascent of Nazism in 
Germany. It is estimated that by the end of 1935, 30,000 German Jewish immigrants 
settled in Palestine. The number of Jews in Palestine soared from 28,000 in 1927 to 
83,000 in 1936. This increase in immigration was accompanied by an influx of Jewish 
capital, which while improving the welfare of all Palestinian residents, accentuated the 
disparity between Arab and Jewish standards of living (Barguty 1988, p.291).  
 
The Arab community lacked the commercial and organized labour institutions 
established by the Jewish population. These factors contributed to a general strike 
declared by the Arab Executive Committee in 1933. Demonstrations spread to 
Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, Nablus and other areas, culminating in a six-month general 
strike in 1936. The strike revealed numerous grievances held by Palestinian Arabs, 
most of which were related directly or indirectly to the surge in Jewish immigration 
and Jewish land ownership. These included, inter alia, dissatisfaction over the eviction 
of Arab farmers from their villages and increasing Arab unemployment. In addition, 
                                                 
32 http://www.tase.co.il/heb/tradingandclearing/history/Pages/History.aspx 
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the Arab community felt that it was being held responsible for Arab insurgency in 
neighbouring states, such as Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. The Arab High Committee was 
formed, headed by Haj Amin Al Husseini. The Committee declared the continuation 
of the strike until the cessation of Jewish immigration. The strike, which included 
numerous violent clashes between Arabs, Jews and the British army, was called off 
after the intervention of Arab leaders. The rebellion continued, however, until 1939 
(Alsiudan 2004, p.244).   
 
When the strike ended, Britain instigated a royal commission headed by Lord Peel, 
which recommended the termination of the Mandate and the partition of most of 
Palestine into two states: Arab and Jewish33. The partition plan was rejected by both 
sides and eventually abandoned by Britain as unworkable (Barguty 1988, p.297).   
 
In 1939, with the imminent outbreak of World War II, Britain acted to resolve the 
conflict between the parties in order to enlist their assistance in the war against 
Germany. Britain’s new approach to governance in Palestine was summarized in the 
(McDonald) White Paper of 1939. Departing from the commitment under Balfour to a 
Jewish homeland, the White Paper called for the establishment of a single independent 
Palestinian state jointly ruled by Arabs and Jews within ten years. The policy outlined 
in the White Paper restricted Jewish immigration to 75,000 within the first five years 
and made future immigration contingent on Arab approval. It also limited the amount 
of land that could be sold to Jews. Jewish leadership around the world rejected the 1939 
White Paper, since it closed Palestine to immigration of Jewish refugees facing 
extermination in Europe. The Arab Higher Committee also objected to it, believing that 
it did not go far enough and fearing that it did not provide a real opportunity for 
meaningful Arab independence. In the 1940s Jewish underground organizations 
violently protested the limitations placed by the Mandatory government on Jewish land 
ownership and immigration. Underground activities included terrorist actions against 
British targets, which invited even greater controls on Jewish immigration34.  
 
                                                 
33 Other recommendations of the Peel Commission included: a) The ratification of a treaty with each of 
the two subject states in order to preserve the military interests of Britain on land, air and at sea and to 
protect ports, communication routes and oil pipelines; b) annual British assistance in the amount of ₤2 
million to the Arab and Jewish states; c) population exchanges; d) a ten-year period during which all 
problems between the two states were to be resolved through peaceful negotiations. 
 
34 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1939.asp 
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Criticism of the British Mandate grew both in Palestine and abroad, and at the end of 
1945, an Anglo-American committee of inquiry was formed to examine Jewish 
immigration and the future of Palestine, particularly in light of the needs of post-war 
European Jewish refugees. The committee submitted its report in April 1946, rejecting 
the principle of establishing either a sovereign Jewish or Arab state in Palestine. 
According to the report, while civil liberties for all communities were to be 
safeguarded, neither Jewish nor Arab domination would prevail in Palestine, which 
would continue to be a protectorate backed by international guarantees. The Committee 
recommended the immediate entry of 100,000 new Jewish immigrants (conditional on 
the disarmament of radical Jewish groups) and the abolition of legal restrictions on 
Jewish land acquisition35. Figure 2.1 displays the distribution between Jewish and Arab 












                                                 
75 http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/anglo.html 
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Figure 2.1 Arab / Jewish Population of Palestine (1914 - 1946)  
 
Sources: 
1914 - 1918 Justin McCarthy The Population of Palestine, 1990 
1922 and 1931 British Census (Census conducted by the British Mandate Government) 
1941 Esco Foundation Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies Vol. 1, p.46, 
Yale University Press, 1947 
1944 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Chapter IV: Population,  
April 20, 1946 
1946 United Nations General Assembly, A/364, "UNSCOP Report to the General 
Assembly," September 3, 1947 
 
In February 1947, Britain proposed to extend its mandate over Palestine for five more 
years, during which time preparations for an independent Palestinian state shared by 
Arabs and Jews were to take place. The proposal was rejected by both Jews and Arabs 
and the matter was referred to the newly-established United Nations.  
 
The Arabs refused to conduct discussions with the U.N. committee; leaving 
deliberations solely between Britain and Jews. The committee presented two proposals; 
firstly, a majority proposal recommending the partition of Palestine into two states; 
secondly, a minority proposal opting for the establishment of one federal state for Arabs 
and Jews. 
 
The majority proposal was submitted and adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on November 17th 1947. The partition plan was accepted by the majority of 
the Jewish community, including the Jewish Agency, but was strongly opposed by 
Palestinian Arabs and the Arab League. Violent clashes between the communities 
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The culmination of these violent clashes occurred on the 30th April 1948, when the 
chiefs of staff of the Arab armies decided to enter Palestine with their armies 
(Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi and Egyptian). The British Mandate ended two 
weeks later and the Jewish leadership declared the establishment of an independent 
Jewish state based on the U.N. partition plan. The Arab armies entered Palestine, but 
with one fifth of the troops originally pledged. Their armies advanced to take some 
positions and cities as well as a few Jewish settlements. The Israeli defence forces were 
able to retake these positions in relatively little time. In June 1948, the United Nations 
intervened and declared the first truce, sending its mediator Count Bernadotte to stop 
the hostilities. 
 
In September, Count Bernadotte proposed a new partition of Palestine. An Arab state, 
including the Negev desert, Ramla and Lod, would be annexed to Trans-Jordan, while 
a Jewish state would be established in the Galilee region. Jerusalem would be placed 
under international rule and refugees would be allowed to return or receive 
compensation for forfeited property. The proposal was rejected by both the Arab 
League and Israel as hostilities resumed.  
 
The Israeli army conquered the cities of Lod, Ramla, Shfaram, Saffourieh, Nazareth 
and the Carmel area. Count Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by Jewish 
extremists, however a second ceasefire and later permanent armistice was achieved by 
November 1948. The outcome of the war was that Israel seized 80% of the area of 
Mandatory Palestine (Barguty (1988), P.316). 
 
Approximately one million Palestinians became refugees, and they were relocated to 
camps in the various neighbouring countries. Approximately 150,000 Palestinians 
remained inside the new state of Israel. The West Bank (which included East Jerusalem, 
Bethlehem, Nablus and Jenin) was annexed by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The 
Gaza was administered by Egypt. The official number of refugees registered with the 
U.N. Relief and Welfare Agency (UNRWA) in 1948 reached 914,000, of which 
545,000 were located in the West Bank and Jordan36.  
                                                 
36 The United Nations Relief Agency (UNWRA) defines a Palestinian refugee as “a person that was 
living in Palestine for at least two years prior to the events of 1948, who lost his home and means of 
livelihood as a result of these events, and took refuge in any country where the agency provides relief 
(Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and the Gaza).” See UNRWA site: 
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2.2.1 The Six Day War (1967) 
In the years that followed the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine lost intensity, 
but was never resolved. Despite intermittent skirmishes and hostilities, including a 
coordinated Israeli-British-French military campaign against Egypt in 1956, the status 
quo attained and the "ceased fire agreement between Israel and its neighbouring 
countries (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt) at the end of 1948 persisted until June 
1967. Israel’s legitimacy was recognized by most nations, but was never recognized by 
either the Palestinians or the Arab states.  
 
On May 22, 1967, following a protracted period of escalating friction in the region, 
Egypt blockaded the Straits of Tiran for Israeli navigation. This act was seen by Israel 
as a justification to launch war against Egypt. Responding to an Egyptian request, the 
governments of Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon moved their armed 
forces in the direction of Israel in the weeks following closure of the Straits of Tiran. 
Israel mobilized its army reserves and launched a diplomatic campaign to lift the 
Egyptian blockade. On June 5, 1967, Israel surprised Egypt with a devastating strike 
on the Egyptian air force. In the six days that followed, the Israeli defence forces 
overran the Sinai Peninsula to the Suez Canal, took control of the entire West Bank of 
the Jordan River, and seized a large portion of the Golan Heights37.   
 
The Six Day War was a watershed event in the conflict over Palestine. The whole of 
Palestine came under Israeli control. Despite this, the Kingdom of Jordan continued to 
regard the West Bank as a part of the kingdom until the announcement by King Hussein 
in July 1988 relinquishing all claims on this territory.   
 
Israel’s own position towards the political status of the West Bank and Gaza has been 
ambivalent. Originally viewed by Israeli policy-makers at the time as strategic 
bargaining chips in imminent peace negotiations or as physical buffers for Israel’s 
security, prolonged occupation lent acceptance to claims by right-wing groups for 
Israeli sovereignty over the “Territories”. Jewish settlement in them was first tolerated 
and later encouraged by the Israeli government. As governments changed, so did the 
policy orientation towards the West Bank and Gaza. However, for all practical 
                                                 
http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/whois.html. As of 2005, the number of refugees was estimated at  4.3 
million, most of whom reside in the Palestinian Authority (1.7 million) and Jordan (1.8 million). 
 
37 http://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Lexicon/Pages/six_days.aspx 
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purposes, the distinction between right and left-leaning governments was one of degree 
rather than kind – i.e., whether the rationale for continued occupation was functional 
or ideological in nature. Left wing governments rarely took steps to disband or even 
regulate settlement in the West Bank and Gaza. For their part, right-wing governments 
never actually annexed the Territories38, despite their apparent ideological commitment 
to an Israel, whose borders are determined by the Bible rather than diplomacy. More 
often than not, the political debate over the West Bank and Gaza became hostage to 
domestic partisan concerns, leaving the universe of possible alternatives extremely 
narrow. 
 
Out of the ashes of Arab defeat, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.), arose, 
and transformed the politics of the region. An umbrella organization of Palestinian 
insurgent groups, the P.L.O. put a decidedly Palestinian face on what was considered, 
until that time, the Arab-Israeli conflict. In both the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli 
occupation met with armed resistance starting as early as August 1967. In September 
1970, Palestinian forces came close to seizing power in neighbouring Jordan, whose 
population was two-thirds Palestinian. The movement was put down and the P.L.O. 
was expelled from Jordan to Lebanon39. In 1974 the Arab League declared the P.L.O. 
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In 1975, the United Nations 
granted the P.L.O. observer status. In 1982, in the wake of the Israel-Lebanon War, the 
P.L.O. leadership was expelled to Tunisia, where it remained until the establishment of 





                                                 
38 Immediately following the Six Day War, East Jerusalem was incorporated into the Jerusalem 
Municipality in a unilateral measure by Israel to ‘unify’ Jerusalem. Arab residents were offered the 
opportunity to obtain Israeli citizenship. In 1980, the Knesset enacted the Basic Law, Jerusalem, capital 
of Israel. This law declares that the unity of greater (post-Six Day War) Jerusalem will not be violated, 
however falls short of explicitly annexing or claiming Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. The law’s 
status as a Basic Law means that its amendment or repeal is subject to special majority vote in the 
Knesset, a feature which may hinder the ability to partition the city in a negotiated settlement. U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 478, which was adopted shortly after the law’s passage, declares this law 
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2.2.2 The First Intifada (1987-1993) 
The first Intifada (1987-1993) was a popular uprising against Israeli military 
occupation, which began in the Jabalia refugee camp and spread to Gaza, the West 
Bank and East Jerusalem. No single individual or organization started the first Intifada, 
but the P.L.O. soon established itself the leading role, sponsoring provocateurs and 
enhancing its presence in the West Bank and Gaza41. 
    
The fundamentalist Islamic organizations, such as Hamas and Jihad were the P.L.O.'s 
major rivals in this, as were local leaders in some cities42.  
 
The Intifada’s contribution to the standing of the Palestinians and their political 
consolidation was substantial. The mobilization of the local population enabled 
Palestinians to better consolidate their identity as a nation with a right to self-
determination. Discussion in Israel to merge the West Bank with Jordan in a 
confederation came to an end. The Intifada succeeded in putting the Palestinian 
question back on the international agenda, not only in United Nations and Arab League 
committee rooms, but in Europe and the United States as well. European and U.S. 
support of Israel became seemingly less automatic as the perception of the Palestinian 
cause as a ‘national’ rather than ‘refugee’ problem took root. In 1988, P.L.O. leader, 
Yasser Arafat, declared the establishment of a Palestinian state at the Palestine National 
Council meeting in Algiers. Later that year, the P.L.O. condemned terrorism, accepted 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and recognized the State of Israel.  
These two important resolutions are presented below:             
"Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967  
The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the 
Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and 
the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in 
security. Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of 
the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of 
the Charter, 
1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the 
following principles: 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect and acknowledgment 
of the sovereignty territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area 
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and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats 
or acts of force; 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State 
in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
 3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the 
Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to 
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in 
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the 
efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. 
Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting." 
 
 
Resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 
The Security Council, 
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military 
activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this 
decision, in the positions they now occupy; 
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire the 
implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations shall start 
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and 
durable peace in the Middle East. 
Adopted at the 1747th meeting by 14 votes to none. 
http://www.un.org/depts/dpi/palestine/ch3.pdf 
 
These declarations enabled the opening of direct discussions between the United States 
and the P.L.O.  
 
The first Intifada coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War. A coalition of countries successfully convened to combat Iraq during the 1991 
Gulf War. These developments appeared to signal the dawn of a new era of 
international cooperation. As a diplomatic expression of what many policy-makers 
hoped to be a “new order”, the United States and Russia jointly convened the Madrid 
Conference in October 1991 to prepare a comprehensive framework to address the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. It was an attempt by the international community to initiate a 
peace process through negotiations involving Israel and the Arab countries, including 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians. Due to Israeli objections, the Palestinian 
team was initially a part of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation and consisted solely 
of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who were not manifestly associated with 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.)43.  
                                                 
43 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madrid_Conference_of_1991 
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The approach adopted at the Madrid conference combined the institution of multi-
lateral formula to address less contentious regional issues and promote confidence-
building with the initiation of direct bilateral talks between Israel and its neighbouring 
states. The formula for bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians was a two-
stage process. The first stage focused on negotiating interim self-government 
arrangements, while the second would address the permanent status issues. This 
formula was essentially followed in the Oslo Peace Accords. 
 
The Oslo Peace Accords were signed on 13 September, 1993. Israel acknowledged the 
existence of the P.L.O. and granted Palestinians limited civil autonomy in the West 
Bank and Gaza in return for peace and an end to Palestinian claims on Israeli territory. 
A provisional government Palestinian Authority was established and Israel allowed 
Chairman and President of the Palestine Liberation Organization Yasser Arafat to 
return to the region and preside over the Authority. The Israel-Jordan Peace Agreement 
followed a year later44. 
 
The Oslo Peace Accords were largely criticized by some Palestinians as one-sided 
accords that benefited only Israel, resulting in continued Israeli control of land, water, 
roads and other resources. It was criticized by Israel’s right wing as well. Critics on 
both sides claimed that the other side was acting in bad faith and that the agreements 
did not set the scope of Israeli withdrawal from the Territories. In 1994, Israel began 
the process of scheduled withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, ending twenty-seven years 
of occupation45.  
 
In 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, was assassinated by a Jewish extremist. 
In the months that followed, in anticipation of impending Israeli elections, Palestinian 
extremists opposing Oslo stepped up terrorist activities inside Israel. In the 1996 
elections, Israelis elected a right-wing coalition led by the Likud candidate, Benjamin 
Netanyahu, an opponent to Oslo, who reluctantly implemented Israel’s commitments, 
causing both sides to have to return to the table to renegotiate the agreement. Certain 
achievements, such as limitations on construction of Jewish settlements in the West 
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Bank that were secured under Rabin, were unravelled by Netanyahu, who accelerated 
the pace of new construction. 
 
Following the Oslo agreement, a second agreement (brokered by the Clinton 
administration) between Israel and the Palestinians was signed on October 23, 1998. It 
was intended to reinstate implementation of the Interim Agreement of September 25, 
1995, (“Oslo II”), that had stalled as a result of Palestinian protest over a controversial 
new Jewish neighbourhood planned in southeast Jerusalem, and as a result of a growing 
mistrust between the two sides. According to the Wye River Memorandum, Israel 
would relinquish control over thirteen percent of the land, of which ten percent would 
be turned over to Palestinian control and the rest would be turned into nature reserves. 
In return, Arafat agreed to take measures to prevent acts of terrorism against Israel, to 
apprehend individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror, to punish 
all persons involved in acts of violence and terror, to collect all illegal weapons held 
by Palestinian citizens and reduce the size of the police force from 36,000 to 30,000 
men. Arafat also agreed to reaffirm a previous letter, concerning the nullification of 
Palestinian National Charter provisions, which called for the destruction of Israel. 
According to the Wye Memorandum, permanent status negotiations would resume and 
accelerated to meet the May 4, 1999 target date set in the Oslo Accords46.  
 
The optimism generated at Wye was short-lived when Arafat announced intentions to 
unilaterally declare an independent Palestinian state. In response, the Israeli 
government resolved to halt Israeli implementation of the Wye Memorandum until 
Arafat retracted his statement and reaffirmed his commitment to halt violence and 
collect illegal weapons. 
 
Netanyahu’s government was defeated in 1999, replaced by a Labour Party government 
under the leadership of Ehud Barak. Another attempt was made to end the impasse in 
the peace process at Camp David during the final months of the Clinton 
administration. Barak agreed to hand over to the Palestinians most of the disputed 
territories and insisted that Arafat accept some general ground rules for negotiations 
before launching the next round of rigorous negotiations. Palestine would have 
sovereignty over ninety-one percent of the West Bank; Israel would annex nine percent 
                                                 
46 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_I_Accord 
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of the West Bank and, in exchange, Palestine would attain sovereignty over 
[unspecified] parts of pre-1967 Israel, roughly equivalent to one percent of the West 
Bank47. 
 
The Palestinian leadership refused to agree to the deal, the apparent deal-breaker being 
the insistence on the Palestinian demand for a "right of return" of Palestinian refugees 
to Israel.48 The summit thus ended without reaching any agreement. 
 
2.2.3 The Al Aqsa Intifada  
Two months after the failure at Camp David, right-wing opposition leader at the time 
and former Israeli military general, Ariel Sharon, undertook a highly controversial49 
visit to a holy Muslim site called "The Temple Mount" by the Israelis, and "Haram al 
Sharif" (Noble Sanctuary) by the Muslims. Sharon’s visit was condemned by the 
Palestinians as provocation, as reflected in the massive police escort accompanying 
him. The day following Sharon's visit, following Friday prayers, large riots broke out 
around the Old City of Jerusalem. The violence quickly escalated and spread 
throughout the West Bank and Gaza, leading to a virtually total breakdown of any co-
existence previously shared between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Israeli 
retaliation to continual daily Authority-sanctioned violence brought devastation to the 
Palestinian infrastructure. Permanent closure of the West Bank and Gaza left 
Palestinians isolated, finding it difficult (if not impossible) to travel to, from, between 
and often within the Palestinian Authority. 
In February 2001 Ariel Sharon was elected as Israel’s Prime Minister. In 2002 Israel 
began building a complex security barrier to block suicide bombers penetrating Israel 
from the West Bank. In the same year the United States, European Union, Russia, and 
United Nations (“the Quartet”) proposed a new peace initiative. The so-called “Road 
Map for Peace” called for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict50.  
                                                 
47 http://www.yaf.ps/ya/life_details.php?start=28 
48 It is widely believed that in addition to the Palestinian right of return issue, the offer did not include 
water resources for the Palestinians or shared sovereignty over Jerusalem. 
 
49 The visit was planned in advance and highly publicized. Palestinian protests and U.S. objections to 
the visit were voiced during the planning stage. Sharon was escorted to the site by more than 1000 riot 
police. See Jane Perlez, "US Envoy Recalls the Day Pandora's Box Wouldn't Shut," The New York Times, 




    
 48 
The United States demanded democratic reforms in the Palestinian Authority, as well 
as the appointment of a prime minister independent of Arafat. On 13 March 2003, 
Arafat appointed the moderate Mahmoud Abbass as Palestinian prime minister. 
Following the appointment of Abbas, the U.S. administration promoted the 
disbandment of militant organizations, the cessation of further Jewish settlement 
activity and the establishment of a peaceful, democratic Palestinian state. The first 
phase of the plan demanded that the Palestinian Authority suppress guerrilla and 
terrorist attacks and confiscate illegal weapons. Unable or unwilling to confront 
militant organizations and risk civil war, Abbas tried to reach a temporary cease-fire 
agreement with the militant factions and requested that they halt attacks on Israeli 
civilians. 
 
By the end of 2003, neither party had complied with the requirements of Phase I of the 
Road Map. The Palestinian Authority had not successfully contained Palestinian 
terrorism and Israel had neither withdrawn from Palestinian areas re-occupied since the 
outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada nor discontinued the expansion of settlements.   
 
On November 11, 2004 Yasser Arafat died after a prolonged illness. In 2005 Ariel 
Sharon unilaterally disengaged from the Gaza, disbanding Jewish settlements and 
withdrawing defence forces. In January 2006 the radical Islamic movement, Hamas, 
won a large majority in the new Palestinian parliament51. 
 
The arrival of Hamas (formerly known as the Islamic Resistance Movement) to the 
Palestinian Authority as a nearly equal partner, severely complicated Abbas's efforts to 
resume “Road Map” negotiations with Israel. Hamas, which emerged in 1987 during 
the first Palestinian uprising as an offshoot of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, favours 
the creation of a Palestinian nation on land that now includes Israel, rejecting the two-
state solution outlined in the Road Map52. 
 
The election results stunned U.S. and Israeli officials who had repeatedly stated that 
they would not work with a Palestinian Authority that included Hamas, an organization 
which both countries and the European Union classified as a terrorist organization. On 
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June 13, 2007, Hamas fighters claimed full control of Palestinian Authority security 
agencies in Gaza. Its leader rejected an emergency decree from Chairman Mahmoud 
Abbass dissolving the Hamas-led Palestinian unity government. After four days of 
intense fighting that left at least 70 Palestinians dead, Hamas fighters waved their green 
banners atop the headquarters of the Preventive Security Service in Gaza City and took 
numerous prisoners53. 
 
Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbass dissolved the Hamas-Fatah 
coalition government and declared a state of emergency. He also said he would replace 
Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh. In response, Hamas issued a statement suggesting it 
did not recognize Abbass's authority. Since then, Hamas has had almost full control 
over Gaza and, for the time being, it appears that there are two Palestinians: Gaza under 
the leadership of Hamas and the West Bank under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbass.  
 
The dichotomy between Gaza and the West Bank is starkly reflected in Israeli-
Palestinian relations. While on the West Bank, the P.L.O. worked to contain terrorism 
against Israel, in the Gaza, armed aggression was encouraged and routinely carried out. 
Gaza-based rocket attacks against towns in southern Israel intensified in scope (and 
range), becoming a daily occurrence under the Hamas regime. In June 2007, Israel 
instituted a blockade on the Gaza, severely restricting the movement of goods in or out 
of the area without the inspection of Israel. 
At the same time, the Israeli government, under Ehud Olmert 54  re-engaged with 
Palestinian Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas to breathe life into peace negotiations. In 
November 2007 an international conference convened by the United States in 
Annapolis and attended by Abbas and Olmert ended with a public statement of joint 
understanding to convene regular bilateral negotiations to bring about a two-state 
solution to the conflict55. Negotiations were held throughout 2008, with a stated goal 
of reaching a peace agreement by the end of the year that would pave the way for the 
establishment of a Palestinian state by 2011. Within the West Bank, the P.L.O. invested 
                                                 
53 http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/he/article/18607 
54 Ariel Sharon suffered a debilitating stroke in January and was replaced by his colleague, Ehud   
 Olmert. 
55 US, Israeli and Palestinian Governments, Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis 
Conference, November 27,2007.   
See http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071127.html 
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considerable resources in improving law enforcement, which gradually lead to a partial 
relaxation of Israeli restrictions on activity and movement in this part of the Palestinian 
Authority. In Gaza, the blockade initiated in June 2007 continued under varying 
degrees of severity, as Israel endeavoured to use it as leverage to compel the Hamas to 
control the rocket attacks against civilian targets in Israel and terrorist activities around 
crossing points. In December 2008, after the end of a six-month ceasefire between 
Hamas and Israel, Hamas escalated rocket attacks into Israel. In retaliation, Israel 
initiated a three-week military offensive on the Gaza under the name of “Operation 
Cast Lead”. This offensive demolished infrastructure throughout the Gaza and caused 
the death of 1300 Palestinians. While Israel continued to let humanitarian aid into the 
Gaza, it reinstated the economic blockade in full force. Temporary closures were also 
imposed on the West Bank during the offensive, but were subsequently lifted.  
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2.3 Economic History 
Palestine’s economic history is no less volatile and complex than its political history 
with a strong correlations between the political-military events and the economic 
difficulties and harshness of the civil population in the West Bank and Gaza. Often the 
victim of the latter, the Palestinian economy has not only been plagued by lack of 
stability, but lack of continuity as well. The relatively frequent changes in political 
regimes has forced the economy to reinvent itself several times and adjust to sudden 
demographic changes, shifts in major trading partners and changes in legal and physical 
infrastructure. Certain features, however, have remained constant throughout the many 
reversals of fortune. For a variety of reasons, industrial development has eluded the 
West Bank and Gaza. The economy has always been acutely dependent on imports and 
capital transfers have always played an important role in financing trade deficits. The 
development of financial intermediaries has been systematically discouraged by the 
various regimes governing the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, given the lack of 
political autonomy, Palestinians have never had control over fiscal and monetary 
policy, and as a result have been unable to either direct or shape the course of their 
economic future. 
 
2.3.1 Mandatory Palestine (1917-1948)56 
From an economic standpoint, the British Mandate was a transformative period for 
Palestine, fuelled in large part by vast demographic changes. Unfortunately, due to lack 
of scholarship on the subject at the time, data concerning the Palestinian economy 
during this period is sparse, particularly the initial years of the Mandate following 
World War I. As a British protectorate in 1917, Palestine lacked financial 
independence. The allocation of public funds focused on administration and security 
with no special attention to economic and social development. Approximately 60% of 
government expenditures went towards administration and security, and only 12% for 
public works and social affairs.  
 
For the most part, the local population was left to feed itself. In anticipation of 
achieving political independence, the Zionist Jewish community57 began the process of 
                                                 
56 This section is based on the analysis of Owen (1988). Unless otherwise indicated, all statistical data 
can be attributed to him. 
        
57 As opposed to the Jewish population living in Palestine prior to establishment of the Zionist movement 
(Ha Yishuv Hayashan). 
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nation-building prior to the attainment of statehood. Hence it erected quasi-public 
institutions and allocated some 40% of its funds for education, health and other services 
not provided by the Mandatory government. In contrast, the non-Jewish population 
suffered a significant decline in the level of basic services such as education (Owen 
1986, p.29). 
 
 In a very tangible sense, it is fair to speak of two rather than one Palestinian economy. 
While the Arab economy was based primarily on agriculture and commerce, the Jewish 
economy was more broad-based. Seeking to create a European lifestyle in Palestine to 
attract and consolidate Jewish immigration, the Jewish community erected urban 
centres and established capital-intensive industries. Given the social, demographic, 
organizational and political differences between the Jewish and Arab populations, 
economic integration in Mandatory Palestine was limited. Political ideologies and 
events exacerbated socio-economic segregation. 
 
Given the British commitment to the establishment of a Jewish homeland under the 
Balfour Declaration, the Mandatory administration cooperated in the economic 
development of the Jewish Yishuv (settlement) by licensing Jewish entrepreneurs to 
undertake projects, such as the construction of an electric power plant on the Jordan 
River and the establishment of the Potash Company to mine minerals in the Dead Sea.   
 
Between 1922 and 1946 the population of Palestine more than doubled, from 750 
thousand to 1.8 million people due to natural population growth and waves of Jewish 
emigration. The Arab population grew 80% to 1.2 million during this period, while the 
number of Jewish residents increased seven-fold, reaching 600,000. Most Jewish 
immigrants were young (aged 15-29) and brought with them skills and capital. 
Although there was a clear Arab majority throughout the Mandate period, Jewish 
manpower was roughly equal to that of Arabs. The literacy rate among young Jews was 
90%, while it did not exceed 25% among Arab youth. On average, the per capita 
income of the Jewish community was more than 2.5 times higher than that of the Arab 
community58. 
 
                                                 
58 Owen (1986, p.16). 
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Population growth and capital investment outpaced production, and although the rate 
of export growth exceeded the rate of import growth, Palestine was plagued with a 
growing trade deficit until the mid-1930s. This trade deficit, which exceeded an 
estimated cumulative ₤100 million by 1939, was covered primarily by Jewish 
remittances from abroad (Owen (1986), p.18). Throughout the Mandate period, the 
Palestinian population continued to be a predominantly agrarian. 
 
Table 2.1 Distribution of Population in Villages and Towns of Palestine 1922,  
                 1931, 1944  
 1922 1931 1944 
Total population 510,651 794,658 1,144,370 
Total Rural population 374,362 519,052 733,870 
Percentage of Rural population 73.31% 65.32% 64.13% 
Sources: My calculations are based on Kamen (1991) Table 1, p.16. His sources are based on: Data for 
1922 and 1931 are based on the censuses of population carried out by the government of Palestine. Data 
for 1944 are an estimate of the year-end population made in the Department of Statistics. For total 
population, 1922, Government of Palestine. Department of Statistics. Vital Statistic, p.3, less tribal 
population as reported in Gurevich, Statistical Abstract, p. 28: 1931, 1944: Vital Statistics, p.6. HM 
Forces are included in 1922, 1931, but not in 1944. For rural population, 1922: Vital Statistics. p.5, 
less tribal population as reported in Gurevich, Statistical Abstract. p. 18; 1931, 1944: Vital Statistics. 
p. 8. HM Forces included in 1922, 1931, but not in 1944. For proportion urban, 1922: Vaal Statistics. 
pp. 3-4, less tribal population as reported in Gurevich. Statisticas Abstract, p. 18: 1931, 1944: Vaal 
Statistics, pp. 6-7.  
 
Table 2.1 indicates that up to 1944, the majority of the population of Palestine lived in 
rural areas although agriculture provided little income as most arable land was used for 
grain, which depended on rainfall, with a few tracts of land assigned for fruits and 
vegetables. The sectorial value of the agricultural product was extremely low59. In the 
wake of shrinking citrus markets in neighbouring countries, Palestine’s first citrus 
exports to Europe were launched during the inter-war period.  
Industry developed substantially during this period, primarily in the Jewish community. 
Arab manufacturing was limited primarily to labour-intensive industries, such as food 
and leather and Arab enterprises remained small-scale. In contrast, Jewish 
manufacturing branched out to more capital-intensive industries, such as chemicals, 
                                                 
59 According to Table 2.2 sectorial distribution of output of the Arabs in Palestine was only 25% 
agriculture, 13% industry and 60% services (compared to 9.5%, 22% and 59.9% respectively among the 
Jewish population).  
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electrical goods and metalwork. The sixteen large (100+ employees) factories 
operating at the time belonged to Jewish entrepreneurs and institutions. Industrial 
production in both sectors of the population aimed at import substitution and virtually 
all products were consumed locally. Given the accelerated population growth and the 
development of urban centres, construction and related industries grew substantially. 
The structure of economic activity in Mandatory Palestine is illustrated in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2 Sectorial Distribution of Output in the Arab and Jewish Economies  
                 1936 (in percent) 
Sector Agriculture Industry Construction Services Total 
Arabs 15 27 1 60 200 
Jews 7.5 11 8.6 57.7 200 
Source: Metzer, 1982, p.28. 
 
Despite the growing complexity of political developments, the advent of World War II 
did not adversely affect economic growth. The war years were years of economic 
prosperity for Arabs and Jews alike. Although stringent subsidies and price controls 
were imposed, the net macro-economic impact of the war was positive as Palestine 
became a base for British war operations. Aggregate demand was stimulated by 
growing British army purchases. The Mandatory government encouraged the 
expansion of Palestinian industry as a means to contribute to the war effort and provide 
consumer goods to a population suddenly deprived of European imports. Foreign trade 
rose from ₤20 million in 1939 to ₤50 million in 1944, and a sizeable deficit in the 
balance of trade accrued, covered this time by transfer payments from Britain and the 
Jewish Diaspora. Another important development during the war years was the massive 
migration of hundreds of Arab peasants from villages to cities to work for the 
government and the army.      
 
After World War II, consumption and investment were set free. Foreign manufactured 
goods began to return to Palestinian shores, doubling the volume of imports. At the 
same time, the post-war European recovery raised demand for Palestinian exports of 
citrus and diamonds, which accounted for 60 percent of total exports. Despite these 
positive developments, the Arab sector did not fare particularly well in the post-war 
environment. In 1947 drought struck rain-fed agriculture and olive groves, particularly 
in the south. Army employees were laid off by the government, but did not return to 
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work in their villages. Settling in coastal towns such as Haifa and Jaffa, they became 
the cadre of a skilled work force. This process of Arab urbanization and the socio-
economic changes it engendered was interrupted by the 1948 war and its aftermath. 
 
2.3.2 The West Bank under Jordanian Rule – Gaza under Egyptian Rule (1948-
1967) 
The establishment of Israel and the outcome of the 1948 war left Arab Palestine divided 
into two distinct geographic and political regions. During the years 1948-1967 the West 
Bank was under Jordanian jurisdiction, while the Gaza was under the control of Egypt.  
There was little, if any, interaction between the two territories, which were 
geographically separated by Israel. In addition, each operated under a different legal 
and administrative system. For this reason, I will discuss the West Bank and Gaza 
separately. 
 
The West Bank60 
The West Bank refers to the territory along the West Bank of the Jordan River, which 
was designated under the British Mandate as the border between Jordan and Palestine. 
In 1948 the entire population was Arab, primarily Muslims with a Christian minority.  
The establishment of the State of Israel led to a massive change in the West Bank. The 
region lost its access to the Mediterranean ports as well as to the major commercial 
centres of Haifa and Jaffa. 
 
The 1948 war caused the displacement of more than 276,000 Palestinians to refugee 
camps set up in the West Bank, increasing its population by approximately 60% during 
the years of 1948-1952. This resulted in extremely high levels of unemployment (50% 
by 1954), which made many seek their livelihood in other Arab countries, particularly 
Jordan and the Arab Gulf states.   
 
In the early 1950s, the West Bank was more highly developed and advanced than 
Jordan in almost every respect; however this was to change under Jordanian rule. In 
the years following the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan in 1950, several factors 
led to the economic development of the East Bank. First, many professionals left the 
                                                 
60
 The analysis of the West Bank economy during this period is based primarily on Mansour (1988). 
Unless otherwise indicated, all statistical data is drawn from this article.  
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West Bank in search of work elsewhere. In addition, as a result of the seperation from 
the ports of Haifa and Jaffa, new transport outlets had to be created. Jordanian 
investments in infrastructure were allocated primarily to the East Bank and Amman 
emerged as a key centre for trade and commerce (Cohen 1986, p.92).  
 
Despite Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, there was the on-going political tension 
between West Bank residents and the royal family. West Bank Palestinians questioned 
the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy and disagreed with the foreign policy stance 
adopted by King Hussein. This conflict created a situation in which, for all intents and 
purposes, two peoples inhabited one state. Palestinian attitudes toward the monarchy 
served to consolidate the king’s preference to invest in Jordan’s ‘loyal’ East Bank rather 
than the rebellious West Bank.  
 
The West Bank economy under Jordan remained largely underdeveloped. The first 
Jordanian census conducted in 1961 indicated that 40% of the workforce was employed 
in tourism and services, 37.6% in agriculture, 11.5% in industry and 10.4% in 
construction. 
 
As the development of the East Bank continued, its relative marginalization intensified. 
Outward migration, particularly of the younger and better educated male residents of 
the West Bank continued, rendering the area a rural outpost devoid of a viable industrial 
base or sources of income. Investment in the West Bank in the 1950s and 1960 was not 
directed at productive enterprises. Approximately two thirds of all investment in the 
West Bank focused on the construction of private housing, with the rest going to public 
infrastructure, transport and construction equipment. The economic survey conducted 
by Israel in 1967 indicated an overall retreat in productive sectors. Manufacturing’s 
share of GDP did not exceed 8.9% and the relative weight of agriculture also declined 
to 27%. The share of tourism and services grew to 56% 61.  
 
  
                                                 
61 Israel Economic Planning Authority, Economic Survey of the West Bank (1967, p. 7) as cited in 
Mansour (1988, p.73).   
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Trade 
The new geo-political reality imposed in wake of the 1948 war affected patterns of 
foreign trade. Table 2.3 provides a snapshot of the composition of trade to and from 
the West Bank towards the close of the period of Jordanian control. While most imports 
(predominantly industrial) came from abroad, almost 50% of West Bank exports 
(predominantly agricultural) were sold in Jordan. 
 
Table 2.3 West Bank Trade by Destination and Type, 1966 (in thousand  







% Total % 
Exports       
Agricultural 1,600 80 1,750 76.1 3,350 77.9 
Industrial 400 20 550 23.9 950 22.1 
Total 2,000 100 2,300 100 4,300 100 
Imports       
Agricultural 300 7 2000 10 2,300 9.5 
Industrial 4,000 93 18,000 90 22,000 90.5 
Total 4,300 100 20,000 100 24,300 100 
Trade Balance -2,300 - -17,700 - -20,000 - 
 
Source: Economic Planning Authority, Economic Survey 1967, pp.27-28. 
 
The West Bank’s trade deficit did not disappear with the end of the British Mandate 
and separation from the Jewish community. By the close of the period of Jordanian 
governance, the deficit exceeded 82% of the total value of trade.  
 
The trade deficit was covered partially by the export of tourism services, and 
supplemented by capital transfers provided by the Jordanian government, United 
Nations organizations and by remittances of West Bank residents working abroad. 
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The Gaza62 
The 1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt placed the Gaza under 
Egyptian jurisdiction, which ended abruptly in 1967 with the Six Day War. Unlike the 
West Bank, which was formally annexed to Jordan in 1950, the Gaza was never 
annexed to Egypt and its residents were never entitled to Egyptian citizenship. 
Throughout the entire 18-year period, Egypt treated the Gaza as a controlled territory 
and it was administered by a military governor. During the Sinai Campaign of 
November 1956, the Gaza was temporarily overtaken by Israeli troops. International 
pressure compelled Israel to relinquish control until 1967, when Israel re-occupied the 
Gaza. 
 
The southern district of Mandatory Palestine, which included the Gaza area and 
Beersheba, was one of the area’s poorest regions. Waves of refugees poured into Gaza 
in 1948, which tripled in population to 360,000. Since then, the Gaza has continued to 
be one of the most densely populated areas in the world. In contrast to the West Bank, 
outward migration from the Gaza was minimal, due to Egyptian restrictions on 
migration. Despite this, the Gaza work force was limited, since most refugees to Gaza 
were elderly. The labour force at that time comprised approximately 15% of the total 
population. A survey conducted in 1960 showed that 35% of the indigenous population, 
and 83% of refugees were unemployed63. 
 
Agriculture, fishing and trade services were the primary economic activities in the Gaza 
during the 1949-67 period. Administration also accounted for a large portion of Gaza’s 
GDP during these years.  
 
Capital investment in Gaza was negligible. As mentioned above, Egypt regarded the 
Gaza as a separate entity. While accepting jurisdiction and applying Egyptian law to 
the territory, it isolated Gaza from the Egyptian economy. Infrastructure development 
in the Gaza was not a priority and little was done to foster economic development.  
Despite this, development did ensue. Table 2.4 summarizes economic activity in 1945 
and 1966. The table indicates a growth in economic activity averaging 6.6% per annum, 
propelled primarily by agriculture, construction and government services. Economic 
                                                 
62 For a more extensive analysis, see Abu-Amr (1988). 
63 Khulusi (1967, pp.61-64).  
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growth, however, did not keep pace with population growth, which grew on average 
9% per annum. 
 
It is worth noting that industrial activity declined during these years. The industrial 
sector was comprised predominantly by “mom and pop” workshops producing goods 
for local consumption. 
 
Trade was important to the Gaza economy. Approximately fifty percent of all imports 
came from Egypt. During this period, since Gaza enjoyed a favourable customs 
treatment relative to Egypt, and it became a “re-export” centre for foreign luxury goods 
destined for Egypt. Citrus was the primary, and by 1966, almost sole export. The Gaza 
sustained a trade deficit throughout the entire Egyptian administration period, which 
was generally covered by remittances and Egyptian tourism. International aid, 
including investments in education from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, 
supplemented public funds. 
 
Table 2.4 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Gaza, 1945, 1966, in Million  
                 Egyptian Pounds (EP) and Percent 
   
  Sources: 1945 - Loftus, National Income of Palestine 1945, Jerusalem 1948, p.18. 












Agriculture including fishing 0.8 4.6 935% 8.6% 
Industry and manufacturing 0.7 0.6 -14% - 0.5% 
Construction and public works 0.2 0.8 700% 6.6% 
Total production of goods 1.7 6.0 253% 6.2% 
Transportation 0.4 0.4 0% 0.0% 
Trade, Finance 1.0 3.6 160% 6.7% 
Housing 0.2 1.2 500% 8.7% 
Government 0.5 3.3 560% 9.4% 
Total services 2.1 8.5 705% 6.9% 
Total 3.8 14.5 189% 6.6% 
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2.3.3 Six Day War - Oslo Agreement (1967-1993) 
Israel assumed control of both the West Bank and Gaza after its military victory over 
Egypt and Jordan in the Six Day War. As the result of the occupation, the West Bank                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
and Gaza were administered by Israel’s armed forces, although each area maintained 
the legal infrastructure inherited from the 1948-67 era. From an economic standpoint, 
Israel unilaterally imposed a customs union between itself and the occupied territories 
(Arnon 2007). No border crossings were erected and for at least the first twenty years 
of occupation, movement of people and non-agricultural goods continued fairly 
unfettered64. Israeli currency was accepted as legal tender throughout Israel and the 
Territories, although Jordanian currency was also commonly used in the West Bank. 
Palestinian imports and exports were handled through Israeli ports of entry and were 
subject to the same customs duties imposed on goods destined to Israel. Exports to 
Israel were not subject to Israeli customs and no levies were placed on imports from 
Israel. Recognizing the ex-territoriality of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli 
government did not levy income taxes on economic activity conducted in the 
Palestinian territories and was compelled to amend the Tax Ordinance to render income 
from economic activities undertaken by Jewish enterprises domiciled there taxable.  
 
Given the lack of autonomous public economic institutions, such as a finance ministry 
or central bank, the West Bank and Gaza did not have the capacity to formulate or 
implement an independent economic policy. Under the imposed economic integration, 
Israeli economic policy became Palestinian policy by default and it rarely reflected the 
economic needs of the Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza (Arnon 2007).  
 
Overall, Israeli interests, be they military, political or economic, superseded Palestinian 
economic interests and, despite the seemingly open access under the customs union, 
did little to promote the development of the productive capacity of the Palestinian 
economy. The seizure of land, encouragement of Palestinian emigration (and restrictive 
repatriation policy), the closure of Arab banks and prohibition on the development of 
a Palestinian financial sector, restrictions on water use and fishing, and other policies 
                                                 
64 Unless otherwise restricted by regulation imposed on all Israeli and foreign goods, such as Ministry 
of Health approval of pharmaceuticals, safety standards, etc. 
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conspired to inhibit agriculture and severely cripple any possibility for industrial 
development65.  
 
In practice, economic integration was less than perfect. The economic annexation of 
the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 increased aggregate demand for Israeli goods as well 
as the means of production available to Israeli enterprises. This generated a post-war 
surge of growth in Israel. Over time, the removal of barriers and improvement in 
infrastructure enabled Israelis to purchase Palestinian goods and vice versa. However, 
while physical and tariff barriers were dropped, restrictions, such as the prohibition of 
agricultural imports from the West Bank and Gaza rendered much of the integration 
one-sided. For various reasons, Israeli banks, which replaced closed Arab banks, 
operated only sparingly. Operations were limited primarily to taking deposits and 
servicing payments to Israeli trade partners, leaving the financial infrastructure for 
capital development lacking. Israeli-Palestinian joint ventures, while perfectly legal, 
were not encouraged. Ultimately, the model that emerged was one in which Arab labour 
from the West Bank and Gaza was imported into Israel. While this model improved the 
standard of living for Palestinians, it did little to promote the creation of a viable 
Palestinian economy.  
 
Israeli economic policy regarding the West Bank and Gaza was intimately tied to the 
question of political annexation vs. separation. More often than not, economic policy 
fell hostage to political considerations. Annexation of the West Bank and Gaza meant 
forming a single geographic and political unit, which would foster total integration of 
Palestinians into the Israeli economy. On the other hand, defining borders, even within 
an economic context, could lead to the establishment of two political entities between 
the Mediterranean and Jordan River. The opposition to economic separation arose out 
of the opposition to any Palestinian sovereignty, or at least out of a desire to facilitate 
a long-term occupation of the Territories that would buy Israel time until a peace 
settlement was reached66. For their part, the opponents of integration feared possible 
competition from Palestinian enterprises with access to more cost-effective means of 
production. Reserve General Shlomo Gazit, Israel’s first Coordinator of Activities in 
                                                 
65 See Mansour (1988) and Abu-Amr (1988). 
66 Those favoring economic integration argued that it would bring a higher standard of living to the 
Territories, which would serve to defuse Palestinian opposition to Israeli occupation. See Arnon (2007), 
p. 575. 
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the Territories, recounts that not only were Israeli entrepreneurship and Israeli-
Palestinian joint ventures discouraged, but that the desire to protect Israeli industries 
was so strong that attempts were made to prevent the establishment of Palestinian-
owned factories that could compete with Israeli products67. 
 
Since 1967, Israeli policy has consistently tried to avoid both scenarios. Its focus was 
directed towards preventing both the division of the land into two states and the creation 
of a single political and economic entity. Although Israeli leadership considered the 
Palestinian economy as complementary to the Israeli market, and did not invest in 
developing the West Bank and Gaza, access to the Israeli market created significant 
economic opportunities for the Palestinian economy. 
  
Palestinian Economic Development 
The Palestinian economy under Israeli occupation experienced accelerated growth, 
which came at the price of almost total dependency on Israel. This dependency emerged 
as a direct result of both Israeli policy and economic realities, which, when combined, 
made the export of labour unbearably easy and the development of productive 
Palestinian enterprises unbearably hard. 
 
Generally speaking, the history of Palestinian economic development during this 
period can be divided into three periods. During the 1970s integration with the Israeli 
economy fostered accelerated growth in the West Bank and Gaza to the extent they 
were included in the World Bank’s list of most rapidly growing economies68. With rare 
exception, double-digit growth in GDP graced the entire decade, exceeding by far the 
rate of population growth. The transfer of wages from workers employed in Israel and 
abroad (primarily the Persian Gulf states) grew steadily during the entire period69, 
resulting in even more impressive GNP growth for most years (see Table 2.5 below.) 
In the early 1980s, the performance of the Palestinian economy was uneven, advancing 
in some years and receding in others. Overall, GNP was flat for most of the 1980s. 
During this period, Israel was in the throes of a grave economic crisis, marred by 
                                                 
67 See Gazit (1995, pp.220-221). 
68 World Bank (1993), Volume 2.    
69 Mansour (1988) argues that actual remittances from abroad may exceed the amounts reported by the 
Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. In addition, sums that were deposited in Jordanian bank accounts are 
not reflected in Israeli statistics. 
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“hyper-stagflation”, i.e. triple-digit inflation coupled with negligible growth. With the 
outbreak of the Intifada in 1987, the Palestinian economy took a steep dive from which 
it did not recover until after the first Gulf War. The contraction of the Palestinian 
economy can be attributed primarily to Israel’s severance of economic ties, reflected, 
inter alia, in restrictions placed on the import of Palestinian labour. The expulsion of 
Palestinians employed in the Gulf States after the first Gulf War only exacerbated the 
economic challenges facing the Palestinian economy. 
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Table 2.5 Selected Macro-Economic Indicators for the West Bank and Gaza,  
                 1968-1993 (constant prices, million 2004 US dollars) 
 
 
Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS). Due to problems of data collection during the first 
Intifada period, parts of data from 1988-1994 are based on my estimates. Explanations of the basis for 
these adjustments are added in data problems in Chapter 5. 
 
*FTR- Financial transfers to the private and public sectors. CT- Net capital and financial transfers  
* Most of the sums indicated represent wages from work in Israel and may understate the actual value 
of wages from work abroad. The Israeli government tended not to recognize Palestinians working abroad 
as West Bank/Gaza residents and hence did not include their remittances in official reports. This also 
does not include sums reported by the Jordanian government as Palestinian remittances deposited 








































1968 938 538  5 543 308 127 182 176.3 
1969 951 603 12.1% 38 642 400 120 280 241.7 
1970 970 670 11.1% 82 752 421 125 296 213.8 
1971 990 763 13.9% 149 911 515 178 337 188.7 
1972 1011 892 16.9% 260 1152 687 213 474 213.7 
1973 1037 857 -3.9% 274 1131 748 206 542 268.0 
1974 1069 1046 22.1% 276 1322 820 249 571 295.1 
1975 1092 1058 1.1% 330 1388 939 313 626 295.4 
1976 1111 1219 15.2% 332 1551 984 360 623 291.5 
1977 1134 1207 -1.0% 338 1544 1080 371 709 371.1 
1978 1159 1362 12.8% 378 1740 1088 418 670 291.9 
1979 1167 1340 -1.6% 439 1780 1132 393 739 300.2 
1980 1172 1536 14.6% 406 1942 1121 427 694 287.9 
1981 1191 1440 -6.3% 448 1888 1242 493 750 301.9 
1982 1214 1564 8.6% 554 2118 1215 475 740 185.6 
1983 1246 1504 -3.8% 589 2093 1232 455 777 188.0 
1984 1285 1580 5.1% 530 2110 1176 422 754 224.7 
1985 1323 1570 -0.6% 485 2055 1195 408 787 301.6 
1986 1362 1873 19.3% 616 2489 1372 484 888 272.5 
1987 , 1st Intifada 1408 1824 -2.6% 780 2604 1511 464 1047 267.4 
1988 1459 1798 -1.4% 672 2470 1130 303 828 155.8 
1989 1505 1838 2.2% 673 2511 1050 257 793 120.8 
1990 1563 2187 19.0% 781 2968 979 286 693 -87.8 
1991 1641 2095 -4.2% 755 2850 1424 305 1119 364.2 
1992 1725 2595 23.9% 911 3506 1566 359 1206 295.5 
1993 1800 2870 10.6% 624 3494 1537 317 1220 596.4 
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The structure of economic activity shifted under Israeli control that started following 
June 6, 1967 "Six Days War". Services continued to be the dominant sector, accounting 
for approximately 50% of all activity, while agriculture retreated in favour of building 
and construction. The decline in agriculture is not only reflected in its weight relative 
to GDP, but in terms of the area of land under cultivation. Land seizures and Israeli 
restrictions on water use contributed to the contraction in agricultural activity, however 
may have not been the sole cause of the change. The pattern of agricultural production 
on the West Bank shifted as farmers diversified production, abandoning field crops in 
favour of non-citrus fruits. These developments were facilitated by the introduction of 
technological improvements, which increased production in absolute terms while 
reducing the resources required sustaining production. 
 
Table 2.6 Average Structure of Economic Activity in the West Bank and Gaza,     






Manufacturing Construction Public 
Services 
Other 
1968 33.9 6.7 3.4 18.4 37.6 
1969 36.0 7.4 5.5 17.0 34.1 
1970 32.6 8.3 6.3 17.7 35.1 
1971 34.0 8.5 6.6 16.4 34.5 
1972 35.0 7.7 8.9 14.8 33.6 
1973 32.2 7.8 11.4 15.8 32.8 
1974 39.7 8.3 12.6 15.0 24.4 
1975 28.8 8.7 15.7 15.2 31.6 
1976 33.1 7.9 15.4 13.1 30.5 
1977 29.3 8.3 15.8 13.7 32.9 
1978 33.2 8.4 15.8 13.5 29.1 
1979 28.1 8.3 19.1 13.1 31.4 
1980 32.9 7.3 15.8 13.0 31.0 
1981 29.1 6.8 17.9 16.1 30.1 
1982 26.1 7.0 18.6 15.9 32.4 
1983 23.7 7.1 18.5 18.1 32.6 
1984 18.4 7.7 17.5 20.5 35.9 
1985 19.7 8.0 16.9 17.3 38.1 
1986 29.4 8.4 15.2 11.5 35.5 
1987 18.8 13.5 22.2 19.8 25.7 
1988 20.0 11.0 23.0 22.0 24.0 
1989 18.0 11.0 22.0 22.0 27.0 
1990 18.0 12.0 19.0 23.0 28.0 
1991 18.0 13.0 18.0 22.0 29.0 
1992 16.0 12.0 21.0 21.0 30.0 
1993 14.0 12.0 22.0 20.0 32.0 
 
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts Judea Samaria and Gaza:             
1968-1993, Publication No 1012.  
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In Gaza, agriculture was not the only sector in relative decline. Cut off from Egypt, 
Gaza no longer served as either a commercial centre or a destination for Egyptian 
tourists. Services, which comprised some 66% of economic activity in 1968 declined 
to 46% by 198770. 
 
The relative decline in agriculture was accompanied by a comparable increase in 
construction. The same cannot necessarily be said for manufacturing. Until the mid-
1980s growth in the manufacturing sector more or less kept pace with GDP growth. As 
of 1987, however, there was a sharp increase in manufacturing’s share of the GDP, 
which persisted into the 1990s. Manufacturing, however, never contributed more than 
13% to GDP during this period.   
 
As mentioned above, industrial development was not encouraged as a matter of policy. 
As a matter of economic feasibility, the considerable risk, perpetual political 
uncertainty and lack of financial mechanisms for the extension of credit and sharing of 
risk hindered the creation and expansion of industrial production. In addition, under the 
customs union, Palestinian manufacturers were forced to compete with Israeli industry. 
Hence, despite the prosperity, tremendous growth in consumption and capital 
accumulation, and access to the Israeli market, a sustainable industrial base was not 
formed. This said, certain shifts did occur in the composition of Palestinian industrial 
activity. While food, beverages and tobacco continued to account for the majority of 
industrial output in the West Bank, rubber, chemical and plastic manufacturing 
increased, rising from 8.7% of the West Bank industrial output in 1968 to 17.8% in 
198471. In Gaza, subcontracting for Israeli textile manufacturers gave a boost to Gaza’s 
textile industry. By 1987, the manufacturing sector contributed approximately 14% to 
Gaza’s GDP, as opposed to 3% in 1968.  
 
Capital investment increased substantially under Israeli occupation. Gross capital 
formation rose steadily from 8.7% of GDP in 1968, averaging 30% from 1970 onwards. 
The private sector drove investment during this period, which concentrated primarily 
on construction and land development.  
 
                                                 
70 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (1996). 
71 Mansour (1988, pp.90-91). 
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More important than the sectorial shifts within the Palestinian economy, is the impact 
of the employment of Palestinian labour in Israel. As mentioned above, the model 
adopted by Israeli policy makers was one of limited integration, which facilitated the 
free movement of labour into Israel while restricting industrial investment. Wages from 
Palestinians employees increased exponentially, growing consistently from five 
million dollars to 780 million dollars on the eve of the first Intifada. Wages from work 
in Israel during this period came to approximately 30% of the GDP on average, peaking 
in 1987 at 43% of the GDP.  
 
The change in political and economic regime initiated in 1967 had a profound impact 
on the pattern of foreign trade. Israel overwhelmingly became the primary trading 
partner for imports and industrial exports. Despite the absence of diplomatic relations 
between Israel and Jordan, trade between the Palestinian territories and Jordan was 
allowed to continue and Jordan remained the primary recipient of Palestinian 
agricultural exports. The trade deficit persisted and grew almost seven-fold during this 
period. Although exports increased by 150%, imports quintupled. While this is directly 
attributable to growth in consumption and investment, the shift to more specialized 
agricultural and industrial activities in the West Bank contributed to increased demand 
for imports72. Wages from Israel went far towards covering the trade deficit. 
Throughout most of the period the value of wages covered more than 50% of the deficit. 
 
Economic activity in the West Bank and Gaza was supplemented by foreign aid, which 
in the pre-Oslo period was dispensed primarily by non-government organizations 
(NGOs). The Jordanian and other Arab governments, the P.L.O. and the Joint 
Jordanian-Palestinian Committee for the Steadfastness of the Palestinian People in 
Occupied Homeland were important sources of aid. International aid was provided by 
the American government, European NGOs and the UNDP. Most aid was earmarked 
for social programs rather than productive enterprises, although some was diverted by 
the Israeli authorities to infrastructure73. 
                                                 
72 Mansour (1988, p.92). 
73 Mansour (1988, p.84). 
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2.3.4 The Oslo Agreement Period (1994-2000) 
The first Intifada and the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War sparked the initiation of 
peace negotiations aimed at resolving the Middle East Conflict once and for all. In light 
of the new reality created by the Madrid Peace Conference, Israeli leaders were obliged 
to reassess economic policy towards the West Bank and Gaza74. Moshe Arens, then 
Israeli Defence Minister, appointed a committee to examine new approaches to 
economic development in the West Bank and Gaza. Chaired by economist Ezra Sadan, 
the committee recommended replacing the policy of importing Palestinian labour 
services with one based on encouraging entrepreneurship and production. This 
approach coincided with new post-cold war foreign aid thinking in the U.S., which 
emphasized the promotion of market-driven economic reforms as the key to economic 
development in developing and ‘transition’ (i.e. Eastern Europe and former Soviet 
Union countries) economies. The Sadan Committee’s recommendations were not 
implemented, obviated in large part by the Oslo Agreement two years later.  
 
In 1993, the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles (referred to also as the Oslo 
Accords) led to Israeli disengagement from the West Bank and Gaza (starting with 
Gaza and Jericho) and to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. The Authority 
took over civil administration of the West Bank and Gaza, including education, health 
and social welfare. With the establishment of the Palestinian Authority came the 
creation of Palestinian economic institutions empowered to set fiscal, monetary and 
development policies. Rather than imposed integration, the terms of economic relations 
with Israel under the new peace regime were to be negotiated. The 1994 Paris Protocol 
articulated the scope and character of economic relations between the Palestinian 
Authority and Israel. While Israel sought to continue a borderless customs union, 
Palestinians argued in favour of a free trade agreement, which would assure 
Palestinians an autonomous trade policy towards third-party nations while maintaining 
duty-free commerce within the free trade area of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza75. To 
compel Palestinian acceptance of the reaffirmation of a customs union, Israel 
threatened to condition the entrance of Palestinian workers to Israel on Palestinian 
                                                 
74 Arnon (2007). 
75 With the planned construction of Palestinian ports of entry, an airport and seaport in Gaza as well as 
border crossings with Jordan and Egypt, Palestinian dependence on Israeli trade infrastructure was to be 
discontinued. 
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acquiescence to the customs union model76. Hence, the customs union model continued 
with a commitment on both sides to “attempt to maintain the normality of movement 
of labour” between Israel and Palestine77. Palestinian foreign trade was conducted 
through Israeli ports of entry and collection of customs and value-added tax was 
administered by Israel on the Palestinian’s behalf. 
 
Palestinian governance over its economy presented the Palestinian Authority with 
numerous obstacles78, given the need to build not only programs and services, but the 
very infrastructure of government as well. In addition, since a significant part of the 
budget and virtually all public investment was funded by highly-specified donor 
contributions (see below), the Palestinian Authority was not entirely independent in its 
allocation of resources. Public revenues, which not only included foreign aid but taxes 
collected by Israel on the Authority’s behalf, were not entirely under the Authority’s 
control. Overall, however, optimism and a positive inward flow of funds sparked 
significant growth in the second half of the 1990s. Investment doubled in 1995-1999, 
with resources directed to productive enterprises outside the field of construction. The 
positive momentum continued until the eruption of the Al Aqsa Intifada in September 
2000.  
 
The process of Palestinian nation-building was underwritten in a coordinated effort 
orchestrated by the World Bank by “donor countries and institutions”, primarily the 
original members of the European Union79, the United States and to a lesser degree, 
Japan. The scheduled foreign assistance was designed to be comprehensive, financing 
humanitarian aid, social services, political and economic “capacity-building”, private 
sector development and physical infrastructure. Major infrastructure projects included 
an airport and seaport in Gaza, power stations, road and rail corridors, industrial parks 
and logistic facilities. A special fund, the Jorgen Holst Fund, was set up specifically to 
provide fiscal aid to the Palestinian Authority to assist the establishment of government 
institutions. During the five years between 1994 and 1998 donors committed some 
                                                 
76 See Arnon (2007, p.585), Elmousa and Mahmoud, (1995, pp. 14-32) and Arnon et al. (1997). 
77 Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. 
Representing the Palestinian People, (Paris Protocol), Article 7. 
 
78 See Bennett et al. (2003). 
79 The list of donors includes some 47 countries and international institutions, including Israel, Russia 
Arab States, the UNDP, and World Bank.  
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US$3.6 billion and disbursed US$2.5 billion80 to the Palestinian Authority, 
approximately 15% of the GDP during this period and accounting for virtually all 
public investment.81 By the eve of the Al Aqsa Intifada in 2000, cumulative donor 
commitments exceeded US$ 5.2 billion and disbursements came to more than US $ 3.5 
billion82.  
 
The Palestinian Authority Economy 
The first years following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority were 
characterised by accelerated growth. Table 2.7 indicates that the momentum created 
after the Second Gulf War continued in the post-Oslo era until the end of the decade. 
GDP continued to grow at an accelerated pace, dipping below 3% only in 1996, when 
frequent closures disrupted the flow of goods and people between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. Inspections and restrictions on the movement of people and 
goods were imposed not only at boundary check points but within the Palestinian 
Authority. Road barriers, curfew hours, and supervised unloading and re-loading of 
goods interrupted economic life and stunted growth. In 1996, as the Oslo Agreement 
began to unravel, it became increasingly difficult to legally employ Palestinians in 
Israel and many Palestinian workers were replaced by foreign workers. In dollar terms, 
wages from Israel after having peaked in 1992, initially retreated to 1980 levels, but 
made a comeback by the close of the decade. Relative to GDP, their weight declined 
substantially, from an average 30% until 1994 to 13-17% post Oslo.   
                                                 
80 See World Bank and U.N. Office of the Special Coordinator of the Occupied Territories (1999), p.44. 
81Secretariat of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee,(1999) pp. 27,.30. 
82 World Bank (2002a), p.60. 
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Table 2.7 Selected Macro-economic Indicators for the West Bank and Gaza,  
                 1994-2007 (Constant prices, million 2004 US dollars)1 
  
 
Sources: Table 5.2 which is based on the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.  
1 The transfer of the figures from current USD to 2004 constant prices and US Dollars is done by me. 
2My estimates for the mid- year figures (1994 to 1996) 
3FTR- Financial transfers to the private and public sectors. CT- Net capital and financial transfers  
4 Most of it represent wages from work in Israel and may understate the actual value of wages from 
work abroad. The Israeli government tended not to recognize Palestinians working abroad as West 
Bank/Gaza residents and hence did not include their remittances in official reports. This also does not 
include sums reported by the Jordanian government as Palestinian remittances deposited directly in 
Jordanian banks. 
  
Palestinian growth in the post-Oslo period can be attributed not only to business as 
usual with Israel, but to public sector demand created by the newly created government 
institutions. An analysis of Palestinian national accounts shows that expenditures 
exceeded GDP by more than 50% during these years (Table 2.9). Generally speaking, 
GDP covered private consumption, while investment and public consumption was 
covered by external sources. The structure of productive activity did not change 
radically in the six years since Oslo, although the 11% contribution of the newly-
established ‘public administration and defence’ sector brought the total service sector 







































1994 2111 3014 5.0% 395 3408 2289 442 1847 1452.3 
1995 2217 3195 6.0% 490 3685 2233 497 1735 1245.0 
1996 2327 3287 2.9% 436 3723 2439 553 1886 1450.2 
1997 2,462 3703 12.7% 517 4220 2639 587 2052 1535.2 
1998 2,547 4150 12.1% 722 4872 2964 724 2240 1518.4 
1999 2,633 4514 8.8% 774 5288 3631 732 2898 2124.3 
2000, 2nd 
Intifada 2,720 4120 -8.7% 652 4773 3399 746 2653 2000.6 
2001 2,801 3767 -8.6% 332 4098 2880 446 2434 2102.2 
2002 2,884 3265 -13.3% 248 3513 2848 408 2440 2191.6 
2003 2,970 3751 14.9% 262 4013 3108 459 2650 2387.6 
2004 3,058 4198 11.9% 232 4430 2909 484 2425 2193.4 
2005 3,155 4560 8.6% 337 4897 2801 598 2204 1866.3 
2006 3,255 4322 -5.2% 398 4720 2911 629 2282 1884.2 
2007 3,357 4536 5.0% 513 5048 2769 601 2168 1655.9 
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Agriculture and Construction in 1999 declined in comparison to 1994 figures, to 
approximately 10% and 14% respectively. The relative share of manufacturing, which 
according to Palestinian sources peaked in 1994 at 19.7%, declined significantly in the 
post-Oslo period to 12.6% in 199983. The trade deficit jumped precipitously, averaging 
60% of GDP over the period, reflecting the radical increase in demand for imported 
goods. 
 
Table 2.8 Economic Activity 1994-2000 in Percentage of GDP in West Bank and  
                Gaza 
 
Economic Activity 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Agriculture and fishing 13.2 13 14.7 11.6 11.6 10.4 9.8 
Mining, manufacturing, electricity and 
water 
22.1 20.5 16.8 15.3 14.8 14.6 13.2 
Mining and quarrying 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 
Manufacturing 19.7 18.4 14.9 13.3 12.8 12.6 11.4 
Electricity and water supply 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 
Construction 8.9 6.9 8.4 7.8 8.9 13.7 8.9 
Wholesale and retail trade 17.9 15.2 10.9 11.4 10.5 11 11.3 
Transport, storage and communications 3.4 3.2 3 3.9 4.6 5.1 5.4 
Financial intermediation 1.2 2 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.4 
Other services 23.7 21 20.1 20.6 20.3 19.5 21.8 
Real estate, renting and business 
services 
12.1 10.5 9.7 10.4 9.8 8.9 11.8 
Community, social and personal 
services 
0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Hotels and restaurants 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.8 
Education 5.6 5.1 5.4 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 
Health and social work 3.8 3.5 3.3 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.6 
Public administration and defence 9.4 11.4 12.6 11.9 10.9 11 12.6 
Households with employed persons 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Public owned employed persons 0 0 1 2.4 2.8 3.5 4.7 
Less: FISIM -0.7 -1.2 -2 -2.3 -2.5 -2.9 -3.8 
Plus: Customs duties 0 1.7 5.7 7.1 7.3 4.6 4.8 
Plus: VAT on imports, net 0.7 6.1 6.4 7.4 7.4 5.6 6.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Table 5.9 which is based on Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) annual reports. 
                                                 
83 Based on data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Methodological differences regarding 
data collection and classification between the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, which covered the 
period until 1993 and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, which covered the post-Oslo period, 
make a direct before-and-after comparison difficult. 
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Table 2.9 Palestinian Authority: National Accounts, 1994-2000 (percent of GDP) 
           
 
Sources: Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and staff estimates, Bennett, Nashashibi, Beidas, 
Reichold, and Toujas-Bernat (2003). 
 
Despite the positive developments colouring the post-Oslo period, political instability 
and economic uncertainty (aggravated by closures) erected significant barriers to 
private sector development. For its part, the public sector faced difficulties in building 
viable national institutions. The promise of the Paris Protocol for unfettered movement 
of goods and labour never fully materialized. In addition, as tensions between the sides 
grew, Israel began withholding taxes collected on the Palestinian Authority’s behalf as 
a sanction against alleged Palestinian infractions of the interim peace agreement. These 
taxes were an important source of revenue for the Palestinian Authority. With the 
exclusion of foreign aid, they constituted more than 60% of the Authority’s revenues. 
This added a financial dimension to the Palestinian Authority’s economic dependency 
on Israel.84 
 
The Wye River Memorandum concluded in 1998 did not specifically address the issue 
of closure and did not alter the existing customs union model of Israeli-Palestinian 
                                                 
84 Arnon (2007, p.588). 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Gross domestic expenditure 157.5 152.1 158.1 156.4 157.1 164.5 157.1 
Consumption 123.1 118.9 123.5 122.4 122.1 122.5 125.8 
Private 104.4 100.7 101.8 100.8 99.7 99.4 99.4 
Public 18.6 18.1 21.7 21.5 22.4 23.1 26.4 
Gross Fixed Investment 33.1 31.1 32.9 31.9 32.8 38.7 30.4 
Private 26.5 21.8 26.3 25.3 26.4 31.7 25.0 
Public 6.6 9.5 6.6 6.5 6.4 7.0 5.4 
Change in inventories 1.3 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.3 3.3 0.9 
Net exports of goods and services -57.5 -52.1 -58.1 -56.4 -57.1 -64.5 -57.1 
Import 75.8 71.1 78.3 75.5 78 84.2 76.6 
Export 18.2 19 20.2 19.1 20.8 19.7 19.5 
Gross domestic product 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Net factor income 14.5 17.3 15.8 16.2 21.2 20.8 18.7 
Gross national income 114.5 117.3 115.8 116.2 121.2 120.8 118.7 
Net current transfers 15.1 12.4 13.9 11.7 9.6 8.8 13.2 
Gross disposable income 129.7 129.6 129.6 128 130.8 129.6 131.9 
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economic cooperation. It did, however, declare the two sides’ intention to launch ‘a 
strategic economic dialogue’and reaffirmed their joint commitment to the completion 
of key infrastructure projects (including the Gaza Airport, Gaza Seaport, ‘safe passage’ 
between Gaza and the West Bank, and the Gaza Industrial Zone), which could 
consolidate the economic sovereignty of the Palestinian Authority85. 
 
In 1999, a committee headed by Professor Avi Ben Bassat, was established in Israel to 
prepare for economic negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. The Ben Bassat 
committee rejected continuation of the "customs union" model and recommended 
defining trade borders, believing that Israeli and Palestinian interests would motivate 
both sides to adopt the free trade agreement model. The committee’s recommendations 
were never implemented, although talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
did take place. The failure of Camp David talks, together with the outbreak of the Al 
Aqsa Intifada, exhausted all efforts towards any permanent arrangement.  
 
2.3.5 Al Aqsa Intifada - Hamas Takeover (2000-2007)   
The Al Aqsa Intifada erupted in September 2000. What started as seemingly random 
popular protests and sporadic spontaneous violence quickly deteriorated to 
premeditated centrally-directed armed actions. The Al Aqsa Intifada terminated a 
period of relative calm and even guarded cooperation between Israel and the 
Palestinians, placing the final nail in the coffin of the Oslo Accords. The damage to the 
Palestinian economy was devastating, as GDP plunged and infrastructure was 
decimated in Israeli retaliations to Palestinian violence.  
 
The Palestinian economy, which was enjoying accelerated growth in the years 
preceding the Intifada, came to a crashing halt as a result of the Al Aqsa Intifada. GDP 
contracted by 8.7% in 2000 additional 8.6% in 2001, and 13.3% in 2002. Successive 
closures led to de facto separation, which resulted in a dramatic across-the-board 
decrease in commerce, employment and investments. Growth achieved in the post-Oslo 
period was all but eradicated, as GDP retracted to 1995 levels.  
 
                                                 
85 See Section III, "Interim Committees and Economic Issues", Wye River Memorandum, October 23, 
1998. 
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Not surprisingly, exports also suffered. High transportation costs resulting from 
internal closures rendered Palestinian products less competitive. Foreign buyers looked 
for more reliable and secure alternatives to Palestinian products and manufacturers 
were forced to rely solely on domestic markets for demand.    
 
The effect on the labour market was not late to come, both directly, i.e. employment in 
Israel, and circuitously, employment in Gaza and the West Bank. Approximately 180 
thousand Palestinians (of these 100 thousand employed in Israel) lost their jobs in the 
second half of the year 2000. Wages from abroad plunged in 2001 declining to 40% of 
what they had been in 1999. There was a dramatic increase in unemployment, decline 
in the standard of living and sharp increase in poverty. It is estimated that by 2001 
unemployment reached levels of 24% in the West Bank and 35% in Gaza86. 
International aid skyrocketed. However, in contrast to the post-Oslo period, in which 
substantial assistance was earmarked for building public institutions and the economy, 
almost all aid was designated as emergency relief87. 
 
By 2003 recovery was underway, mainly due to the improvement in the security 
situation. As violence subsided, restrictions imposed on the Palestinians were gradually 
eased. However Palestinian jobs in Israel, particularly those of Gaza residents did not 
return.88 During the years 2004 and 2005 the Palestinian economy was well on the way 
to recovery, with GDP returning to pre-Intifada levels and exports steadily increasing. 
 
In January 2006 the Hamas Movement achieved success in the elections to the 
Palestinian Authority. This development led to the rise of the violence in Gaza, and 
hence to intensification of the closure policy. In addition, economic aid from Israel and 
other countries was discontinued.  
 
The consequence of these developments was a sharp decline in key Palestinian 
economic indicators. GDP contracted by 5.2% in 2006. Moreover, shifts in the 
composition of the economy indicate that the economy had become increasingly driven 
by government and private consumption and financed by foreign aid. The Palestinian 
                                                 
86 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 
87 Arnon (2007, p.593). 
88 Ibid, p.588. 
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civil service has become employer of last resort. Between the years 1999-2006 the 
public sector grew by 60%. Of the US$1.4 billion in donor country aid granted the 
Palestinian Authority during this period, more than half went to support the budget89. 
 
The Impact of Closure on the Palestinian Economy 
Israel’s closure policy has had a heavy impact on the Palestinian economy and the 
ability to develop its productive sectors. Figure 2.2 illustrates the direct inverse relation 
between the density of closure, employment and GDP growth. 
 
  
Figure 2.2 Closures and Macroeconomic Developments, 1994-2002 
 
Source: West Bank and Gaza: Economic Performance and Reform under Conflict Conditions, 
International Monetary Fund, 2003. 
 
In this thesis I contend that closure not only affects the current state of Palestinian 
economic affairs but has an adverse impact on the potential for future development. By 
caging in the productive sector, the perpetual closure imposed on the Palestinian 
economy deprives it of the capacity to convert foreign aid and even foreign direct 
investment into sustainable growth. In so doing, it creates the symptoms of Dutch 
Disease, i.e. the diversion of resources from productive tradable sectors 
                                                 
89 Data in this section drawn from World Bank, (2007).  
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(manufacturing, agriculture, service exports) to non-tradable sectors, such as 
administration and security services. Table 2.10 reflects the diminishing weight of the 
industrial and agricultural sector from 2000 to 2007 period when foreign aid was very 
high (A detailed analysis of this point will be provided in chapters 5 and 6). 
 
Table 2.10 Economic Activity 2000 to 2007 in % of GDP in West Bank and Gaza 
Economic Activity 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Agriculture and fishing 9.8 9.1 7.7 7.9 7.1 5.2 5.6 5.6 
Mining, manufacturing, electricity and 
water 
13.2 16.4 16.4 17 17.1 17 15 13.8 
Mining and quarrying 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Manufacturing 11.4 12.5 11.8 12.6 13.2 13 11.7 9.9 
Electricity and water supply 1.2 3.3 3.8 3.8 3.2 3.4 2.8 3.5 
Construction 8.9 5.5 3.9 5 5.7 6.8 7.2 6.2 
Wholesale and retail trade 11.3 9.6 11.9 9.8 9.8 9.4 9.6 9.2 
Transport, storage and communications 5.4 5.6 5.6 4.6 6.1 5.8 6.6 7.5 
Financial intermediation 4.4 3.6 4.2 4.1 3.6 4.4 4.3 5.2 
Other services 21.8 21.5 23.5 22.8 22.8 23 19.6 22.2 
Real estate, renting and business services 11.8 10.3 11 10.3 10.4 10.3 7 7.6 
Community, social and personal services 0.7 0.8 1 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.5 
Hotels and restaurants 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 
Education 5.9 7.1 8 7.6 7.8 8.2 7.9 9.6 
Health and social work 2.6 2.8 3.3 3.3 3 2.5 2.7 2.8 
Public administration and defence 12.6 17.6 16.7 16.9 14.3 14.1 15.7 13.9 
Households with employed persons 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 
Public owned employed persons 4.7 2.8 3.6 4.5 3.7 3.4 4.5 5.8 
Less: FISIM -3.8 -3.1 -3.1 -3 -2.8 -2.6 -3 -5.7 
Plus: Customs duties 4.8 4.5 2.7 4.4 4.8 5.9 6.7 6.3 
Plus: VAT on imports, net 6.7 6.7 6.7 5.8 7.7 7.6 8.1 9.9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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2.4 Conclusion of the Historical Review of the Palestinians- Israeli 
Conflict 
In this chapter I condensed the thousands of years of history in the region to a review 
of the main political events and decisions with its economic implications over the 
period of 1917 to 2007 (Appendix 2.1 provides cogent facts on this period). The 
economic question this thesis seeks to investigate is the impact of foreign aid on growth 
in the West Bank and Gaza under the harsh political relationships with Israel. Thus all 
the data and analysis up to 1967 is primarily background to the main analysis. Also 
under the sovereignty of Jordan before 1967, the Palestinians were deprived of their 
own national rights and were not able to develop their own economy as more able men 
emigrated to other countries and the economy of West Bank and Gaza remained 
underdeveloped. The review in this chapter provides a strong indication that under the 
existing political situation mainly with Israel there is a little chance that foreign aid will 
develop the Palestinian's economy. Later in the thesis I claim that since about 90% of 
the import is from Israel, foreign aid supports more the economy of Israel as the 
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Appendix 2.1  
Table A 2.1 Table of Historical Events in Palestine 
Year Event Outcome 
1917 Balfour Declaration Arab opposition. The beginning of the 
Arab/Jewish conflict. 
1918 Allied forces occupy Palestine Britain begins working on fulfilling the 
Balfour declaration. 
1919 First Palestinian National Congress. 
Peace conference decides to send 
international commission to Palestine (King-
Crane)  
“Third Wave” of Zionist immigration begins 
-Rejection of the Balfour Declaration. 
England and France decline participation.  
-King-Crane Commission advises 
abandoning idea of a Jewish commonwealth 
in Palestine.   
1920 Violent disturbances  
Treaty of Versailles, assigning mandate over 
Palestine to Britain implemented.  
- British civilian administration inaugurated; 
Sir Herbert Samuel appointed as First High 
Commissioner.  
1924 “Fourth wave” of Zionist immigration Jewish population increases to 16% of total 
population. 
1925 Palestinian general strike protesting visit of 
Lord Balfour to Jerusalem. 
 
1928-1930 Attempt of Jewish religious leaders to 
change "status quo" at the Wailing Wall. 
 
Palestinian riots expand to several towns 




-Islamic Conference in Jerusalem demanding 
protection of Muslim property rights at 
Wailing Wall followed by Palestinian riots. 
- British Shaw Commission sent to Palestine 
for inquiry of 1929 disturbances and 
recommends re-evaluation of British policy 
towards Jewish settlement of Palestine. 
- British Hope-Simpson Commission on 
settlement and immigration leads to issuance 
of Passfield White Paper stipulating 
measures to restrict Jewish immigration and 
land ownership/development. 
1933-1934 Arab Executive Committee calls for general 
strike against British pro-Zionist policies. 
- Disturbances break out in main towns. 
- Special commission of inquiry under Sir 
William  
 Morris visits Palestine in 1934. 
1935 Arms shipment to Zionist groups discovered 
in Jaffa Port. 
- Sheikh Izz –Aldin Al-Qassam, leader of 
Palestinian insurgent group killed in action 
against British security forces. 
 
1936 Leaders of political parties form the "Higher 
Arab Committee" under Haj Amin Al-
Hussseini. 
- Six-month Arab general strike and violent 
clashes 
- Conference of Palestinian National 
Committees calls for self-rule.  
- 1000 Arab, 80 Jewish and 37 British 
deaths. 
- Intervention of leaders from Arab world to 
end strike. 
- Great Arab Revolt begins (1936-1939). 
- More than 5,000 Arabs, 400 Jews, and 200 
Britons killed, at least 15,000 Arabs were 
wounded. 
– Consolidation of Arab Palestinian identity.  
- Disengagement of Jewish and Arab 
economies.  
1937 -Peel Royal Commission recommends 
partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab 
states. -Arab revolt intensifies. 
  
- Jewish and Arab leadership reject Peel 
partition proposal. 
-British dissolve Arab Higher Committee 
and other Palestinian political organizations 
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Table A 2.1 Table of Historical Events in Palestine - continue 
1938-1939 British Woodhead Commission declares 
impracticality of Peel Commission's 
partition plan 
 
Outbreak of WWII 
Irgun (a Jewish underground organization) 
calls for conquest of Palestine by force. 
- London conference convened, attended by 
Arab,   
Palestinian and Zionist representatives, ending  
without agreement. 
- White Paper proposing single Palestinian 
state   
under joint Jewish/Arab rule issued in attempt 
to resolve dispute and mobilize local wartime  
support for Britain. 
- Stern Gang (a Jewish underground 
organization) calls for alliance with Axis 
powers in war against British. 
1944 Land transfer law, forbidding the transfer 
of land ownership to Jews in most districts, 
issued. 
Jewish underground instigate protests and 
violent activities against British. 
1945 World War II ends. 
Anglo American Committee supports 
immediate mass Jewish immigration, while 
rejecting either Jewish or Arab sovereignty 
in Palestine. 
- Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, 
issues White Paper affirming continued Jewish 
immigration into Palestine. 
- Abolition of land ownership restrictions 
1947 After failure to secure support for extension 
of Mandate, Britain submits Palestine 
problem to UN. 
UN General Assembly adopts amended 
UNSCOP partition  
- UNSCOP Committee recommends partition 
of Palestine. 
- Jews accept partition plan.  
- Palestinian Arabs reject plan.  
1948-1950 British Mandate ends. 
Israel declares independence; Arab states 
declare war on Israel.  
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 
supports right of Palestinian refugees to 
reclaim their homes or alternatively receive 
compensation. 
- Israel gains control of 77% of Mandatory 
Palestine, including some areas designated for 
Arab state under partition plan;  
-Armistice gives Jordan and Egypt control 
over the West Bank and Gaza respectively.   
-Jerusalem divided between Israel and Jordan. 
- Israel rejects Resolution 194. 
- Jordan annexes West Bank and Jordan. 




Israel occupies West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and 
Golan Heights, expands Jerusalem boundaries 
and extends Israeli jurisdiction over East 
Jerusalem. 
- 500,000 Palestinians displaced. 
1970 War between Jordanian army and 
Palestinian (Black September) militia. 
 
P.L.O. expelled from Jordan and relocates to 
Lebanon. 
1974 Arab League declares P.L.O. the sole 
legitimate representative of Palestinian 
people. 
Arafat addresses United Nations, which grants 
P.L.O. observer status in 1975. 
1982 Israel-Lebanon War. P.LO. forced to leave Lebanon and relocate 
headquarters to Tunisia 
1987-1988 Outbreak of popular uprising (Intifada) in 




- Consolidation of Palestinian national identity 
- Renewal of U.N. discussion of Palestinian 
sovereignty. 
-Re-evaluation of policy and alternative 
solutions in U.S., Europe and Israel 
- Arafat proclaims establishment of Palestinian 
state, recognition of Israel’s right to exist  
- Jordan renounces claims to West Bank 
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Table A 2.1 Table of Historical Events in Palestine – continue 
1991 Madrid Conference -Foundations for Oslo Peace Accords. and 
mobilization of international aid for 
Palestinian self-government  
1993-1994 Oslo Peace Accords -Mutual recognition of Israel and P.L.O. 
- Israel withdraws from Gaza and Jericho 
- Establishment of Palestinian Authority as 
provisional government in anticipation of a 
Palestinian state under final status agreement 
-Arafat returns to Palestine and becomes first 
President of the Palestinian Authority 
-Paris Protocol stipulates terms of economic 
 cooperation between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority 
- World Bank coordinates international 
comprehensive economic assistance initiative 
1995-1997 Assassination of Israeli Prime Minister 
Rabin by Jewish assassin over Oslo. 
Escalation of Palestinian violence in Israel. 
Right wing government elected in Israel. 
- Permanent status negotiations, while 
formally opened, never get underway, stalling 
peace process Implementation of Israeli 
redeployment stalled 
- Disintegration of trust on both sides leads to 
discontinuation of peace process 
1998-1999 Wye River Memorandum–stipulates 
immediate. Resumption of permanent 
status talks revises Israeli military 
redeployment and reaffirms key 
Palestinian infrastructure projects. 
Left wing government elected in Israel 
Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum reaffirms 
commitments under Wye 
Israel fails to implement Wye agreement 
causing continued stalling of peace process. 
Permanent status negotiations reconvene.  
Redeployment and prisoner release 
commence. 
On-going negotiations on implementation of  
interim agreement re-established 
2000 - Camp David Summit convened in an 
attempt to accelerate completion of 
permanent status agreement 
 - The Second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada              
- The Palestinians reject the offer; Camp 
David ends without an agreement. 
- Breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian political 
cooperation on all levels 
- Devastation of Palestinian economy and 
recession in Israel. 
- Election of right-wing government in Israel   
2002-2003 “Quartet” endeavours to rekindle peace 
process towards a two-state solution under 
“Road Map” to peace. 
- Formal resumption of bilateral talks between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 
-Failure to fulfil stage I of the plan (cessation 
of violence and freeze on Jewish settlements 
in Territories) leads to failure of initiative 
2004-2005 Death of Yasser Arafat  
Mahmoud Abbas elected head of P.L.O.  
Israeli disengagement from the Gaza 
-Support for road map reiterated at Sharm el-
Sheikh Summit, but no tangible progress 
followed. 
- Israeli disengagement from the Gaza. 
2006 Hamas wins majority in Palestinian 
parliament. 
- Israel, U.S. and others boycott Hamas-led 
government. 
- Prospects for resumption of peace talks 
complicated 
2007 Hamas claims full control over Palestinian 
agencies in Gaza.  
Abbas dissolves Hamas-Fatah coalition. 
Civil strife between West Bank and Gaza 
ensues, leading to de-facto political separation. 
2008 Operation Cast Lead; Israeli military 
campaign in Gaza to stop Hamas rocket 
attacks on southern Israel. 
Hamas blames Israel for not lifting the Gaza 
blockade. 
14 Israelis and estimated 1,300 Palestinians  
killed.  
Cessation of peace talks 
 
Sources: Barguty (2788) , Alsiudan (2004), Albargute and Totah (2001) and Bellin (1999) 
http://www.palestine-studies.org , http://main.knesset.gov.il and Wikipedia 
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The main goal of this thesis is to examine the impact of foreign aid on the economic 
growth of an economy of a very poor and very small country that is under occupation. 
In particular whether symptoms of Dutch Disease can be identified. Extremely limited 
physical mobility exits with respect to both labour and merchandise outside the 
country, as well as within the country. The country is divided into two regions, that is, 
the West Bank on the east side and Gaza on the west, with Israel being situated between 
the two. This separation allows only minimal physical connection between the two 
regimes, each of which has its own governmental control90. In addition to the trading 
constraints, the country has significantly nascent governing institutions and 
underdeveloped financial sectors with virtually non-existent savings systems.  
 
The unique case of the West Bank and Gaza makes it is extremely difficult to find 
existing literature on these issues. In attempting to review the (paucity of) existing 
literature I have grouped the available literature into the following three sections so as 
to examine firstly models of economic development that may assist in defining that of 
the West Bank and Gaza; secondly to examine models of the possible impact of foreign 
aid on economic growth and thirdly studies of Dutch disease and its possible impact on 
growth. These three sections cover: 
 
I. Economic Development Models 
These basic models describe the process of growth in the absence of extraordinary 
restrictions, such as those placed on the movement of goods and labour between Israel 
and the West Bank and between Israel and Gaza. The models posit economic growth 
as a function of investments, savings, capital formation, efficiency91, the accumulation 
of know-how and technology transfer, the interactions with the world, the inequality of 
income and the structure of economic and political institutions. In this context, the most 
relevant literature to my thesis is the two-gap model of Chenery and Strout (1966), 
                                                 
90 Since 2007, the Hamas group has governed Gaza, while the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)    
governs the West Bank.  
 
91 Efficiency determines competitiveness. Today, most countries increase their efforts and efficiency to 
compete in imports and to increase exports, both of which are vital to growth. 
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which extends Harrod-Domar and Solow’s models. Chenery and Strout’s model 
investigates the case in which development is limited by not only the vicious cycle of 
poverty-low/saving-low investment/low growth but also the foreign currency gap in 
the balance of payment. The two-gap model of Chenery and Strout was later extended 
and analysed by Harms and Lutz (2004). 
 
II. Models Pertaining to the Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth 
The vast empirical literature on this subject reveals conflicting economic and political 
impacts of foreign aid, which are attributed to various factors. Several of these impacts 
are relevant to the case of the West Bank and Gaza. However, the case of the West 
Bank is significantly different from all other cases discussed in the literature. First, the 
level of foreign aid to the West Bank and Gaza is much higher than that of almost all 
other low income countries (see Figure 1.1 in chapter 1). Second, there is no other 
country that suffers from such extremely limiting constraints that are the result of a 
long lasting occupation. The most relevant literature to the case in the thesis is that of 
Djankov et al. and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), who claim that the effectiveness of 
aid depends on a variety of interacting factors.  
 
III. Dutch Disease and Empirical Findings 
The symptoms of Dutch disease as well as relevant historical cases will be discussed 
and an analogy between them and the West Bank and Gaza case will be formulated.  
Note that these analogies, at this time, will be incomplete, though a full analogy will 
be offered in the following chapter in which we establish, both theoretically and 
empirically, the constrained economy model and the existence of Dutch disease in the 
West Bank and Gaza. In this section, the works that are most relevant to our case are 
those of Rajan and Subramanian (2008 and 2011), who provide multiple reasons why 
foreign aid may not have a positive impact on growth, and Kang, Prati and Rebucci 
(2013), as they provide the broadest and most current international empirical analysis 
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3.2 Economic Development Models 
The enigma of economic growth attracted early economists such as Malthus 
(1798) and Smith (1776). However, even after more than two hundred years, the secrets 
of economic growth have yet to be fully investigated as the global inequality among 
nations increases significantly in almost all decades since 1820 and up to year 200092. 
As a result of the accelerated technological changes since the nineteenth century, some 
countries have experienced high growth while others have experienced low growth, 
thus causing a dramatic increase in the disparity in wealth among countries.93 
 
Inequality among nations in the 2007 per capita GDP is illustrated in Figure 3.1, which 
presents an international comparison of per capita GDP in terms of purchasing power 
parity in the year 2007. 
 
Figure 3.1 International Comparison of Per Capita GDP, 2007* 
 
* Based on 2007 or latest estimates 




                                                 
92 See Figure 1.5 p.230 in Lindert and Williamson (2003). 
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In 2005, the West Bank had purchasing power parity adjusted per capita GDP of US 
$800. Accordingly, it ranks 215 out of 237 countries. The Gaza, in 2005, had a per 
capita GDP of US $600, thus rendering it 225 out of 237 countries. In 2007, the per 
capita GDP of the West Bank and Gaza was among the lowest 4% of any population 
in the world. Israel’s per capita GDP in 2007, on the other hand, was US $26,200, thus 
placing it among the 17% of those countries in the world with the highest GDP. The 
per capita GDPs of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt were US $4,900; $4,500; $11,300 
and $5,500 USD, respectively, and their rankings among all countries were 136, 152, 
128 and 138, respectively94. The low per capita GDP for the West Bank and Gaza 
contrasts with the much higher standard of living in the surrounding countries and with 
other data, such as the universal literacy rate of 95% to 100% in the West Bank and 
Gaza.  
 
The parameters affecting economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza are the same as 
those in other countries; however, specific conditions unique to the West Bank and 
Gaza also come into play. These conditions include, inter alia, political and armed 
conflict as well as extended periods of economic isolation imposed by Israel. Since 
1967 and until the first Intifada95 in the 1980s, Israel provided a key source of 
employment for the Palestinian population, and as a result, the two economies, for all 
intents and purposes, were unified. In the 1990s, particularly in the wake of the Oslo 
Accords, the West Bank and Gaza were flooded with international economic aid 
intended to consolidate the physical and institutional infrastructure of the newly created 
Palestinian authority. Excluding the severe periods of the first and second Intifada, the 
economic policy of Israel was to employ Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza in 
Israel rather than to generate employment and industrial development in the West Bank 
and Gaza. Since the beginning of the occupation, almost all foreign trade of the West 
Bank and Gaza has been with Israel. Foreign trade, especially export activity, is 
constrained by Israel. Part of the constraints stem from security problems, as the free 
entry of goods through commercial ports enables the smuggling of dangerous terrorist 
explosives and weapons. However, it is also possible that the Israeli constraints were 
                                                 
94 Source: C.I.A. World Fact Book, 2005 http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2005/ 
95 The term designated to the violent Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza in the mid- and 
late-1980s. Prior to this and in the interim period between the first and second Intifada, which began in 
2000, freedom of capital and individual movement between Israel and the West Bank, Gaza and the 
Stripwas virtually unhindered. 
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intended to eliminate competition from the industrial and agricultural sectors of the 
West Bank and Gaza. Namely, the economic policy of Israel was to employ low-cost 
Palestinian workers in the agricultural, construction and industrial sectors of Israel, 
rather than to develop agricultural and industrial sectors in the West Bank and Gaza 
that would be based on relatively low-cost labour and would thereby compete with 
Israel’s industry and agriculture. Since the first Intifada in 1987, the employment of 
workers from the West Bank and Gaza in Israel declined dramatically. The constraints 
on exports and the economic closure remained, however, and became even more 
stringent.  
 
Let first look at basic growth models that have been developed that may assist in 
describing growth in the developing economy of the West Bank and Gaza before 
looking at more sophisticated models.  
 
3.2.1 Basic Growth Models 
Malthus 1766-1834  
Malthus (1798) assumed that land, as the basic capital and technology input, is fixed 
and finite. Under the assumption of the diminishing marginal productivity of labour, 
the increase in population (at a given geometric rate) will lead the world toward 
starvation. In other words, limited natural resources must lead to perpetually 
diminishing growth and a reduction in per capita production. In addition, Malthus 
projected that the scarcity of land will cause competitive rents to increase and salaries 
from labour to decrease. It can be claimed that the Malthusian trap still holds in some 
periods and in some underdeveloped agricultural countries96. However, on a global 
scale, his projections were invalidated by technological and educational advances and 
by the impact of capital and productive resources other than land (see Galor 2011). 
 
Adam Smith 1723-1790 
Adam Smith (1776) deviated from Malthus by adding capital equipment and 
productivity to his model. He emphasised the importance of the "invisible hand" under 
competitive free markets and claimed that the role of the government is to maintain 
                                                 
96 Diao et. al. (2007) claim that some Sub-Saharan African countries with a large proportion of the 
agricultural sector and small industrial sector such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda are in a Malthusian 
agricultural poverty trap. However, international foreign aid is intended to rescue these countries from 
that situation. 
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laissez-faire conditions. Left to their own devices, competitive markets will generate 
growth driven by capital formation, specialisation and trade. 
 
John Rae 1796-1872 
While Adam Smith introduced the importance of capital formation, Rae was the first 
to recognise the importance of technology. The concept of diminishing marginal 
production does not hold with regard to technological change. Rae (1834) 
recommended government support of technological development, which is a departure 
from the laissez-faire model put forward by Adam Smith. Rae also emphasised the 
importance of savings and claimed that differences in savings behaviours of countries 
can affect growth. 
 
Karl Marx 1818-1883 
Marx acknowledged the importance of capital to growth but also claimed that 
production methods generate political ideologies and friction. According to Marx, the 
struggle between labour and capital rather than free competition governed the market 
for production inputs. Marx believed that the industrial revolution will cause farmers 
who own their land to become industrial workers without capital and that, after a series 
of increasingly frequent crises, workers will revolt precipitating the collapse of the 
capitalist system. Marx correctly projected a series of economic boom and bust periods 
under the free market system, but he did not foresee the robustness of modern 
capitalism, which mixes economic freedom with political freedom and a welfare 
system in which the government addresses externalities and occasionally intervenes to 
insure a level playing field for fair competition. 
 
The Harrod-Domar Static Model 
Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) developed separately a model that is based on two 
assumptions. The first is the existence of unemployment, i.e., the supply of labour does 
not constitute a constraint. The second is that production is proportional to the stock of 
capital equipment.  
 
Accordingly, 
(3-1)     GDP ≡ Y= f(K) and  
(3-2)     dY/dk = constant ≡ C 
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Thus, 
      (3-3)    d2K/d2Y = 0 →dY/dY = Y/K, 
(3-4)    s·Y = S =I  
and 
      (3-5)   ∆K = s·Y-δ·K 
where δ is the rate of depreciation. 
 
The implication of this model is that growth depends on savings, which equals 
investment. This model has been criticised on several levels. Many question the validity 
of the assumption of a fixed ratio between labour and capital equipment as well as the 
assumption of insufficient growth to eliminate unemployment. Others note that the 
model only explains economic booms and assumes that investors are influenced solely 
by output and not by relative prices. In addition, the model ignores issues of uncertainty 
and credit risk. To generate growth, the model prescribes that poor countries simply 
borrow money and invest it.  
 
3.2.2 Sophisticated Growth Models 
Solow (1956), (1957) 
Robert Solow (1956) provided a basic economic growth model based on capital   
formation. According to this model, diminishing marginal productivity of capital-
intensive enterprises tends to reduce long-term growth rates. Due to Solow and others, it 
was believed that poor countries are subject to a vicious cycle of under-investment and 
under-development. Poor countries have no savings and, therefore, no investments/ 
without investment and capital formation, there is no growth/ thus, poor countries remain 
poor while rich ones become richer. 
 
At that time, aid to poor countries appeared to be the key to breaking this cycle of 
under-development97. 
 
In an empirical study conducted in 1957, Solow deviates substantially from his earlier 
capital formation model and concludes that technology, rather than capital intensity, 
constitutes the key driver of economic growth98.  
                                                 
97 Such opinions were supported by the successful Marshall Plan implemented in post-war Europe. 
98 Robert Solow received the Nobel Prize for his two papers.  
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The Robert Solow Neo-classical Model99 
This production model establishes the exogenous relation between aggregate inputs of 
capital and labour and aggregate savings and investment in the economy. “Y” denotes 
aggregate production in an economy, and y = Y/L represents production per unit of 
labour. “K” denotes capital investment, while k signifies capital intensity per unit of 
labour, i.e., k=K/L. Assuming constant economies of scale, Solow employed the Cobb-
Douglas production function to obtain: 
 
(3-6)    y = f(k )= Ak 
 
Accordingly, if there is no change in the technology (A), capital intensity k remains the 
sole source for generating growth in terms of output per labour. If one ignores 
government and international trade, the only final products in the economy are private 
consumption, investment and private savings = gross investment (I). If the savings rate 
out of disposable income Y is s, and the depreciation rate of capital is , then the net 
capital formation K is: 
 
(3-7)    K = sY-K 
 
To determine the impact of capital intensity k, a proportional change of the term k=K/L 
can be restated as: 
 
(3-8) k/k = (K/K-L/L)/(1+ L/L) 
 
Multiplying both sides by k = K/L and assuming that the amount of labour is constant 
and thus L=0, one can rewrite the above equation as follows: 
 




                                                 
99 The review of Solow's model and its extension is based on the analysis in Mayshar (2008) and   
 Helpman (2004). 
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By substituting sY-K for K and rearranging the terms of the Cobb-Douglas function, 
the following is derived: 
 
(3-10) k=sy-k= sAk-k 
 
Accordingly, the annual change in capital intensity is a function of annual per capita 
(i.e., per labour unit) savings /s y  minus the annual per capita depreciation. 
 
The dynamic properties of the Solow model can be described as follows. The level of 
capital in a given period determines depreciation, output and, consequently, savings 
and investment in that period. Gross investment minus depreciation determines the 
level of capital for the coming period. The above dynamic process reaches steady state 
in which: 
 
(3-11)    k*/y*=s/δ 
 
where k* and y* are capital investments per labour (Capital) and production (GDP) per 
labour. In the steady state, the ratio of capital per worker over production per worker 
equals the savings rate over the rate of depreciation.  
 
The progression of growth according to Solow is illustrated in Figure 3.2, which depicts 
100 years growth for initial exogenous parameters k1=1000, =0.1, s=0.2, A=100 and 
=0.4. 
Figure 3.2 exhibits the results of the Solow model, which is based on the above input. 
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Figure 3.2 Progression of Annual Growth under the Solow Model 
 
 
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the important insight rendered by the Solow model such that 
without technological change, economic growth discontinues and converges into a 
long-term steady state in which savings equal depreciation. 
 
Three key conclusions can be drawn from Solow’s basic model. First, in the long run, 
in the absence of technological change, growth in production per capita will come to a 
halt. Second, if the sole difference between two economies is capital intensity, in the 
long run, per capita production in the two will converge. Finally, in the long run, 
economies with higher proportions of savings will attain higher standards of living100. 
 
Chenery and Strout (1966) Two-Gap Model 
Chenery and Strout (1966) extended Harrod-Domar and Solow’s analysis as it applied 
to developing economies. They identified a second gap, a balance-of-payments gap, 
which serves to constrain economic development. According to their two-gap model 
one of two constraints may impede growth. If the effective constraint is the level of 
savings, then growth is constrained by the gap between savings and the critical level of 
investment that is required to insure a sustainable growth rate. It is also possible that 
                                                 
100 The optimisation of either savings or per capita production does not constitute reasonable long-term 
goals. Per capita consumption is considered an economically reasonable goal. It can be seen that the 
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the effective constraint is the foreign currency that is needed for the investments that 
ensure sustainable growth. In that case, the balance-of-payments gap constrains 
growth. At a given period in time, either one of the two gaps can trap poor countries in 
a vicious cycle of low savings, under-investment and lack of growth.   
 
According to Chenery and Stout, the vicious cycle generated by these two gaps can be 
overcome by the infusion of foreign development assistance (FDA). They constructed 
a three-stage model to describe the process of emergence from the gap to economic 
independence. In the first stage, an inflow of FDA funds is essential to close the gap 
between saving and investment. Namely, 
 
(3-12)    I=S+FDA, where I denotes total investment and S represents local savings.  
 
In the second stage, investment exceeds savings, and foreign aid is required to close 
the gap between the import and export of goods and services. In this stage:  
 
(3-13)   M=X+FDA, where M denotes imports and X denotes exports. 
 
In the third stage, the balance of payments deficit is closed. 
 
For further discussion on the two-gap model see Harms and Lutz (2004) who provide 
a detailed description, review and analysis. 
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3.2.3 Extending the Solow Model to Demographic and Technological Changes 
The Demographic Factor 
The possible impact of demographic factors on growth needs to be considered and 
incorporated into growth models. The clear negative correlation between GDP growth 
and population growth is exhibited in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 Correlation between Average Annual World Population Growth  
                   Rates and GDP Per Capita Growth Rates, 1975-2004 
 
 
Source: Population Reference Bureau, Population & Economic Development Linkages 2007 Data Sheet. 
West Bank and Gaza added by author according to data based on annual reports from Israel Central 
Bureau of Statistics and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 
 
Differences in productivity, technology and population growth can explain why 
economies do not converge in the long run to the same level of GDP as projected by 
Solow. Several empirical studies have examined Solow’s conclusions regarding the 
steady state101. The primary conclusion of these studies is that major deviations can 
                                                 
101 For a review of this literature, see Helpman (2004). 
X 
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occur as a result of endogenous demographic changes (Lucas 1988), technological 
changes (Arrow1962; Romer 1986,1990), interaction between economies (Frankel and 
Romer 1999; Grossman and Helpman 1991), endogenous savings rates (Lucas 1988), 
different production functions (Fagerberg 1994), political problems (Mauro 1995) and 
other factors (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995).  
 
The basic aggregate production function is extended by adding the time t index to the 
original equation GDP ≡ Y= f(K) to obtain: 
 
(3-14)   Y(t)=A(t)·[K(t)]α·[L(t)]1-α 
 
In this model, only Y and K are derived endogenously, while L and A are determined 
exogenously102. It is assumed that the exogenous population growth rate (denoted by 
n) is fixed over time. Under this assumption, the dynamic equation K = sY-K is 
extended to the following: 
 
(3-15)   k=sy-k= sA(t)k-( +n)k, 
 
and the steady state equation y = f(k )= AK becomes: 
 
(3-16)    k*/y*=s/(δ+n). 
 
According to the above time-adjusted aggregate production function, the dynamic 
change in net capital formation per unit of labour is negatively affected by depreciation 
and population growth. In the steady state, the capital/GNP ratio is inversely related to 
the rate of depreciation and population growth rate, thereby explaining the negative 
correlation between per capita GDP and population growth. The per capita GDP of the 
West Bank and Gaza is partially consistent with the phenomenon presented in Figure 
3.3, and its coordinates place it significantly above the regression line. This indicates 
that, given the high population growth in the West Bank and Gaza, one would expect 
the West Bank and Gaza to have negative per capita GDP growth. The numerous 
                                                 
102 The assumption of a given exogenous population growth rate is not vindicated by empirical research. 
It is well known that population growth is negatively correlated with wealth. Namely, poor countries 
exhibit high fertility rates and population growth. The causality direction in this correlation is most 
likely bi-directional.     
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additional factors that may contribute to the explanation of this deviation will be 
discussed later. 
 
The Solow model takes into account production per unit of labour. The shift from 
production per labour unit to standard of living as reflected in per capita GNP should 
consider the per capita production/labour ratio while taking into account the following 
four factors: 
- The number of working hours per employed person during the relevant period; 
- The employment rate as a portion of the available work force; 
- The rate of participation in the work force out of the total working age population;   
- The ratio of the working age population to the total population. 
 
These factors are vital to analysing GNP/GDP growth in an economy. In the case of 
the West Bank and Gaza, the high unemployment rate and the high rate of the 
population below the working age are especially meaningful and will therefore be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
 
Technological Changes 
Assume that there is an annual exogenous growth rate (denoted by g) in the technology 
parameter A in (3-13). As a result, the equation k=sy-k= sAk-k, which describes 
changes in capital intensity, can be extended to:  
 
 (3-17)   k*/y*=s/(δ+n+g) 
 
The following two conclusions can be derived from this adjusted equation. If two 
economies (i and j) differ solely in the basic starting technology (A0), yet experience 
the same rate of technological change (g), then both economies k* and y* will grow at 
the same rate in the steady state, while the relative difference in production per worker 
will remain constant, namely, y*j/y*i=y(A0)j/y(A0)i.. In addition, if the technological 
change factor g in one economy is greater than that of the second economy, then the 
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Discussion: Technology and its Specifications 
The level of technology can be determined exogenously, but it can also be shaped 
endogenously. Education policy from kindergarten to post-secondary education and 
economic policies supporting research and development can generate technological 
development103. In addition, accumulated know-how and experience add considerably 
to the level of human capital. Basic research as well as clinical and applied research 
and development is crucial to technological change. 
 
Technological development is not always welcome by countries as it causes 
unemployment among those skilled in traditional technologies. Many technological 
developments in the last two centuries came in jumps and precipitated meaningful 
changes in the lives of human beings104 (Aghion and Howitt 1992). Technological 
developments are diffused through international interactions. 
 
Even though the level of education in the West Bank and Gaza is relatively high105, the 
technology cannot be considered a meaningful driver of the Palestinian economy. The 
limited mobility of the Palestinians and the types of low-level jobs Palestinians fill in 
Israel further limits access to new technologies in the West Bank and Gaza. There are 
four reasons for the negative impact of the above constraints on adaptations of 
technologies in the West Bank and Gaza. Firstly, there are almost no options to obtain 
permissions and visas to travel abroad, mainly from Gaza but also from the West Bank, 
to acquire knowledge. Israel is concerned that many youngsters who travel abroad may 
do so to be trained in various terrorist activities, and therefore, Israel attempts to 
prohibit them from returning to the West Bank and Gaza. Secondly, Israel employs 
only low level skilled employees with the only opportunities for high level skilled 
employees being in other countries and the way back from these countries for these 
employees is limited. Thirdly, high unemployment and fourthly, export restrictions 
constitute further constraints on the adoption of new technology. Given the high rate 
of unemployment, there are no economic incentives to adopt new technology that 
improves the productivity of labour as under the high unemployment rate, the cost of 
labour is very low. Also the restrictions on the export of goods and labour from the 
                                                 
103 Israel is internationally a very good example of a country with a high technological level. 
104 For example, the inventions of external and internal combustion engines, cars, airplanes, telephones, 
the electric light bulb , antibiotics , transistors, computers, the Internet and others. 
 
105 In 2006, the literacy rate in the West Bank and Gaza was 92.4% (see CIA-the World Fact Book 2008) 
and the average schooling was 14 years. 
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West Bank and Gaza causes investment in technological changes to be unprofitable if 
the results of the changes are relevant only for the small market of the West Bank and 
Gaza. In most cases, only under open and relevant global markets can the high risk of 
technological investment be balanced.  
 
Additional Factors Affecting Growth  
Economic development can be constrained by many factors, including a lack of 
infrastructure (Bertrand-Albala (2008) and Siddiq (2008)); a lack of technical 
knowledge and human capital (Shell (1996) Lucas (1988), Romer (1986, 1990) and 
Fayissa and El-Kaissy (1999)); political factors such as type of regime (Boone (1996), 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Knack (2001)); social structure and income inequality 
(Kuznets (1995), Birdsall, Ross, and Sabot (1995) Barro (1999) and Knowles (2005)); 
and political unrest and terror (Alesina, Özler, Roubini and Swagel (1996), Abadie and 
Gardeazabal ( 2005), Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) and Selah (2004)). 
 
3.3 Foreign Aid and Economic Development 
3.3.1 Models of Foreign Aid and Economic Development 
As noted above, empirical evidence indicates that a flood of cash flow from natural 
resources or foreign aid may lead to a lag in other economic sectors, and in some 
countries, it can also lead to de-democratisation and increased corruption. Sobovitz 
(2010) employed sixteen well-known international governance indices from the 
literature on corruption106 to analyse the level of corruption of the Palestinian 
Authority in the years 1998 to 2008. The main findings are: 
"The use of the WBI CC index in a TSCS multivariate regression model 
allowed an induction from a large dataset of cases into global cross-country 
explanations, and back, deducing into the one particular case of the PA. It 
found that although ranked in the top two deciles of corrupt countries, the 
PA’s political performance is in fact less unique than what might otherwise 
be assumed. Due to its particular circumstances, the PA remains above 
expected levels of corruption even when controlling for global determinants 
of corruption, during almost all the measured years. Yet, its divergence is 
surprisingly low, falling not very far from the median of the distribution"      
(P. 44). 
                                                 
106 The measurability, subjectivity and normativity of the governance indices is questionable, which is 
one of the reasons for ignoring corruption as one of the potential factors for inefficiency of foreign aid 
to the West bank and Gaza.   
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The inflow of foreign-capital increases also the demand for non-tradable goods and 
thus increases wage levels in the non-tradable sectors. Another potential impact is 
political in nature as the prevalence of revenues stemming from natural resources in 
some countries tends to sustain dictatorial regimes for longer periods [see, for example, 
Verwimp (2003), Coyne and Ryan (2008) and Easterly and Pfutze (2008)].  
Foreign aid became a prevalent facet of international relations due to the Marshall Plan 
at the end of World War II. The food crisis in Africa in the 1980s and the financial 
crisis in South American countries along with the declining growth rate of international 
trade increased the demand for foreign aid, which soared to approximately US$ 55 
billion in 1989 to 1990 (World Bank Report 1991). Throughout this period, a debate 
regarding aid effectiveness continued. Many questioned the impact of foreign 
assistance on growth rates of recipient countries. 
 
There is an ongoing bitter and harsh debate on the impact of foreign aid on economic 
development. The debate is well reflected in the paper. "A Primer on Foreign Aid" by 
Radelet (2006), who opened his paper by quoting the following: 
“Rich countries must recognize that even with action on trade or 
agricultural subsidies, there is still a fundamental need to boost 
resources for developing countries. We estimate that it will take 
on the order of an additional $40 to $60 billion a year to reach 
the Millennium Development Goals--roughly a doubling of 
current aid flows--to approximately 0.5 percent of GNP, still 
well below the 0.7 target agreed to by global leaders, years ago. 
... Does anybody really believe that the goal of halving absolute 
poverty by 2015 is not worth this investment?” World Bank 
President James Wolfensohn, 2002.2  
“I have long opposed foreign aid programs that have lined the 
pockets of corrupt dictators, while funding the salaries of a 
growing, bloated bureaucracy.” U.S. Senator Jesse Helms, 
January 11, 2001.3  
 
Chenery and Strout’s two-gap model is the starting point for the debate on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid.107 The rationale for foreign aid rests in the argument that 
foreign capital transfers can bridge either of the two gaps constraining economic 
development and boost growth to threshold target levels.  
                                                 
107 For a comprehensive review of the investment-savings gap, see Basu (1997). For a discussion of the 
balance-of-payments, see also Bacha (1990). 
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Since Chenery and Stout’s seminal work on the role of foreign aid in economic 
developments, other studies continue to point to the positive impact foreign aid can 
have on developing economies. Several support the claim that foreign aid increases 
savings and supports the exchange rate of developing countries108. In some countries, 
such as Bangladesh and India, foreign aid has proven to be very effective109. Collier 
and Hoffler (2002) claim that foreign aid is particularly effective for countries 
emerging from civil war that have relatively stable regimes. Harms and Lutz (2004) 
discuss and compare the macroeconomic models behind the various empirical studies 
and conclude that most studies support the hypothesis that foreign aid has a positive 
impact on investment and growth. Watson and Wilson (2007) claim that much of the 
funds transferred from rich to poor countries are savings transferred by immigrants to 
their families. These transfers have a significant and positive impact on reducing 
poverty.  
 
Despite the very appealing positive impact of foreign aid in theory, there is a growing 
body of empirical literature questioning the effectiveness of foreign aid on long-term 
economic growth. Nkusu (2004) reported on some low income African countries in 
which he diagnosed the full or partial impact of foreign aid on Dutch disease symptoms. 
Devarajan and Weiner (1989) suggested that the agricultural sector of Cameroon 
deteriorated due to foreign aid.110 Mosley, Hudson and Horrel (1987) find a negative 
correlation between foreign aid and growth. Boone (1996) supports this finding, 
concluding that foreign aid boosts consumption rather than development. Maizels and 
Nissanke (1984) claim that foreign aid rendered by superpowers serves their own 
interests rather than those of the recipient countries and is therefore less effective than 
theory would suggest111. Durbarry, Gemmel and Greenaway (1998) claim that foreign 
aid has a limited positive impact on growth as it is conditional on various factors such 
as macroeconomic policy environment, income level, level of foreign aid and 
                                                 
108 See, for example, Chenery and Strout (1966), Papanek (1973), Gulati (1975), Gupta (1975), Over 
(1975), Levy (1987) and Islam (1992). 
 
109 For the positive effect of foreign aid in Bangladesh and India, see Cassen (1994). 
110 There are more studies that provide conflicting impact of foreign aid and the diagnostic of Dutch 
disease. For a review of some of these studies, see Nkusu (2004). 
 
111 According to Table 5.10 (in chapter 5, p.156) in the years 2000 to 2007, 72% of the imports are from 
Israel. Thus, it is highly possible that Israel benefits considerably from the aid to the West bank and 
Gaza. 
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geographical location. Griffin and Enos (1970) claim that foreign aid increases 
consumption rather than investment and growth. The finding of their study, that foreign 
aid has a negative impact on savings, supports the hypothesis that foreign aid can be 
detrimental to GDP growth. The ineffectiveness of foreign aid as a catalyst to GDP 
growth is not surprising as foreign aid does not necessarily enhance human capital, an 
essential ingredient for growth. Birdsall, Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) claim that 
developing countries remain poor because of limited technological opportunities, yet 
these opportunities remain difficult to create as long as the countries are poor. 
 
In addition, Griffin and Enos observe a negative correlation between aid and the ability 
of governments to collect taxes (see (Schultz 1961), (Becker 1964), (Nelson and Phelps 
1966), (Otani and Villanueva 1989), (Lucas 1988), (Benhabib and Speigel 1994). 
 
Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2006) reviewed much of the literature 
pertaining to the impact of aid on growth and examined the economic development of 
poor countries subsequent to the receipt of foreign aid. They reveal that the findings of 
empirical studies tend to be ambiguous with respect to the impact of aid on growth. 
Their study indicates that poor countries are trapped in a vicious cycle of chronic 
poverty because of a lack of human and financial capital. Djankov et al. claim that the 
additional foreign aid can lower the motivation of recipient governments to promote 
tradable economic activity and may increase government consumption and policies that 
tend to have a negative impact on GDP growth. They also find a negative correlation 
between foreign aid and democracy in poor developing countries112.  
 
Hence, foreign aid has both direct and indirect impacts on growth. The direct impact is 
measured by the GDP growth rate. Indirect affects, however, cannot be directly or 
easily measured but are discerned by monitoring the level of investment, government 
consumption and democratic processes. Djankov et al. suggest measuring both the 
intensity and the effectiveness of foreign aid against the following indicators: 
 
                                                 
112 An increase in the share of the non-tradable sector along with a decrease in the share of the tradable 
sector and a decrease in exports are the well-known negative impacts of foreign aid (see Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2009). These phenomena are exhibited also in the West Bank and Gaza.  
    
 101 
 Official Development Assistance (ODA), defined as the inflow of capital less the 
outflows of repayments in a given year. The official development assistance is an 
indicator of net foreign aid; 
 
 Effective Development Assistance (EDA), defined as official development 
assistance plus inflows from foreign loans in a given year.  
 
According to Djankov et al., the servicing of loans plays an important role in foreign 
aid effectiveness. If most of the net capital inflow from loans is repaid and new loans 
are not secured, the net effective development assistance is low and foreign aid is 
ineffective. 
 
There are five key findings of Djankov et al. which are as follows. One, foreign aid 
does not necessarily increase GDP. Two, there is a negative correlation between foreign 
aid and the integration of democratic processes in developing countries. This result is 
in stark contrast to the basic assumption underlying international development 
organisations that foreign aid supports democratic processes. Three, the inability to 
hold accountable those responsible for the mismanagement of foreign aid funds is one 
of the reasons for the negative impact of foreign aid. Four, foreign aid rendered in the 
form of loans is preferred to grants. In contrast to grants, loans can increase the 
responsibility of recipient governments. Five, conflicts of interest between donor 
countries have a negative impact on foreign aid effectiveness. 
 
Similar to Djankov et al., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) claim that the effectiveness 
of aid depends on a variety of interacting factors. Burnside and Dollar (2000) claim 
that, even in countries practicing good political governance, foreign aid fails to provide 
incentives for success. In this thesis, I did not examine empirically whether the 
impediments to the positive impact of foreign aid on growth, found in these studies, are 
relevant for the case of the West bank and Gaza. While some of them may be relevant, 
further study will be necessary to substantiate this. 
 
Between the proponents and opponents of foreign aid lies a vast body of theoretical 
and empirical literature covering the middle ground. Mosley (1980) claims that other 
variables affect the correlation between foreign aid and growth, and therefore, the 
impact of foreign aid on growth varies from country to country. Based on a sample of 
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83 developing countries, Mosley found that twenty five percent of growth can be 
explained by savings and foreign aid. At the same time, however, this positive impact 
was concentrated in the thirty least developed countries from among the 83 countries. 
Negative effects prevailed in the remaining 53 countries that comprised the sample.  
 
Otani and Villanueva (1989) find a strong positive correlation between investment in 
human capital and growth. This finding indicates that foreign aid should be channelled 
toward human resource development. Fayissa and El-Kaissy (1999) conclude that a 
positive correlation exists between GDP growth and investment in human capital, 
foreign aid, domestic savings, exports, size of the labour force and civil and political 
freedom.  
 
Collier and Dollar (2002) and Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) claim that foreign aid 
is neither categorically beneficial nor detrimental to economic growth. Departing from 
an approach that views development as a function of exogenous factors, they find that 
the macroeconomic policies of the recipient countries, rather than the aid itself, 
determine foreign aid effectiveness. Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that foreign aid is 
more effective in stable regimes. In response to Burnside and Dollar, Easterly (2003) 
concludes that the road to achieving “a beneficial aggregate impact of foreign aid 
remains a puzzle”.  
 
Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004) claim that foreign aid accelerates growth in 
countries neighbouring the countries receiving foreign aid rather than in the recipient 
countries. In their study, they attempt to reconcile the conflicting results of previous 
studies and do so by identifying three generations of studies that explore the relation 
between growth and foreign aid. The first generation analysed empirical data in the 
years 1970 to 1972 and focused on the impact of foreign aid on aggregate savings. 
Based on the Harrod-Domar model, these studies identified the positive impact foreign 
aid has on savings and growth. The next generation of research analysed data spanning 
from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. These studies emphasised negative impacts, 
employing the concept of Dutch disease to explain the impact of foreign aid on 
investment. The third generation of research started with the study conducted by Boone 
in 1994. This and subsequent studies examined wider empirical data and considered 
foreign aid an endogenous as well as an exogenous factor. 
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The debate on foreign aid effectiveness continues and there is still little, if any, 
consensus regarding the overall impact of foreign aid or the mechanisms behind the 
apparently inconsistent empirical findings. Despite the substantial body of research, the 
support for either a correlation or causal relation between foreign aid and GDP growth 
has been inconclusive. Neither theory nor empirical research has been able to provide 
a comprehensive or internally consistent explanation as to when foreign aid works and 
when it fails. Roodman (2007) claims that the findings of the empirical studies 
conducted on the impact of foreign aid on growth are not robust and are highly sensitive 
to data expansion. Namely, longer or different periods under which the impact of 
foreign aid is examined can alter the findings. Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) 
surveyed 97 studies on foreign aid effectiveness. The aggregate finding of 97 of these 
studies is that in approximately 25% of the cases, foreign aid increases investment. In 
75% of the cases, the impact of aid on growth is negligible due to a growth in 
consumption, which comes at the expense of savings and investment. These aggregate 
results vary greatly, thus rendering the alleged contribution foreign aid makes to capital 
formation even more questionable. 
 
3.3.2 Macroeconomic Analysis of the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid 
The above survey of the literature reveals conflicting results concerning foreign aid 
effectiveness. The ambiguity stems, inter alia, from methodological differences in the 
compilation of data sets, the selection of variables (such as governance, institutional 
differences, corruption, poor administration, political dictatorship, terror, balance of 
powers, type of foreign aid and technology level and more) used to test the possible 
direct and indirect impacts and the macroeconomic models underlying the theoretical 
analysis. 
 
This subsection discusses some of the macroeconomic models that provide the 
framework for the empirical studies on the impact of foreign aid on economic 
growth113. There appears to be consensus that foreign aid fails in the sense that its 
overall impact is less than the sum of its parts. This “micro-macro” paradox is reflected 
in the fact that investment in specific projects can be extremely successful, while 
overall macro-economic growth lags behind. 
 
                                                 
113 The discussion in this section is based on the survey by Harms and Lutz (2004). 
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The Two-Gap Model  
According to Harrod’s closed economy model, the growth rate (g) in the economy is 
a linear function given by: 
 
(3-18)   g=s/c, 
 
where s is the savings rate and c is the fixed ratio of capital to product. This model 
predicts that a target growth rate can be achieved by adjusting the level of investment. 
 
An ex-ante gap exists between the level of savings and the required investment for 
attaining a given target growth rate. In an open economy, the formation of a second gap 
can occur due to an inability to finance foreign currency needs. 
 
The two-gap model accepts the Harrod-Domar linear relation between output (Y) and 
capital (K) (dY/dk = constant ≡ c). Accordingly, 
 
(3-19)   
Y K K I
Y K c Y c Y
   
 
 
where /Y dY dt , K is the capital stock, I is the investment, 1/c is the marginal 
productivity of capital under the constant marginal productivity of the Harrod-Domar 
model where, according to the model, c is the assumed fixed capital-output ratio and δ 
is the depreciation rate. 
 
Accordingly, the minimum level of investment ( I*) to attain a given target growth 
rate of ( g*) is: 
 






    
The second gap pertains to foreign currency required to attain target growth. Based on 
national accounts of equilibrium, we know that: 
 
(3-21)   FSXMGTSI P  )()(  
 where Sp denotes private savings and (T-G) denotes fiscal surpluses in the government 
budget. S=SP+(T-G) is the aggregate domestic savings and M-X is the import/export 
deficit, which is financed by foreign aid, denoted as F, which serves as an additional 
source of savings that can increase investment. 
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The two-gap model assumes that the right-hand side of the equation is exogenous. 
Hence, I is constrained by S+F. If the minimal level of investment I* exceeds S+F, a 
savings gap is created. 
 
To derive the foreign exchange gap, Harms and Lutz (2004) draw a distinction between 
capital imports (Mk) and service and nondurable goods imports (Mc). 
 
(3-22)   M=Mc+Mk 
 
Assume that a fixed share m of all capital goods must be imported from abroad. 







I   
As M=X+F, the above equation can be restated as: 
 
(3-24)   
1
[( ) ]I X M F
m
     
Supporters of the two-gap models assume that the level of capital imports, the balance 
of trade, and the level of foreign aid are given, and hence, a second gap exists if the 
minimal required investment I* is lower than the sum derived from the right-hand side 
of equation (3-24). 
 





FSMinI C   
The constraints envisioned in the two-gap model can be graphically rendered in Figure 
3.4. In this figure, the vertical axis is the investment I and the horizontal axis is the 





FSMinI C  holds. The line with a 45
0 slope 
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[( ) ]cI X M F
m
  
I S F 
*F045
 
It is assumed in this figure that the savings S is negative, and thus, at F = 0, the line 
starts at a negative number. The steeper line represents the upper bound for investment 
due to the balance of payment constraint. Its slope is higher than 450 as m < 1, and for  
F= 0, it is extremely negative when the export X is much lower than the import Mc for 
consumption. Our empirical data indicate that this is the situation in the West bank and 
Gaza. The heavy, broken, straight line represents the effective constraint on investment. 
When foreign aid is below F*, the balance of payment constraint is the effective one.  
 
Note that the exchange gap constitutes a constraint when: 
 
(3-26)   





In other words, the exchange gap becomes increasingly crucial as exports decrease, 
imports of noncapital goods increase and the ratio of imports/investment increases. The 
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The two-gap model is highly criticised for over-simplifying the dynamics underlying 
foreign aid and economic growth. The assumptions made regarding the various agents 
and government are static. There is an implicit assumption that prices are fixed. The 
fixed ratio between capital and output represented by c is not vindicated in neo-classical 
theory or by studies that extended Solow's model to technological changes and human 
capital in development114. Finally, the assumption of the model that I S F   is the 
savings constraint equivalent to an assumption that all aid is only foreign development 
aid (FDA) that goes only to investment, while in actuality, consumption is significantly 
directly and indirectly affected by all forms of aid as well.  
 
The Vicious Cycle of Aid and Poverty  
According to the previous analysis, aid should generate growth by releasing the binding 
constraints placed on growth by the savings and foreign exchange gaps. However, once 
foreign aid dissipates, long-term growth reverts back to its previous low level. This 
raises the question as to the dynamics of poverty. Is long-term aid necessary to 
eliminate long-term poverty or can temporary aid save poor countries from a seemingly 
self-perpetuating poverty trap? To answer this question, we begin with the Solow 
model, which defines capital intensity as a function of per capita savings and output, 
initial investment and depreciation as follows (see the details in subsection 3.2 above):  
k=sy-k= sAk-k 
 
This equation can be rewritten as follows: 




Recall also that savings equals investment, I=S. 
 
Harms and Lutz (2004) deviate from the Solow model by assuming that the constant 
savings rate s is positive only above a given threshold of consumption per capita. 
Namely, we assume that the poor countries do not have positive savings. 
(3-28) ].[

 CYsS , if 

 CY  and 0, if 
^
Y C . 
 
                                                 
114 See, for example, Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986, 1990), and recent empirical studies that are 
reported in Galor (2011) and Dalgaard and Srulik (2013). 
    
 108 
Let us combine the restated Solow equation K I K

    with the above-mentioned 
threshold conditions for savings and under the stipulation that I=S. Considering the 
extension to Solow, in which the population growth rate n is taken into account,  
 
(3-29)     k=sy-k= sA(t)k-( +n)k and restating in terms of per capita, we             
               obtain: 
 
(3-30)  knCkfsk ).(])(.[ 

  
This function is outlined in Figure 3.5. Figure 3.5 depicts the components of equation 
(30-3).  The bold solid line is curved as f(k) has diminishing marginal returns. 
 
Figure 3.5 Extended Solow, Steady State Equilibrium Model 
k* k**
( )n k 




Thus, k = 0 at two crossing points with the dashed line that reflects the term ( )n k  
which comprise the right side of (30-3). At a level of capital k**, the economy reaches 
the stable steady state. On the other hand, the point k* represents the threshold point of 
the poverty trap. This point is unstable as above k* and below k** also f(k )> ( )n k  
,and thus k  is positive and k moves up away from this point. If k < k*, then k  is 
negative and moving down and away from k*, which is, in fact, the threshold point of 
the poverty trap. If the economy is pushed exogenously above k*, then a positive 
growth rate can be generated. However, if the consumption per capita is below this 
critical threshold level, then s becomes zero and k decreases. Foreign aid should push 
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the economy above the critical unstable point k*, thus stimulating an increase in local 
savings k. Growth will continue up to the long-term Solow equilibrium level. 
 
3.4 Foreign Aid and Dutch Disease 
The Wikipedia's definition of Dutch disease is as follows: 
 
"In economics, the Dutch disease is the apparent relationship 
between the increase in exploitation of natural resources and a 
decline in the manufacturing sector (or agriculture). The 
mechanism is that an increase in revenues from natural resources 
(or inflows of foreign aid) will make a given nation's currency 
stronger compared to that of other nations (manifest in an 
exchange rate), resulting in the nation's other exports becoming 
more expensive for other countries to buy, making the 
manufacturing sector less competitive. While it most often refers 
to natural resource discovery, it can also refer to "any 
development that results in a large inflow of foreign currency, 
including a sharp surge in natural resource prices, foreign 
assistance, and foreign direct investment". 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_disease 
 
The term first appeared in The Economist, November 26, 1977, pp-82-83. History 
contains numerous examples of Dutch disease (see, for example, Drelichman 2003 and 
Table 3.1). This apparently anomalous phenomenon was originally associated with 
windfall foreign currency revenues stemming from natural resource discovery and is 
named after developments in the Dutch economy subsequent to the discovery of natural 
gas deposits in the North Sea in the 1960s. Rather than leading to a burst of growth in 
the Dutch economy, the gas discovery and the flood of foreign currency resulting from 
it led to the appreciation of the local currency, which, in turn, triggered an imbalance 
in the economy. Ultimately, resources from manufacturing and export industries were 
diverted to the more immediately lucrative, but less productive, natural resource, 
commerce (imports) and services sectors, culminating in less rather than greater GDP.  
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Table 3.1 Historical Examples of Dutch Disease 
Country Example 
Peru Wealth from guano in the 19th century. The influx of currency prevented any 
real industrial growth in the country for 30 years. 
Australia The Gold Rush in the 19th century. 
Azerbaijan Oil in the 2000s. 
Alberta, Saskatchewan,  
Newfoundland, Labrador -
Canada 
Oil revenues exacerbated local labour shortages and supply bottlenecks in the 
2000s 
Chile Copper in the 2000s. 
Malaysia Oil and natural gas in the 1990s and 2000s 
Mexico Oil boom in 1970s and early 1980s 
Ireland Property boom in the 2000s 
Netherlands Discovery of North Sea oil in the 1960s 
New Zealand Dairy industry boom in the 2000s 
Nigeria and other post-
colonial states 
Oil in the 1990s 
Norway Oil from the late 1970s until the early 1990s, and from the 2000s until today 
Philippines FOREX inflows in the 2000s leading to appreciation of local currency and loss 
of competitiveness 
Russia Oil and natural gas in the 2000s 
Spain Inflow of gold and other wealth during the 16th century from the Americas 
United Kingdom Financial services boom in the 1990s and 2000s, while other industries have 
largely disappeared 
United States The American South of the early 19th century experienced retarded 
industrialisation because of cotton's dominance as an export good. Cotton 
price increases in the 1850s actually caused slave and free working 
populations to from cities and industrial trades to cotton-growing regions.  
Venezuela Exports of oil since the early 20th century have stunted industrialisation 
 
Corden and Neary (1982) developed the economic model describing Dutch disease. 
According to this model, there is the non-traded goods and services sector and two 
traded good sectors - the booming sector and the lagging sector (also referred to as the 
non-booming tradable sector). The booming sector is usually the extraction of oil or 
natural gas, but can also be the mining of gold, copper, diamonds or bauxite, or the 
production of crops, such as coffee or cocoa. The lagging sector generally refers to 
manufacturing, but can also refer to agriculture. 
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A foreign currency flood will affect this type of economy in two ways. The flood causes 
production to shift from the industrial tradable lagging sector that loses competitiveness 
due to the lower foreign currency exchange rate relative to the booming non-tradable 
sectors that cannot be imported and also uses much less foreign currency. This shift in 
labour from the lagging sector to the booming sector is called direct de-
industrialisation. However, this effect may be negligible as booming sectors, such as 
oil and minerals, generally employ few people (see Corden 1984). The spending effect 
occurs as a result of the extra revenue brought in by the resource boom, and it increases 
the demand for labour in the non-tradable sector, thus shifting labour away from the 
lagging sector. Corden and Neary refer to this shift from the lagging sector to the non-
tradable sector as indirect de-industrialisation. As a result of the increased demand for 
non-traded goods, the price of these goods increases. In contrast, as prices in the traded 
goods' sectors are set internationally, they cannot be changed at the local level. 
 
Bruno and Sachs (1982) attempt to expand the Harrod-Domar static model to Dutch 
disease. They identified the Dutch disease effect following the energy crisis of the 
1970s. The increase in oil prices caused oil supply countries to shift production to non-
tradable sectors. 
 
Many explain the failure of foreign aid to generate growth in developing economies in 
terms of the diversion of resources precipitated by the inflow of foreign funds away 
from competitive production towards consumption, services, and non-tradable goods.  
 
The claim in this thesis is that it is very possible that the West Bank and Gaza's Dutch 
disease is due to the long-term policy of Israel to employ Palestinians in Israel and 
remit their pay to the West Bank and Gaza. It is possible that this policy was initiated 
to deter industrial development within the West Bank and Gaza. Israel was apparently 
apprehensive that because of the low cost of Palestinian labour, Palestinian industries 
would successfully compete with Israeli industries. Thus, up to the first Intifada in the 
late 1980s, the employment of Palestinians in Israel increases dramatically (see Shaban 
1993, Table 2 there). By the time of the second Intifada in 2000, employment of 
Palestinian workers in Israel was blocked and the borders were closed, thus curtailing 
the free movement of goods and labour (see Table 5.1 columns for Wages from abroad 
and exports in chapter 5, p.144). The infrastructure to generate alternative significant 
domestic economic activity was non-existent.  
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Transfer payments of foreign assistance and donations comprised the primary 
manifestation of economic activity. Since the turn of the century, foreign aid has 
averaged 48% of the GDP of the West Bank and Gaza115. 
 
The resource curse, a term coined and developed by Gelb (1988) and Auty (1990), 
relates to the reduction of productivity and long-term growth associated with resource 
booms. Sachs and Warner (1995) find that countries that were based on natural resource 
exports in the 1970s experienced lower relative growth rates in the twenty subsequent 
years. They provided theoretical explanations for this observed phenomenon by using 
an endogenous growth model, which expanded the list of effects associated with Dutch 
disease.  
 
The Sachs and Warner model is based on Matsuyama (1992), who defined three sectors 
in any economy. The first sector produces durable merchandises and goods. The 
second, the service sector, produces nondurable services. The third sector produces 
goods out of natural resources. Employment in the first sector upgrades human capital. 
Finding and exploiting natural resources raises the overall income for many periods. 
Part of this income is used in the consumption of nondurable goods such as services. 
As a result, production factors move to the service sector as most services cannot be 
imported. High income also generates a demand for goods, though this demand can be 
supplied by increased imports. 
 
A country ought to specialize in areas in which it has comparative advantage.  
Accordingly, a country rich in natural resources would theoretically be better off 
specializing in the extraction of natural resources. In reality, however, the shift away 
from manufacturing can be detrimental. If natural resources approach depletion, or if 
there is a downturn in prices, the ability to rebuild the manufacturing sector may be in 
question, since competitive manufacturing firms do not return as quickly or as easily 
as they left. Since competition is one of the main drivers for technological change, their 
development tends to be lower in the non-competitive and non-tradable sectors such as 
public investment and consumption than in the more competitive tradable sectors. 
                                                 
115 See Tables 5.2 in Chapter 5, p.146. 
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Another partial argument for the causes of Dutch disease is given by Gylfason,  
Herbertsson and Zoega (1999), who claim that the volatility of natural resource prices 
and the subsequent increase in currency risk resulting from fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate may deter further investment as firms refrain from investing when they 
are uncertain about future economic conditions.  
There are two basic ways to reduce the threat of Dutch disease. The first is to slow the 
appreciation of the local currency, and the second is to boost the competitiveness of the 
manufacturing sector. The first approach, to slow the appreciation of the local currency, 
means to sterilise the boom of revenues of foreign currency by generating national 
reserves of foreign currency and to increase governmental investments in foreign 
currency for various future purposes, such as investments in future retirement funds of 
public employees116. That is, to prevent the flood of foreign currency revenues from 
entering the country all at once, it is recommended that some revenues in foreign 
currency be saved abroad in special funds for future measured release117. This approach 
is very important in the West Bank and Gaza case as it may be a good idea to use part 
of the donations to establish pension funds (that currently do not exist) for the 
populations of the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, enhancing technological change 
and supporting manufacturing investment by various methods, including investment in 
technological education and industrial infrastructure, can increase the competitiveness 
of the manufacturing sector. 
 
It is difficult to diagnose Dutch disease as it is difficult to prove the relationship 
between an increase in natural resources, the real-exchange rate and a decline in the 
lagging sector. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza, the impact is not through the 
exchange rate as the Israeli and Jordanian currencies are used as the legal means of 
exchange. The diagnosis in our case will be analysed by the relationship among the 
GNP growth and the foreign aid to the West Bank and Gaza, export levels and the 
weight of the lagging industrial sector.  
                                                 
116 Such investments also lower the investment home biased tendency, which prevails more in countries 
with less developed economies and security markets. 
 
117 For example, recently, Israel decided that part of the foreign currency from exporting gas will be kept 
in foreign currency funds for future educational, ecological and environmental purposes. 
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Many of the aforementioned critics of foreign aid and additional ones that will be 
presented below apply the concept of Dutch disease to development economics as they 
have found that foreign aid may, in fact, provide disincentives to capital investment. 
They argue that the flood of foreign currency precipitated by foreign aid, similar to that 
stemming from a windfall in natural resource exports, causes a diversion of resources 
from tradable productive to non-tradable sectors. Hence, rather than bridging the gaps 
to growth, foreign aid impedes economic development. 
 
Much of the literature on foreign aid and growth as well as the empirical global data 
on growth is intensively reviewed in UNCTAD (2006-B). Kang, Prati and Rebucci 
(2013) used a heterogeneous VAR model to analyse the impact of aid shock on exports, 
imports and the per capita GDP growth panel. Their data are related to 37 developing 
countries with the aid to GDP ratio over 2%. While Israel was one of these 37 countries, 
the West Bank and Gaza were not among these countries. The time series in this study 
is 1960 to 2002. The results with respect to aid and growth are mixed but consistent 
with the Dutch disease hypothesis that aid increases (decreases) growth when the aid 
increases (decreases) exports and imports. Torvik (2002) develops a simple model 
under which Dutch disease is a result of the increased profitability of the rent-seeking 
sector relative to the profitability of the productive modern sector. Torvik further 
claims that the same model can be applied to foreign aid. Rajan and Subramanian 
(2011) provide a substantial amount of empirical data that supports the claim that aid 
has a negative impact on the competitiveness of the tradable manufacturing sectors of 
developing countries. Elbadawi (1999) and Munemo, Bandyopadhyay and Basistha 
(2007) also support the notion that foreign aid breeds Dutch disease. They claim that 
similar to the discovery of natural resources, which precipitates over-appreciation of a 
country’s currency and drives down the profitability of exports, aid drives the prices of 
the non-traded sector up and leads to an over-appreciation of the effective exchange 
rate in developing countries.  
 
Rajan and Subramanian (2005) model the causal relationship between foreign aid and 
growth by focusing on changes in the structure of economic activity. As evidenced in 
figure 3.6, they regress the average changes in the ratio of manufacturing to the GDP 
against the changes in the ratio of FDA/GDP for the years 1980 to 2000. If an increase 
in foreign aid is accompanied by a lower ratio of manufacturing/GDP, then the 
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possibility of negative causality between foreign aid and GDP is supported. Their 
results are depicted in Figure 3.6.  
 
Figure 3.6 Average Manufacturing and Aid Levels, 1980-2000 
 
Source: Rajan and Subramanian (2006) based on Industrial Statistic Database, United Nations Industrial 
Organization-UNIO 2003. p.43.  
 
The negative correlation between foreign aid intensity and manufacturing is evident in 
figure 3.6. Rajan and Subramanian interpret this correlation cautiously because this 
observed correlation is only statistical and does not prove causality. Moreover, it is 
possible that additional factors are responsible for this negative correlation. For 
example, the governing dynamic could be that poor countries receive more aid and the 
poorer they become the more aid they receive. This is, for example, the case of the 
West Bank and Gaza. 
 
Table 5.9 of chapter 5 p.155, shows that the contribution of the industrial sector to GDP 
shrank consistently from 19.7% in 1994 to 9.9% in 2007. Table 5.1 (in chapter 5 p.144) 
indicates that in this period, the ratio of foreign aid with respect to foreign transfers and 
net capital transfers to the GDP fluctuated without any trend between 39% and 67%. 
Namely, the proportion of the manufacturing sector of the West Bank and Gaza is 
below the bottom in Figure 3.6 and the ratio of FDA/GDP is near the middle of the 
graph. The fact that the proportion of the manufacturing sector declined consistently 
during the period of heavy aid is evidence of possible Dutch disease infection in the  
    
 116 
West Bank and Gaza. This result is consistent with the claims by Rajan and 
Subramanian as expressed in Figure 3.6. The causality between foreign aid and the 
GDP and the weight of the industrial sector in the economy of the West Bank and Gaza 
will be further analysed in Chapter 4. The relationship between foreign aid intensity 
and the ratio of the manufacturing sector to the services sector also exhibits the impact 
of Dutch disease. This relationship is demonstrated in Figure 3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7 Foreign Aid Intensity and the Manufacturing/Services Ratio1980-2000  
 
Source: From Rajan and Subramanian (2006), based on the Industrial Statistic Database, United Nations 
Industrial Organization-UNIO 2003. p.44. 
 
The negative correlation between foreign aid and the weight of the manufacturing 
sector relative to the service sector coincides with the claim that a flood of external 
funds leads to the development of the non-tradable sector towards the development of 
the tradable sector, a phenomenon that leads to weaker economic performance. In 1994, 
the proportion of manufacturing to services in the West Bank and Gaza was 30.4% (log 
of -0.51). In 2005, this proportion had declined to 14.1% (log of -0.85).  
 
The analysis of Rajan and Subramanian differs from previous studies. Unlike their 
predecessors, they incorporate indicators of the relative deterioration (or failure of 
development) of the manufacturing sector, which is symptomatic of Dutch disease. 
They also explicitly analyse the impact of foreign aid on the exchange rate as projected 
by Dutch disease. In addition, they treat foreign aid as an endogenous factor, justifying 
this with the claim that poorer countries (ostensibly prone to mismanagement) attract 
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greater foreign aid. Namely, the negative correlation alone between foreign aid and the 
GDP does not necessarily support the claim that foreign aid induces Dutch disease. To 
support the claim of negative causality, one must investigate the indirect factors such 
as the currency rate appreciation as well as the weight of the tradable industry in the 
economy.    
 
Rajan and Subramanian claim that the negative correlation between foreign aid and 
economic growth is mediated through the exchange rate. The infusion of funds from 
foreign aid, similar to windfall profits from natural resources, leads to over-valuation 
of the local currency, and this over-valuation, rather than the foreign aid itself, 
precipitates the diversion of an economy’s resources from the tradable sector to non-
tradable goods and services. To measure the direct impact of foreign aid, one must 
deduct the impact of over-valuation on the GDP and on the ratio between tradable and 
non-tradable sectors. 
 
Figure 3.8 outlines the avenues of foreign aid impact based on the Rajan-Subramanian 
model. According to this diagram, foreign aid can adversely affect the GDP either 
directly or indirectly. Route A depicts a direct negative impact on the relative share of 
the tradable sector. In Route B, the negative impact on the tradable sector (C) is 
triggered by the appreciation of the local currency. Both routes culminate in a decline 
in aggregate growth. 
 
Figure 3.8 The Impact of Foreign Aid on Growth According to the Rajan- 





Source: Rajan, R.G. and Subramanian, A. (2005). p.8. 
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Rajan and Subramanian conclude that foreign aid has a direct negative impact on the 
GDP even after adjusting for over-valuation of the local currency. They also find that 
foreign aid adversely affects growth in the labour market.  
 
Rajan and Subramanian (2006) claim that foreign aid is similar to the “natural resource 
curse” that leads to Dutch Disease. This result is consistent with the previous claims on 
the positive correlation between aid and consumption and the negative correlation 
between aid and development.  
 
3.4.1 The Political Implications of Dutch Disease  
Knack (2001) and Brautigam and Knack (2004) claim that massive foreign aid provides 
rulers with an extra degree of freedom to apply bad governance and corruption. 
Conflicting political interests can aggravate the negative effects of Dutch disease. Lane 
and Tornell (1996) and Torvik (2002) consider Dutch disease a process in which 
different political groups seek rents from the wealth of a country as each political group 
attempts to maximise its own expected utility (wealth) by securing a larger share of the 
national income. Such struggles between these groups can lead to a decrease in 
investments and a reduction in growth rates. Jones (2013) studied the used Granger 
causality tests to examine the causality direction of foreign aid and growth. 
 
Collier (1988) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) suggest that the inequality 
generated by the increase in natural resources increases pressures toward establishing 
democratic regimes. In contrast, Wantchekon (1999) and Ross (2001) find a positive 
correlation between long-term dictatorships and natural resources (for example, Iraq 
and Libya). Carapico (2002) finds that most foreign aid to the Arab world is through 
governments that attempt to retain political power through non-democratic agents. As 
a result, foreign aid is ineffective in promoting democracy in the Arab world. 
 
Lam and Wantchekon (2003) investigate how the GDP, the distribution of income and 
the distribution of political power change as a result of the discovery of natural 
resources. They claim that inequality increases directly as the power of ruling elites 
increases and indirectly as a result of Dutch disease and its negative impact on the GDP. 
Lam and Wantchekon generate a rent-seeking model that extends and explains the 
effects of Dutch Disease by adding political factors. Furthermore, they assume that 
elites govern the country by a single dictatorial dynasty and that no meaningful 
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resistance to the elite is allowed. In addition, the power and claims of the elite on their 
share of income and wealth is inherited from previous generations. The Lam-
Wantchekon model divides the economy into three sectors: durable goods 
manufacturers, non-tradable good producers, and natural resource exploiters. It is 
assumed that the natural resource sector does not require production inputs, and it is 
also assumed that, in addition to the elite, there are two plebeian groups that compete 
for what is left by the elite group. 
 
In their study, Lam and Wantchekon prove three hypotheses. One, that new resources 
disproportionately increase the power and wealth of the elite. Two, that human capital 
diminishes as a result of new natural resources because the tradable goods sector, which 
employs a greater number of knowledgeable employees, shrinks. Three, that new 
resources increase the lobbying efforts of the lower class in an attempt to improve their 
ability to benefit from the new resources. 
 
3.4.2 Dutch Disease and the Palestinian Economy  
Most studies analysing the development of the West Bank and Gaza concentrate on the 
prospects in the wake of the Oslo Accords of 1993. While the West Bank and Gaza 
have always relied on aid and donations from abroad to some degree, the post-Oslo 
period coincides with the infusion of massive foreign aid118.  
 
The World Bank (1999) and the Secretariat of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (1999) 
provide an initial glimpse into the effectiveness of aid in the West Bank and Gaza a 
few years after the Oslo Accords. Le More (2008) claims that the foreign aid to the 
West Bank and Gaza following the Oslo Accords was wasted money as it failed to 
enhance peace.  
 
Petri (1997) and Astrup and Dessus (2002) claim that the Palestinian economy is 
plagued with Dutch disease. Petri (1997) states, 
                                                 
118 World Bank (1999) and the Report of the Secretariat of Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (1999) are the 
only studies that provided an initial glimpse at the effectiveness of aid in the West Bank and Gaza in the 
years following the Oslo Accord. Later data indicate that after the second Intifada, most of their 
conclusions do not hold and the most we can say is that the aid to the West Bank and Gaza prevented 
the entrenchment of deeper poverty. Saleh (2004) claims that the economic condition in the West Bank 
and Gaza is directly affected by terror. 
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"An especially dramatic example of the Dutch disease at work is provided by the 
structure of the Palestinian economy in the early 1990s. Despite its very small 
economic size, the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) exported only 14 per cent of its 
output. These exports paid for only one-fifth of imports, with the remaining 80 
per cent financed by wages earned in Israel. As a result, the WBG’s productive 
resources at home were engaged mostly in non-traded sectors, with tradable 
accounting for only 8 per cent of outputs. Nevertheless, wage rates were higher 
than those in neighbouring Jordan or Egypt. As the effects of Israeli border 
closures demonstrate, the shift to alternative foreign-exchange generating 
activities is difficult because the economy lacks a base for producing tradable"   
(p. 25). 
 
According to Astrup and Dessus, the replacement of the wages of Palestinians formerly 
employed in Israel with foreign aid serves to increase the symptoms of Dutch disease 
in the West Bank and Gaza119. 
 
Lasensky and Grace (2006) question the impact of aid on the economy of Palestine as 
well as its impact on the way to peace. Hever, S., (2006) claims that aid to the West 
Bank and Gaza inflames the conflict. UNCTAD (2006-A) claims that the main effect 
of the aid to the West Bank and Gaza was the creating of basic institutional and 
regulatory frameworks. In the AFP (2004), it is claimed that foreign aid for Palestinians 
funds Israel's occupation as more than 75% of the imports to the West Bank and Gaza 
are from Israel. 
 
3.5 Conclusions and Suggested Potential Remedies to Dutch Disease  
Dutch disease in developing countries can be induced by natural resource discovery. 
However, many factors other than the discovery of natural resources can trigger this 
phenomenon. Any sudden increase in wealth due to a booming sector that leads to a 
shrinkage of productive sectors, as well as any massive flow of funds from abroad, 
including foreign aid, donations, and repatriation of migrant worker wages and savings, 
can induce Dutch disease in developing economies. At this stage, I must emphasise that 
the claim that foreign aid generates Dutch disease is not conclusive, as the causality 
                                                 
119 See also Levy (2007). 
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direction is not clear, even if one finds a negative relation between foreign aid and 
growth. 
 
Contrary to intuitive belief, a massive flow of funds can paradoxically lead to economic 
deterioration as a result of the weakening of the industrial and technological sectors 
that manufacture tradable goods. Dutch disease explains how this is precipitated by the 
over-valuation of local currency and the transfer of labour and capital to the non-
tradable service sector. It was also observed that foreign aid and the sudden increase in 
wealth can lead to an increase in inequality and that they tend to promote non-
democratic processes by facilitating ruling dictators to entrench political power.  
Recent studies claim that due to the direct and indirect effects of Dutch disease, foreign 
aid may have a negative impact on economic growth, even though, generally speaking, 
foreign aid and donations alleviate the hardships of poverty. The primary problem 
regarding Dutch disease is the ability to regenerate economic growth after the 
discontinuation of the external flow of funds. The question is whether recovery from 
Dutch disease can be expedited in the 21st century. The answer is a definite yes, 
providing the following three measures are implemented amongst others. Rendering 
foreign aid in the form of developing infrastructures, providing technological rather 
than financial assistance and curtailing foreign aid instrumental in sustaining dictatorial 
governments are a few strategies that can be employed120.  
 
In the empirical part of my study, I examine whether the long period of cash flow from 
the sale of labour to Israel, which was subsequently replaced by massive foreign aid, 
generated Dutch disease in the West Bank and Gaza. Petri (1997) claims that the West 
Bank and Gaza are seriously infected by Dutch disease. The empirical portion of my 
thesis will examine the claim of Petri in the years that followed the Oslo Accords. A 
further question to be explored is whether Dutch disease can be cured and, if so, how, 
given that there is a connection between terrorism and the economy. 
 
                                                 
120 Chauvet and Collier (2004) find that it takes, on average, 56 years for a country to rise from the status 
of low income countries under stress (LICUS). 
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Chapter 4 - Methodology of Research: The 
Foreign Currency Gap Model 
 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the main claims of this thesis is that almost all the supply of foreign currency 
to the West Bank and Gaza is exogenous and thus in line with the "Two Gap Model", 
GDP is almost entirely determined by the exogenous foreign currency constraint. This 
claim is based on the following assumptions. First, foreign aid to the West Bank and 
Gaza is determined exogenously, and its level is very high, in fact, foreign and capital 
transfers to the West Bank and Gaza financed sixty-four percent of imports over the 
period 1994 to 2007 (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2, p.144). Second, over the period 2000 to 
2007, approximately ninety percent of the Palestinians' exports were directed to Israel 
and controlled by Israel (See Table 5.10, p.156). Third, between 1999 to 2007, 
approximately eighty-nine percent of compensation in the balance-of-payments for 
Palestinian employees was from Israel (See Table 5.7, p .153). Fourth, due to special 
political risk, the level of borrowing from abroad was very limited, and the reserve of 
foreign currency was small (See Table 5.7, p.153). Under these circumstances, if the 
relative weight of the tradable and non-tradable sectors is given and if the optimal levels 
of import out of total resources and investments under the constraints are employed and 
selected121, then the level of GDP is also determined by exogenous constraints and not 
by free economic demand and supply equilibrium. 
 
This chapter develops the above claim in the following sections. 
In section 4.2, national accounting identities establish a presentation of GDP and GNP 
as a function of the available foreign currency. In section 4.3, I use this representation 
of GDP and GNP to analyze the factors that affect the theoretical optimal proportions 
between the tradable and non-tradable sectors, under the assumption that there is a 
cumulative representative utility function of the economy. In section 4.4, the analysis 
is extended to examine the theoretical optimal investment path in the tradable and non-
                                                 
121 I will claim later that if the non-tradable sectors are over weighted because less foreign currency is 
required in these sectors, then GDP may increase but welfare may be reduced. I will also provide rules 
for the optimal path of investments and discuss the negative implication of saving foreign currency by 
inefficient local production. 
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tradable sectors under the foreign currency constraint. Lastly, in section 4.5, the 
potential implications and limitations of the analysis of the previous sections are 
discussed. 
 
4.2 GDP and GNP as a Function of the Available Foreign Currency 
As explained in the introduction, 4.1, in the case of the West Bank and Gaza, the 
effective constraint according to the ‘two-gap model’ is the foreign currency constraint. 
The model developed in this dissertation focuses exclusively on the barrier to economic 
development posed by the gap between exports and the foreign currency required to 
finance capital investment, i.e., the balance-of-payments gap. 
 
The “two-gap model” analyses two market failures that construct structural barriers to 
economic growth. The role of foreign aid is to clear the road for growth by bridging 
these gaps. In their review of the literature on foreign aid effectiveness, Harms and Lutz 
(2004) provide a description, review and analysis of the two-gap model. They note that 
although gap models and the mechanical approach to development they exemplify have 
come under heavy criticism in academic literature over the past 15 years, they remain 
highly relevant to policy makers.   
 
The two-gap model starts with the simple Harrod-Domar static model of investment 
and growth and then focuses on constraints on economic growth by introducing two 
gaps. The first is the gap between savings and investment, where the claim is that poor 
countries are trapped in a vicious cycle of inadequate savings, underinvestment and 
lack of growth. The second gap is the balance-of-payments; there are not enough 
exports to provide the foreign currency that is needed for investment. Either of these 
two gaps can limit investment and thus growth. By bridging the relevant gap, foreign 
aid raises the feasible level of investment and the feasible growth rate. The model 
predicts that the impact will be less pronounced when the economy faces a savings gap. 
 
The assumption supporting the development of my "two-gap" approach is that there is 
only one relevant gap confronting the Palestinian economy, which is the balance-of-
payments gap. Exports are constrained exogenously due to closure on the West Bank 
and Gaza and thus cannot be increased by additional capital and labour. Under the 
closure situation, both labour and capital are underemployed, and foreign aid enables  
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an increase in imports and consumption expenditures. Accordingly, rather than 
bridging the gap to generate investment and growth, foreign aid contributes to the 
diversion of resources from productive sectors to non-tradable services and aggravates 
the symptoms of Dutch disease. 
 
Expressing GNP in terms of balance-of-payments constraints can lead to a valuable 
model only if the impact of endogenous and exogenous parameters on this constraint 
can be determined.  
  
4.2.1 Notations and basic equations 
Notations 
CP- Private consumption 
I- Investment 
CG- Governmental consumption 
EX - Export of goods and services 
 IM- Import of goods and services 
FTR- Financial transfers to the private and public sectors. 
NCT- Net capital and transfers  
W- Salaries of residents from abroad and net income from abroad.  
Y- Gross national product (GNP) 
Yd- Gross domestic product (GDP) 




(4-1)       CP+CG+I+EX+W =Y+IM 
 
The import function is: 
 
(4-2)      IM=  [CP+CG+I+EX] 
The balance-of-payments constraint can be expressed as: 
 
(4-3)      EX+FTR+NCT+W=IM 
 By inserting IM from (4-2) into (4-3) and solving for I, I obtain: 
(4-4)    
X
P G X
E FTR NCT W
I C C E

  
   
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Let us now solve Y by restating I in (4-1) in terms of equation (4-4) and by replacing 










Solving for Y from the above expression yields: 
(4-6)     
The GDP can be written as: 






The ratio of  is the "foreign currency GDP multiplier". For example, if =0.4, 
then =1.5. Thus, if  is given, 1 USD of resources in foreign currency will 
increase GDP by 1.5 USD. The lower  is, the higher the foreign currency GDP 
multiplier. Equations (4-6) and (4-7) express the following claim, 4-1. 
 
4.2.2 Claim 4-1 
In the short run, Y and Yd are determined solely by the sources of foreign currency, EX, 
FTR, NCT, and W, and by , the ratio of imports to uses.  
 
Equations (4-6) and (4-7) are merely an expression of the sources and uses parity of 
national accounting and the balance-of-payments parity. In all economies, FTR is 
assumed to be exogenous. In most economies, NCT is partially endogenous; at least in 
the short run, as borrowing and fluctuations in foreign currency reserves can affect this 
term. However, in some economies, such as the Palestinian economy, NCT is entirely 
exogenous. Given the fragile political situation in the West Bank and Gaza, borrowing 
in the free market is impossible, and foreign currency reserves are negligible. In most 
economies, W, Ex and β can be largely endogenous and can be derived from economic 
equilibrium conditions. However, in the case of the West Bank and Gaza, I assume that 
exports EX and the remittances of wages from West Bank and Gaza residents abroad 
are primarily constrained by Israel. Hence, in our case, β remains the sole endogenous 
factor. Lowering β is possible either by lowering the production of tradable goods that 
have a high component of imports or by decreasing the level of investments in sectors 
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that have a high import component. The analysis of these alternatives is given in section 
4.3 and 4.4. 
 
4.3 Tradable vs. Non-tradable: Partial Real Economy Equilibrium Analysis    
Let us assume that consumption is composed of tradable and non-tradable goods. 
Manufactured products are tradable goods that have a high import component122. 
 
According to the distinction between tradable and non-tradable sectors, equations  
(4-1) and (4-2) can be restated as: 
 
(4-1)'    CT+CN+IT+IN+EX+W =Y+IM 
 
where CT and IT denote the consumption and investment of the tradable goods, and CN 
and IN represent the consumption and investment of non-tradable goods, respectively. 
 
(4-2)'    
where CN  and IN  in (4-2)
' denote the proportion of imports out of non-tradable 
consumption and investment, respectively, and βT represents the proportion of imports 
out of tradable consumption, investment and export.  
 
















Equation (4-6) is a private case of (4-6)' when βCN=βIN=βT≡β, i.e., the propensity to 
import is identical in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. 
 
In our model, βCN and βIN are lower than βT. Increasing the levels of CN and IN and 
decreasing the relative weight of tradable consumption and investment can increase Y. 
However, an increase in CN and Y does not necessarily increase welfare. 
 
 
                                                 
122 It can be assumed that most services and the investment in infrastructure, such as highways, 
educational systems and housing, are considered non-tradable consumption and investment and have 
relatively low β.    
 M CN N IN N T T T XI C I C I E      
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4.3.1 Optimal Levels of CN and CT and Dutch Disease 
Assume that despite the theoretical reservations (see Arrow (1950)) I aggregate the 
social utility of the economy. Under the given relative prices of imported products and 
local products and services, the balance-of-payments constraint and the given level of 
investments IT and IN generate a possibility trade-off between CN and CT, which is given 
in (4-8) below123: 
 
(4-8)   
The linear production possibilities constraint due to the foreign currency constraint in 
(4-8) is depicted in Figure 4.1. 
For simplicity, let A denote the amount of available foreign currency expressed within 
the brackets on the right hand side of equation (4-8). Namely, 
 
Thus, the linear production possibilities constraint can simply be written as: 
(4-8)'  






















                                                 
123 The given prices assumption implies that the constraint is actually expressed in terms of real imported 
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Figure 4.1 indicates that the highest indifference aggregate utility is obtained at the 
optimal point B and the optimal aggregate levels of CN and CT are C*N and C*T. These 
optimal levels are obtained at the point of tangency between the trade-off line and the 
social utility indifference curve UU. Because by assumption T CN  , then lowering 
CT below C*T by given units will increase CN by more units; therefore, GDP will 
increase. However, the aggregate utility from this higher GDP will decrease due to the 
deviation from the optimal point B. The higher the ratio of βT/βCN, the steeper the slope 
of the trade-off line in Figure 4.1. Given the social utility indifference curve, UU, is 
convex, the optimal consumption of non-tradable goods C*N will increase, and the 
optimal consumption of the tradable goods C*T will decrease, the higher the ratio of 
βT/βCN. In other words, under stringent foreign currency constraints, a higher ratio 
βT/βCN implies that optimality is contingent on an increase in the level of the ‘low-
import’, non-tradable sectors of the economy.  
 
The implication of this analysis to symptoms of Dutch Disease requires additional 
assumptions regarding the "income effect" on the slope of the indifference curve. The 
necessary and sufficient condition that a marginal increase in foreign currency 
increases the proportion of the non-tradable sector relatively to the tradable sector is 
given in Claim 4-2. 
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4.3.2 Claim 4-2 
Assume partial equilibrium124 conditions in which the aggregate utility function is 
maximised and subject to the foreign currency constraint. Then, a marginal increase of 
foreign currency resource A leads to a marginal increase in the proportion of the non-
tradable sector relative to the tradable sector, if, at the equilibrium point, the following 
holds: 
 
(4-9)   
 
Namely, at the optimum point, an increase of A increases more the impact of CN on U 
relative to the impact of CT on U. 
 
Proof:  
At any point on an iso utility curve (utility indifference curve) the following differential 
equation holds: 
(4-10)   
Thus, the slope of the indifference curve at any point is simply: 
 
(4-11)   
The optimal equilibrium point is on the linear constraint (production possibilities line) 
where the slope of the indifference curve is identical to the slope of the production 
possibility line. That is: 
 
(4-12)   
When (4-9) holds, the marginal increases of A will lead to a higher increase in 
 relative to the increase of . Thus, the slope of the utility 
indifference curve will be lower than that of the constraint line. Based on the convexity 
                                                 
124 The analysis is only a partial equilibrium in terms of real units, as I ignore price changes along the 
maximization of the aggregate utility function. 
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assumption of the utility indifference curve, the new equilibrium points  and  
are such that . 
 
The implication of Claim 4-2 is that assuming maximisation of the aggregate utility 
function, additional foreign aid will not necessarily lead to an increase in relative 
demand for the non-tradable sector. This theoretical conclusion is based on expected 
utility maximisation while holding prices constant. Thus, the analysis presents only a 
partial equilibrium model. It is an addition to the general convention related to the 
symptoms of Dutch disease that are based on the impact of a flood of foreign currency 
on the exchange rate. If the condition in (4-12) does not hold, then the impact of the 
maximisation of aggregate expected utility is in contrast to the impact of the exchange 
rate on the relative demand for the tradable sector. 
  
 4.4 The Optimal Level of IN and IT and Dutch Disease 
Increasing investment lowers current consumption, but it may also increase future 
consumption. Equation (4-6)' reflects the fact that under the balance-of-payments 
constraint, increasing IN and lowering IT can lead to GNP growth. This increase is 
obtained due to the shift from investment in high-import enterprises to investments in 
low-import sectors and import-substitution industries.  
 
The question remains as to the optimal mix of investments in tradable and non-tradable 
sectors. The profitability index (PI) rule that is used under capital rationing conditions 
can assist in answering this question. Under capital rationing, the maximum total net 
present value (NPV) is obtained when investments are ranked by the profitability index 
PI, i.e., the ratio of present value (PV) or NPV relative to total investment (I). The 
marginal project that is accepted must have a non-negative NPV. In our case, the 
relevant constraint is not total investment but rather foreign currency. Thus, the relevant 
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4.4.1 Claim 4-3 
Under balance-of-payments constraints, an investment project j is preferred over an 








*   
where PIj and PIi are the profitability indexes of project j and i, respectively, and βJ and 
βi are the proportion of foreign currency to investments j and i ratios, respectively.  
 
The proof is immediate because the contribution in terms of NPV per one unit of the  
constrained foreign currency is equal to  and  for projects i and j, 
respectively. Using the definition of PI and assuming positive βs complete the proof. 
Note, inequality (4-13) only states the conditions under which one investment is 
preferable to another, not that either of the projects is worthwhile. To accept a project, 
the PI, which is the NPV/ I should be positive. 
 













Note, that if only partial equilibrium optimality is considered, it is not necessary that 
the amount invested will be determined by the balance-of-payments constraint. If 
negative NPV for the marginal investment is obtained when investment is increased to 
make the balance-of-payment constraint effective, then it is preferred to lower 
investment instead of increase consumption until marginal positive NPV is restored.  
 
Optimal levels of investment and consumption will be determined according to the 
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According to claim 4-3, regardless of the total investment I, which is composed of IN 
and IT, the optimal proportion between the two should guarantee that the profitability  
 index PI of the marginal project meets the following condition: 
(4-15)       
where  and  are the profitability indexes of the marginal investment in the 
tradable and the non-tradable sectors. 
 
Equation (4-14) generates the foreign currency constraints on investments under the 
assumed level of consumption, and equation (4-15) generates a path of optimal 
proportions between IN and IT. The optimal path is described in Figure 4.2 below. 
 
Figure 4.2 The Optimal Combination Path of IN and IT 
 
Let start to construct the optimal path at point 0 while assuming given capital each 
sector. Assume that the additional investment in each sector is 
, 
generating 
positive NPV. If the proportions between these two marginal investments are 
according to equation (4-15), , then a point such as A on the optimal path 
line is obtained. Other points on the optimal path are obtained similarly. The optimal 
proportions between IN and IT are not necessarily fixed along the optimal path line 





























1 T X T T CN N
IN
E FTR NCT W C C  






















    
 133 
different levels of invested capital. According to equation (4-6)', an increase in Y can 
be attained if we move from optimal points, i.e., from 0 to A, from A to B, and from 
B to C, where all of the points 0, A, B and C are on the optimal path line. Y can also 
be increased if we move to a suboptimal point such as D that is either below or above 
this line. The cost of such a decision is a suboptimal NPV and lower increase in Y. For 
example, point D is on a dashed line that lies parallel to the balance-of-payments line 
and crosses point B. On this line, the total foreign currency required for investment 
remains constant. However, as proved in claim 4-3, total NPV at point D is lower than 
the NPV of point B, which is on the optimal path line. Because NPV measures the 
additional Y, the additional GDP is lower due to moving from point A to point D rather 
than moving to point B. 
 
As noted previously, a project contributes to growth only if its NPVs are positive. It is 
very possible that the marginal project has zero-NPV before the balance-of-payment 
constraint is effective. For example, if the marginal project of IT approaches zero-NPV 
at point B, then according to the optimal path line condition (4-15), the NPV of the 
marginal project IN also approaches zero. Because projects are ranked by their PI along 
the optimal path line, at any point on this line to the right of B, the NPV of subsequent 
projects is negative. In this case, the balance-of-payments constraint will be ineffective 
and over-employment of capital will likely result if the level of investment reaching up 
to point C, which is on the balance of payment constraint. In such a case, it will be 
worth increasing consumption and lowering the balance-of-payments constraint for 
investment up to the point in which B is on the balance-of-payment constraint line. 
According to the Hirshleifer's model, consumption should be increased until the NPV 
of the marginal project is zero. I expect that if investment becomes less attractive due 
to the various reasons, there should be a decrease in the ratio of investment to GDP.  
 
The limitations on exports imposed on the West Bank and Gaza lower the attractiveness 
of developing industrial exports. In addition to these constraints, a lack of water and 
arable land limit the potential for agricultural exports. Dutch disease, in the case of 
West Bank and Gaza probably generated by the lack of profitable opportunities, will 
be perpetuated under these conditions and the continuing clashes with Israel. Using 
foreign aid to underpin investment in industrial and agricultural projects can generate 
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white elephant projects125. According to my calculations, the years before the Oslo 
Accord (1968 to 1993), the net per capita productive capital remained almost constant. 
The average net productive per capita capital was US $255 in the 1970s and US $266 
in 1993 (see Table 5.2, p.146). Since 1993 the per capita net productive capital has 
increased to US $779.2, a nearly two hundred percent increase. At the same time, per 
capita GDP decreased from US $1594 to US $1351, and the contribution of the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors to GDP fell from 32.9% in 1994 to 15.5% in 
2007 (see Table 5.9, p.155). This decrease was in a period where the annual average 
total foreign aid in terms of per capita net transfers plus net capital transfers was US 
$667 over the years 1994 to 2007 compared to only US $208 over the years 1968 to 
1993 (see Table 5.2, p.146). 
  
4.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I provided an analysis of the available GDP according to the constraint 
of foreign currency. Under the assumptions that this constraint is binding and almost 
all sources of foreign currency are exogenous, the macroeconomic models that 
determine the level of GDP according to endogenous demand and supply are of little 
relevance. This thesis contends that given the special political situation, mainly with 
Israel, almost all sources of foreign currency for the West Bank and Gaza are 
exogenous and the foreign currency constraint is binding. Thus, the foreign currency 
constraint determines the level of GDP. A partial equilibrium aggregate utility model 
for optimal proportions between tradable and non-tradable sectors was developed. 
According to the partial equilibrium model that holds constant the price of foreign 
currency and under specific assumptions on the marginal slopes of the indifference 
curves of the aggregate utility, an increase in the supply of foreign currency can 
generate an incentive to increase the relative demand for the products of the tradable 
sector. Under this situation, there is a demand factor that contradicts the well known 
claim that an increase in an external supply of foreign currency lowers the price of 
foreign currency and lowers the relative demand for the products of the tradable sector.  
 
A theoretical optimal proportion path of investment in tradable and non-tradable 
sectors was proposed which demonstrated that if investment is not profitable for  
                                                 
125 The above assertion is more readily observable in Gaza than in the West Bank.  
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various reasons, then based on Hirshleifer's model of optimal savings consumption, it 
is better to increase consumption and lower investment. Based on empirical data it is 
reasonable to conclude that aggregate capital investment in productive assets in the 
West Bank and Gaza since 1994 has probably had negative NPV which would be 
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Chapter 5 - Data 
 
5.1 Introduction 
All data presented here concern the years of 1968 to 2007. Between the years 1968 and 
1993, the data are based on the 'National accounts Judea Samaria and Gaza 1968-
1993' (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) Publication No 1012), a regular 
publication of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS). Between the years 1994 
and 2007, the data are based on the following five publications from the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics: 'National Accounts at Current and Constant Prices (2000-
2005)', 'National Accounts at Current and Constant Prices (1994-2000)', 'Palestine in 
figures (2004)', 'Palestine in figures (2006)' and 'Palestine in figures (2007)'. During 
the first Intifada period in 1988 to1993, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) 
experienced difficulties in collecting data, and in particular, data on exports and imports 
during this period are missing. For those years, data on imports and exports from Arnon 
et al. (1997) were used. 
 
The next section of this chapter discusses problems with the reliability of the data. 
Section 5.3 presents the perpetual inventory method for estimating the capital stock 
using information on investments and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS's) 
assumptions on the rates of depreciation of various types of capital stocks. Section 5.4 
presents the collected data, and section 5.5 concludes the chapter. Appendices 5.1 and 
5.2 present the methodologies of Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) and 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). To the best of my knowledge these 
data I have compiled represent the most comprehensive set available on the West Bank 
and Gaza for these periods. 
 
5.2 Reliability and Consistency 
Before I present the analysis of the main empirical data, it should be noted that these 
data must be interpreted with extreme caution. Political instability in the region has 
created a number of problems in the collection and analysis of the economic data. There 
are four major problems with the empirical data. 
 
The first major problem which is a source of inconsistency stems from the fact that 
during the period concerned, the data were collected by two different institutions. The 
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Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) was responsible for data collection up to the 
year 1993, and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) has collected data 
since the year 1994. For political reasons, these two institutions use different definitions 
for some parameters. For instance, during the period in which the Israeli Central Bureau 
of Statistics (ICBS) collected the data, many Palestinians were not considered citizens 
for political reasons. In particular, Palestinians in the annexed part of Jerusalem were 
not counted as Palestinians in the West Bank. In the Gaza area, additional inconsistency 
occurred because the borders changed; in 1979-1982 the North Sinai area and the 
Rafiah area were ceded to Egyptian control. In addition, Palestinians who left the West 
Bank and Gaza for various reasons and were not allowed to return by the Israeli 
authorities, were not considered citizens by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 
(ICBS) up to 1993, but were considered part of the population in 1994. As a result, 
from 1993 to 1994, the recorded population increased from 1.8 million to 2.11 million 
(an increase of 17.1%). This growth rate is much higher than the average annual growth 
rate in all other years, which was only 2.99%. It is possible that the unusually high 
growth rate observed in 1993-1994 is due to an actual increase in population because 
after the Oslo Accords, many Palestinians decided (and were permitted) to return, but 
it is also possible that the growth rate is partially due to political influences on the 
statistical methodologies of the two statistical Bureaus. Thus, I divide much of the per 
capita analysis into two periods: 1968-1993 and 1994-2007. Also note that up to 1993, 
most civil services were administered by the Israeli Military Authority, whereas after 
1994, civil services were administered by the Palestinian Authority.     
 
The second problem relates to the fact that the macro-economic data found in the 
publications of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) covering the period 
between the first Intifada and the Oslo Accords (1988-1993) is unreliable due to data 
collection difficulties during this period of clashes between Israel and the Palestinians. 
Thus, I supplemented the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) data for this period 
with data from Arnon et al. (1997), but I did not examine the reliability of these data. 
Since 1994 the Palestinian Authority (PA) has taken responsibility for producing the 
official economic and social statistical data in the region. In 1994, the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) was established, and it has since ensured that 
modern international standards and recommendations were used for reporting of the 
National Accounts. Nevertheless, in the first years of its work, the Palestinian Central 
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Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) encountered certain inevitable difficulties in organizing 
the process. 
 
The first Palestinian National Accounts appeared in 1994; however, I encountered 
many inconsistencies and gaps in the data from this year, and different estimation 
methods were used to fill in the missing data. For instance, foreign trade indicators 
were estimated using the residual methodology from the economic equation for the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and were calculated using two different methods. The 
1994 Census covered only establishments and did not include population or housing. 
Moreover, it was difficult to obtain reliable governmental data because only Gaza and 
Jericho were under Palestinian control at that time, while the rest of the territory was 
under the control of the Israeli civil administration. In the National Accounts from 1995 
to 1996, the statistical coverage and comprehensiveness of the data were noticeably 
improved, although the problem of inconsistency and difficulty in displaying the data 
in detail remained. For the period 1997 to 1998, however, a significant shift in the 
estimation quality was achieved due to the higher level of coverage in the data and 
because of the use of Supply and Use Tables – a methodology that provides full, 
internally consistent data even at the disaggregated level. As a result, better estimates 
and adjustments were available at this stage, especially in fields such as foreign trade 
and agricultural statistics. The main task for the next stage of 1994 to 2000 was to 
produce the revised National Accounts time series using constant prices, which 
included re-weighting of the economic data from the years 1994 to 1996 based on the 
findings of the 1997 Establishments Census, as well as to redefine the borders of 
Jerusalem according to the 1997 Census. The period of the second Intifada (2000-2003) 
was also problematic for gathering data on economic activity in the area. As a result, 
statistics on trade with Israel during this period were only partially collected, and the 
reliability of other information was also reduced. 
 
The third problem with the data relates to the political and economic separation 
between the West Bank and Gaza following Hamas control of Gaza in 2006. Since 
then, a tight closure has been imposed on Gaza, accompanied by severe economic 
deterioration126. The GDP in Gaza in U.S. dollars (constant 2004 prices) fell from 
                                                 
126 It should be noted that there are substantial economic distinctions between the West Bank and Gaza. 
See Arnon et al. (1997).   
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$1,683 million in 2005 to $1,272 million (-24%) in 2007, whereas in the West Bank, it 
increased from US $2,877 million to US $3,264 (+13%). The main reason for the 
extreme difference between the positive economic development of the West Bank and 
the economic deterioration of Gaza during these years is probably due to the different 
political situations in the two regions. In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority had 
strong control, and thus almost all clashes between the Israelis and the Palestinians 
were avoided. In Gaza, the situation was entirely different; due to military clashes 
between the two sides, Gaza fell under an Israeli siege that damaged the economic 
situation there. As a result of this extreme difference between the West Bank and Gaza, 
major analysis was ended at the end of 2006. It is also important to mention that 
throughout the whole reported period, the movement of residents and goods between 
the Israeli economy and those of the West Bank and the Gaza area remained relatively 
free. The close economic ties between the regions complicate attempts to measure the 
volume of transactions between the residents of these regions. Consequently, some of 
the estimates are based on partial data and evaluations. 
 
The low reliability of the following data should be particularly noted: import and export 
of goods and services from Israel, private consumption of goods and services from 
Israel, payments to employees from the West Bank working in Israel, revenue from 
industry and data on the construction sector. The reasons for the low reliability of these 
data are twofold. Firstly, informal commerce ("black dealings" and smuggling) occurs 
over the border between Israel and the West Bank. These black dealings included both 
merchandise and labour that was not recorded. The "Security Fence" that was erected 
in the years 2004-2007 caused a decrease in these dealings, but the borders cannot be 
entirely closed as there are many Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Secondly, in an 
economy with low level of unemployment, building houses and renovations are done 
by hired constructors. However, in the case of the West Bank and Gaza many 
unemployed Palestinians spend their free time building or renovating their homes and 
this activity is not and should not recorded under the international principles national 
accounting, but one can consider this activity as a kind of "hidden" GDP activity.  
The official levels for exports, imports, compensation from work in Israel and 
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Figure 5.1 Exports, Imports, and Compensation from Work in Israel  
                   (thousands USD) and Hundreds of Unemployed Workers in West  
                   Bank and Gaza 1999-2007 
 
 
Sources: Table 5.1 and 5.4 in Chapter 5 p.144. 
 
Figure 5.1, which is based on the official recorded data, shows that after the outbreak 
of the second Intifada on September 2000, imports, exports and compensation for work 
in Israel all dropped dramatically. I do not have a way to estimate the level of informal 
trade with Israel, but such trade probably also declined after the erection of the dividing 
fence, which made smuggling more difficult. Thus, even long after the second Intifada 
subsided, unemployment continued to soar.  
 
The fourth empirical problem relates to the large economic differences between the 
periods before (1968-1993) and after (1994-2007) the Oslo Accords. A dramatic 
increase in foreign aid began in 1994, when the Palestinian Authority (PA) started to 
develop an autonomous government system. Thus, I divided the analysis into two 
periods, and in the second period I analyzed only thirteen to fourteen years. Analyzing 
the impact of macroeconomic factors using a time series representing only one country 
without access to comparable data on other countries is a very difficult task. The small 
number of years in this second period also impairs the accuracy of this kind of time 
series analysis. 
 
More specific and detailed information on the reliability and consistency of the data 




    
 141 
5.3 Estimation Method of West Bank and Gaza Capital Stock 
Capital stock was calculated according to the Perpetual Inventory Method (also called 
the continuous inventory method). The Perpetual Inventory Method model is 
recommended by the ESA95 (the European system of national and regional accounts) 
to calculate the Gross Capital Stock (GCS). The Perpetual Inventory Method creates 
an estimate of the capital stock by accumulating past asset purchases throughout the 
expected duration of the assets. Purchases and withdrawals are recorded starting from 
a benchmark stock value. Using this method, gross capital stock is estimated as the sum 
of the gross fixed capital formation in previous years for which the service life has not 
yet expired. This method assumes that the total investment of a certain asset does not 
deteriorate during its expected service life (d years) and that it is completely discarded 
after that period, as illustrated in figure 5.1127. 
 








Assuming a straight line depreciation, gross capital stock can be estimated using 
equation (2) below: 














,t tGC = stock of fixed assets (gross) in year t, measured in prices of year t 
t iI  = gross fixed capital formation in year t, measured in current prices 
,t i tP = price index of year t with base year t-i 
d = expected service life 
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Consumption of fixed capital can be calculated as follows: 
(3)                                     tttt GCdCFC ,, */1  
     
As a result, the net capital stock in year t in current prices can be estimated as stipulated 
in equation (4) below: 
(4)      }*{ ,, CFCPINC titittt  
The mortality function has a truncated normal retirement distribution. Assuming that 
the duration is normally distributed, the possible values of the duration are limited to 
those falling between 50 percent and 150 percent of the average duration. The 
depreciation function is linear; the constant market value price is reduced by a fixed 
amount each period. The depreciation average duration for machines, equipment and 
transportation is 8 years, and for buildings and other construction work it is 40 years 
(for all industries). 
 
Assumptions: 
 No investments were made before 1968. 
 Investments in West Bank and Gaza between the years 1988-1993 occurred at the 
same level as in 1988. 
 The chaining coefficient between 1986 prices in shekels and 1997 prices in dollars 
is 0.78021679 for all assets and industries. 
 Distribution of the government’s and local authority's investments between the 
buildings and equipment used to provide public services in Israel was calculated 
according to the ratio of parallel years. 
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5.4 Tables of Main Selected Economic Data 
 
Variables Index of Notation 
CP- private consumption   
I- Investment        
CG- Governmental consumption 
EX - Export of goods and services     
IM- Import of goods and services 
FTR- Financial transfers to the private and public sectors    
NCT- Net Capital and Transfers 
NPC- Net Productive Capital          
NC- Net Capital 
W- Salaries of residents from abroad and net income from abroad    
GNP  - Gross national product 
GDP- Gross domestic product 
- Proportion of import out of uses 
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Table 5.1 Selected Economic Indicators for West Bank and Gaza, 1968-2007  










































1968 938 538 543 36.40% 176.3 5 182 127 308 588.4 235.4 
1969 951 603 642 39.80% 241.7 38 280 120 400 579.2 207.6 
1970 970 670 752 38.60% 213.8 82 296 125 421 634.1 224.4 
1971 990 763 911 40.30% 188.7 149 337 178 515 696.9 248.2 
1972 1011 892 1152 43.50% 213.7 260 474 213 687 773.8 271.3 
1973 1037 857 1131 46.60% 268 274 542 206 748 909.7 300.3 
1974 1069 1046 1322 43.90% 295.1 276 571 249 820 1049.3 297.8 
1975 1092 1058 1388 47.00% 295.4 330 626 313 939 1230.7 296.4 
1976 1111 1219 1551 44.70% 291.5 332 623 360 984 1443.5 291.7 
1977 1134 1207 1544 47.20% 371.1 338 709 371 1080 1673.7 275.5 
1978 1159 1362 1740 44.40% 291.9 378 670 418 1088 1916.8 263.7 
1979 1167 1340 1780 45.80% 300.2 439 739 393 1132 2202.5 271.6 
1980 1172 1536 1942 42.20% 287.9 406 694 427 1121 2530.2 285 
1981 1191 1440 1888 46.30% 301.9 448 750 493 1242 2809.7 287.7 
1982 1214 1564 2118 43.70% 185.6 554 740 475 1215 3083.2 284.8 
1983 1246 1504 2093 45.00% 188 589 777 455 1232 3368.5 289.6 
1984 1285 1580 2110 42.70% 224.7 530 754 422 1176 3638.8 305 
1985 1323 1570 2055 43.20% 301.6 485 787 408 1195 3881.7 314.2 
1986 1362 1873 2489 42.30% 272.5 616 888 484 1372 4138.6 324.1 
1987 , 1st 
Intifada 1408 1824 2604 45.30% 267.4 780 1047 464 1511 4462.6 358.3 
1988 1459 1798 2470 38.60% 155.8 672 828 303 1130 4820.3 410.9 
1989 1505 1838 2511 36.40% 120.8 673 793 257 1050 5115.8 422.7 
1990 1563 2187 2968 30.90% -87.8 781 693 286 979 5418.6 439.5 
1991 1641 2095 2850 40.50% 364.2 755 1119 305 1424 5697.1 449.8 
1992 1725 2595 3506 37.60% 295.5 911 1206 359 1566 5959.1 458.8 
1993 1800 2870 3494 34.90% 596.4 624 1220 317 1537 6257.3 471.6 
1994 post 
Oslo 2111 3014 3408 43.20% 1452.3 395 1847 442 2289 6593.7 486 
1995 2217 3195 3685 41.10% 1245 490 1735 497 2233 7282.3 666.7 
1996 2327 3287 3723 42.60% 1450.2 436 1886 553 2439 7918 837.5 
1997 2,462 3703 4220 41.60% 1535.2 517 2052 587 2639 8611.9 1053.7 
1998 2,547 4150 4872 41.70% 1518.4 722 2240 724 2964 9377.4 1271 
1999 2,633 4514 5288 44.60% 2124.3 774 2898 732 3631 10295.7 1547.8 
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Table 5.1 Selected Economic Indicators for West Bank and Gaza, 1968-2007 (in  











































Intifada 2,720 4120 4773 45.20% 2000.6 652 2653 746 3399 11630.6 2008.3 
2001 2,801 3767 4098 43.30% 2102.2 332 2434 446 2880 12449.1 2258.1 
2002 2,884 3265 3513 46.60% 2191.6 248 2440 408 2848 12760.6 2309.8 
2003 2,970 3751 4013 45.30% 2387.6 262 2650 459 3108 12847.4 2315 
2004 3,058 4198 4430 40.90% 2193.4 232 2425 484 2909 13140.9 2402.4 
2005 3,155 4560 4897 38.10% 1866.3 337 2204 598 2801 13203.8 2263.4 
2006 3,255 4322 4720 40.20% 1884.2 398 2282 629 2911 13522 2319.7 
2007 3,357 4536 5048 37.90% 1655.9 513 2168 601 2769 13888 2615.8 





2 Net capital is calculated by assuming that 1968 initial capital is the average of net capital to GDP in 
1980-1987. Annual net capital is calculated by a formula that is given to us by the Israeli Central Bureau 
of Statistics (ICBS). This method is based on the "perpetual inventory method” and normal distribution 
of the life of the assets with constraints of 50% and 150%. The expected life span is eight years for 
machines and equipment and 40 years for construction. 
 
3 Only Equipment. 
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Table 5.2 Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for West Bank and Gaza in per  

















































1968 938 574 579 36.4% 188 6 194 135 328 627.3 250.9 
1969 951 634 675 39.8% 254 40 295 126 420 609.1 218.3 
1970 970 690 775 38.6% 220 85 305 128 434 653.7 231.4 
1971 990 770 920 40.3% 191 150 341 180 520 703.9 250.7 
1972 1011 882 1140 43.5% 211 257 469 211 679 765.4 268.3 
1973 1037 827 1091 46.6% 258 264 523 198 721 877.3 289.6 
1974 1069 978 1237 43.9% 276 258 534 233 767 981.6 278.5 
1975 1092 969 1271 47.0% 271 302 573 287 860 1127.0 271.4 
1976 1111 1097 1396 44.7% 262 299 561 324 885 1299.3 262.5 
1977 1134 1064 1362 47.2% 327 298 625 327 952 1475.9 242.9 
1978 1159 1175 1502 44.4% 252 327 578 360 939 1653.9 227.5 
1979 1167 1149 1525 45.8% 257 376 634 336 970 1887.3 232.8 
1980 1172 1311 1657 42.2% 246 346 592 364 956 2158.8 243.2 
1981 1191 1209 1585 46.3% 253 376 630 414 1043 2359.1 241.5 
1982 1214 1288 1745 43.7% 153 457 610 392 1001 2539.7 234.6 
1983 1246 1207 1680 45.0% 151 473 624 365 989 2703.5 232.5 
1984 1285 1230 1642 42.7% 175 412 587 328 915 2831.7 237.3 
1985 1323 1186 1553 43.2% 228 367 595 308 903 2934.0 237.5 
1986 1362 1375 1827 42.3% 200 452 652 355 1008 3038.6 237.9 
1987 , First Intifada 1408 1295 1849 45.3% 190 554 744 329 1073 3169.5 254.5 
1988 1459 1233 1693 38.6% 107 460 567 207 775 3304.3 281.7 
1989 1505 1221 1668 36.4% 80 447 527 171 698 3398.7 280.8 
1990 1563 1399 1899 30.9% -56 499 443 183 626 3466.8 281.2 
1991 1641 1277 1737 40.5% 222 460 682 186 868 3472.0 274.1 
1992 1725 1505 2033 37.6% 171 528 699 208 908 3455.0 266.0 
1993 1800 1594 1941 34.9% 331 346 678 176 854 3475.7 261.9 
1994 post Oslo 2111 1428 1615 43.2% 688 187 875 209 1084 3123.5 230.2 
1995 2217 1441 1662 41.1% 562 221 783 224 1007 3284.7 300.7 
1996 2327 1413 1600 42.6% 623 187 811 238 1048 3402.7 359.9 
1997 2,462 1504 1714 41.6% 624 210 834 238 1072 3497.9 428.0 
1998 2,547 1629 1913 41.7% 596 283 880 284 1164 3681.8 499.0 
1999 2,633 1714 2008 44.6% 807 294 1101 278 1379 3910.3 587.9 
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Table 5.2 Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for West Bank and Gaza in per  


















































Second Intifada 2,720 1515 1755 45.2% 736 240 975 274 1250 4276.0 738.3 
2001 2,801 1345 1463 43.3% 751 118 869 159 1028 4444.5 806.2 
2002 2,884 1132 1218 46.6% 760 86 846 141 987 4424.6 800.9 
2003 2,970 1263 1351 45.3% 804 88 892 154 1047 4325.7 779.5 
2004 3,058 1373 1449 40.9% 717 76 793 158 951 4297.2 785.6 
2005 3,155 1445 1552 38.1% 592 107 698 189 888 4185.0 717.4 
2006 3,255 1328 1450 40.2% 579 122 701 193 894 4154.2 712.7 
2007 3,357 1351 1504 37.9% 493 153 646 179 825 4137.0 779.2 
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) up to 1994 and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(PCBS) from 1994. 
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Table 5.3 β, GDP and Balance of Payments Components, as Percentage of GNP 
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) up to 1994 and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(PCBS) from 1994. 
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1968 36.4% 99.04% 32.46% 0.96% 33.42% 23.29% 56.71% 108.31% 43.33% 
1969 39.8% 94.02% 37.67% 5.98% 43.65% 18.63% 62.28% 90.26% 32.34% 
1970 38.6% 89.04% 28.43% 10.96% 39.39% 16.56% 55.95% 84.32% 29.84% 
1971 40.3% 83.69% 20.71% 16.31% 37.02% 19.50% 56.52% 76.48% 27.24% 
1972 43.5% 77.42% 18.55% 22.58% 41.13% 18.49% 59.62% 67.17% 23.55% 
1973 46.6% 75.77% 23.69% 24.23% 47.92% 18.17% 66.08% 80.42% 26.55% 
1974 43.9% 79.12% 22.32% 20.88% 43.20% 18.84% 62.04% 79.38% 22.52% 
1975 47.0% 76.21% 21.29% 23.79% 45.08% 22.56% 67.64% 88.67% 21.36% 
1976 44.7% 78.60% 18.79% 21.40% 40.19% 23.23% 63.42% 93.05% 18.80% 
1977 47.2% 78.15% 24.03% 21.85% 45.88% 24.04% 69.92% 108.37% 17.84% 
1978 44.4% 78.25% 16.77% 21.75% 38.52% 24.00% 62.52% 110.13% 15.15% 
1979 45.8% 75.32% 16.87% 24.68% 41.55% 22.06% 63.61% 123.76% 15.26% 
1980 42.2% 79.11% 14.82% 20.89% 35.72% 22.00% 57.71% 130.30% 14.68% 
1981 46.3% 76.28% 15.99% 23.72% 39.71% 26.10% 65.81% 148.82% 15.24% 
1982 43.7% 73.83% 8.76% 26.17% 34.93% 22.44% 57.38% 145.55% 13.44% 
1983 45.0% 71.85% 8.98% 28.15% 37.13% 21.74% 58.87% 160.91% 13.84% 
1984 42.7% 74.90% 10.65% 25.10% 35.75% 20.01% 55.76% 172.49% 14.46% 
1985 43.2% 76.38% 14.68% 23.62% 38.29% 19.83% 58.13% 188.88% 15.29% 
1986 42.3% 75.26% 10.95% 24.74% 35.69% 19.45% 55.14% 166.29% 13.02% 
1987 45.3% 70.04% 10.27% 29.96% 40.23% 17.81% 58.04% 171.40% 13.76% 
1988 38.6% 72.80% 6.31% 27.20% 33.50% 12.25% 45.75% 195.15% 16.64% 
1989 36.4% 73.21% 4.81% 26.79% 31.60% 10.22% 41.82% 203.76% 16.83% 
1990 30.9% 73.69% -2.96% 26.31% 23.35% 9.63% 32.98% 182.58% 14.81% 
1991 40.5% 73.51% 12.78% 26.49% 39.27% 10.70% 49.97% 199.92% 15.78% 
1992 37.6% 74.02% 8.43% 25.98% 34.41% 10.25% 44.66% 169.96% 13.09% 
1993 34.9% 82.15% 17.07% 17.85% 34.92% 9.08% 44.01% 179.11% 13.50% 
1994 43.2% 88.42% 42.61% 11.58% 54.19% 12.97% 67.16% 193.46% 14.26% 
1995 41.1% 86.69% 33.79% 13.31% 47.09% 13.50% 60.59% 197.63% 18.09% 
1996 42.6% 88.29% 38.95% 11.71% 50.66% 14.85% 65.51% 212.67% 22.49% 
1997 41.6% 87.74% 36.38% 12.26% 48.63% 13.90% 62.53% 204.06% 24.97% 
1998 41.7% 85.18% 31.17% 14.82% 45.99% 14.85% 60.84% 192.49% 26.09% 
1999 44.6% 85.36% 40.17% 14.64% 54.81% 13.85% 68.67% 194.71% 29.27% 
2000 45.2% 86.33% 41.92% 13.67% 55.59% 15.62% 71.21% 243.70% 42.08% 
2001 43.3% 91.91% 51.29% 8.09% 59.38% 10.88% 70.27% 303.76% 55.10% 
2002 46.6% 92.94% 62.38% 7.06% 69.44% 11.61% 81.05% 363.20% 65.74% 
2003 45.3% 93.47% 59.49% 6.53% 66.02% 11.43% 77.45% 320.13% 57.68% 
2004 40.9% 94.76% 49.51% 5.24% 54.74% 10.92% 65.66% 296.61% 54.23% 
2005 38.1% 93.11% 38.11% 6.89% 45.00% 12.21% 57.21% 269.64% 46.22% 
2006 40.2% 91.58% 39.92% 8.42% 48.34% 13.33% 61.67% 286.49% 49.15% 
2007 37.9% 89.85% 32.80% 10.15% 42.95% 11.90% 54.86% 275.11% 51.82% 
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Table 5.4 Population, Labour and Unemployment 1968-20071  



























1968 10.78% 88 98 314 578 17.5% 47 57 189 360 
1969 4.10% 110 115 314 591 9.4% 53 58 189 360 
1970 3.20% 115 119 324 603 6.4% 59 63 198 367 
1971 2.42% 117 120 331 616 4.0% 60 62 202 374 
1972 1.10% 126 127 338 628 2.3% 64 65 207 383 
1973 1.01% 127 128 343 643 1.9% 68 70 213 394 
1974 1.00% 138 140 357 661 2.0% 73 75 221 408 
1975 1.19% 133 135 369 672 2.0% 73 74 228 420 
1976 1.29% 131 132 374 680 2.0% 77 78 235 432 
1977 1.23% 128 130 383 690 2.1% 78 79 244 444 
1978 0.97% 133 134 394 702 2.8% 81 83 255 457 
1979 1.03% 134 135 403 713 2.7% 80 82 249 454 
1980 1.80% 136 139 406 721 3.1% 82 84 249 451 
1981 1.46% 135 137 408 728 3.1% 83 86 254 463 
1982 1.38% 143 145 411 741 3.6% 83 86 254 473 
1983 2.02% 146 149 419 760 0.9% 86 87 267 486 
1984 3.73% 152 158 435 783 1.2% 88 89 271 502 
1985 5.03% 151 159 444 805 1.2% 91 92 279 519 
1986 3.77% 166 172 442 826 1.5% 94 95 277 536 
1987 1st Intifada 2.52% 178 182 456 853 1.6% 100 102 283 555 
1988 2.71% 183 188 459 882 2.4% 99 101 292 577 
1989 4.39% 181 189 470 906 2.5% 99 101 301 599 
1990 3.56% 193 200 490 936 3.8% 104 108 314 627 
1991 10.28% 180 200 508 982 3.7% 108 112 326 659 
1992 4.75% 205 215 522 1029 3.5% 115 119 336 696 
1993 7.92% 201 218 543 1068 4.6% 115 120 351 733 
1994
3 
17.36% 213 258 638 1252 24.9% 103 138 394 859 
1995
3 
24.30% 225 297 733 1315 40.6% 92 155 437 902 
1996
3 
26.02% 241 325 775 1380 37.6% 106 169 465 947 
1997 23.12% 272 354 818 1466 29.0% 125 176 493 996 
1998 15.71% 316 375 849 1514 21.8% 147 188 516 1033 
1999 12.99% 334 383 883 1562 18.0% 168 205 540 1071 
2000 2nd Intifada 15.26% 341 403 920 1610 19.9% 172 214 567 1110 
2001 23.79% 302 396 955 1655 35.4% 128 198 594 1146 
2002 30.90% 275 398 994 1701 39.1% 131 215 624 1183 
2003 25.87% 317 428 1024 1749 31.0% 167 242 647 1221 
2004 25.36% 337 452 1061 1797 36.4% 157 246 676 1261 
2005 22.65% 365 471 1099 1851 31.7% 177 259 707 1304 
2006 21.51% 367 467 1058 1906 37.1% 158 251 695 1349 
2007 20.61% 380 478 1111 1961 32.1% 186 273 718 1396 
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Source: 1968-1993 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS), the estimates 1994-2007, Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). 
 
1In the years 1968-1993, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) data exclude Jerusalem. The 
Palestinian's Central Bureau of Statistics data from 1994 include Jerusalem. In this table, I excluded 




2 Until 1993, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) considered only two categories, "employed" 
and "unemployed". Since 1995, the Palestinian's Central Bureau of Statistics has added a third category 
of "under-employed" to take part-time labour into account. I estimated that the underemployed work 
halftime. 
 
 3 Populations for the years 1994-1996 are according to the estimates, which are based on growth rates 
in other years. 
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FTR  +  
NCT 
GDP 
1968 43.33% 108.31% 36.41% 56.71% 24.25% 23.29% 8.64% 17.49% 106.34% 32.46% 99.04% 
1969 32.34% 90.26% 39.85% 62.28% 24.62% 18.63% 13.60% 16.82% 107.25% 37.67% 94.02% 
1970 29.84% 84.32% 38.59% 55.95% 27.52% 16.56% 7.77% 16.71% 103.94% 28.43% 89.04% 
1971 27.24% 76.48% 40.31% 56.52% 35.81% 19.50% 12.13% 14.45% 94.13% 20.71% 83.69% 
1972 23.55% 67.17% 43.51% 59.62% 41.07% 18.49% 16.32% 12.14% 90.09% 18.55% 77.42% 
1973 26.55% 80.42% 46.59% 66.08% 42.40% 18.17% 15.64% 12.60% 95.45% 23.69% 75.77% 
1974 22.52% 79.38% 43.95% 62.04% 39.72% 18.84% 22.32% 10.98% 89.02% 22.32% 79.12% 
1975 21.36% 88.67% 47.02% 67.64% 46.35% 22.56% 18.81% 10.25% 92.23% 21.29% 76.21% 
1976 18.80% 93.05% 44.66% 63.42% 44.63% 23.23% 21.38% 9.42% 87.98% 18.79% 78.60% 
1977 17.84% 108.37% 47.22% 69.92% 45.89% 24.04% 21.57% 9.52% 92.94% 24.03% 78.15% 
1978 15.15% 110.13% 44.41% 62.52% 45.75% 24.00% 24.28% 8.62% 83.87% 16.77% 78.25% 
1979 15.26% 123.76% 45.79% 63.61% 46.74% 22.06% 22.18% 8.67% 86.02% 16.87% 75.32% 
1980 14.68% 130.30% 42.18% 57.71% 42.89% 22.00% 27.99% 7.79% 79.05% 14.82% 79.11% 
1981 15.24% 148.82% 46.32% 65.81% 49.82% 26.10% 23.67% 8.11% 84.21% 15.99% 76.28% 
1982 13.44% 145.55% 43.73% 57.38% 48.62% 22.44% 24.12% 7.23% 77.41% 8.76% 73.83% 
1983 13.84% 160.91% 45.03% 58.87% 49.89% 21.74% 22.21% 7.51% 79.27% 8.98% 71.85% 
1984 14.46% 172.49% 42.68% 55.76% 45.11% 20.01% 21.34% 7.68% 81.63% 10.65% 74.90% 
1985 15.29% 188.88% 43.21% 58.13% 43.45% 19.83% 23.06% 7.92% 83.69% 14.68% 76.38% 
1986 13.02% 166.29% 42.29% 55.14% 44.19% 19.45% 23.88% 7.31% 79.76% 10.95% 75.26% 
1987 13.76% 171.40% 45.31% 58.04% 47.77% 17.81% 20.93% 7.56% 81.77% 10.27% 70.04% 
1988 16.64% 195.15% 38.59% 45.75% 39.44% 12.25% 19.83% 7.04% 79.44% 6.31% 72.80% 
1989 16.83% 203.76% 36.36% 41.82% 37.01% 10.22% 18.88% 7.42% 78.51% 4.81% 73.21% 
1990 14.81% 182.58% 30.92% 32.98% 35.94% 9.63% 18.86% 8.01% 70.18% -2.96% 73.69% 
1991 15.78% 199.92% 40.46% 49.97% 37.18% 10.70% 23.85% 8.07% 80.86% 12.78% 73.51% 
1992 13.09% 169.96% 37.63% 44.66% 36.23% 10.25% 19.07% 7.94% 81.42% 8.43% 74.02% 
1993 13.50% 179.11% 34.88% 44.01% 26.93% 9.08% 18.56% 8.14% 90.37% 17.07% 82.15% 
1994 14.26% 193.46% 43.17% 67.16% 24.56% 12.97% 30.86% 21.89% 89.86% 42.61% 88.42% 
1995 18.09% 197.63% 41.14% 60.59% 26.80% 13.50% 28.91% 20.89% 83.98% 33.79% 86.69% 
1996 22.49% 212.67% 42.59% 65.51% 26.56% 14.85% 31.19% 24.30% 83.46% 38.95% 88.29% 
1997 24.97% 204.06% 41.61% 62.53% 26.15% 13.90% 31.07% 22.50% 82.81% 36.38% 87.74% 
1998 26.09% 192.49% 41.67% 60.84% 29.67% 14.85% 31.44% 21.55% 78.17% 31.17% 85.18% 
1999 29.27% 194.71% 44.58% 68.67% 28.49% 13.85% 39.37% 21.71% 79.09% 40.17% 85.36% 
2000 42.08% 243.70% 45.20% 71.21% 29.29% 15.62% 32.72% 25.73% 83.47% 41.92% 86.33% 
2001 55.10% 303.76% 43.33% 70.27% 18.97% 10.88% 27.34% 28.72% 95.23% 51.29% 91.91% 
2002 65.74% 363.20% 46.58% 81.05% 18.67% 11.61% 27.17% 31.91% 103.30% 62.38% 92.94% 
2003 57.68% 320.13% 45.31% 77.45% 17.96% 11.43% 30.01% 27.20% 102.28% 59.49% 93.47% 
2004 54.23% 296.61% 40.93% 65.66% 16.16% 10.92% 23.07% 27.11% 99.32% 49.51% 94.76% 
2005 46.22% 269.64% 38.06% 57.21% 19.10% 12.21% 25.85% 21.03% 91.23% 38.11% 93.11% 
2006 49.15% 286.49% 40.24% 61.67% 21.75% 13.33% 28.54% 22.45% 88.93% 39.92% 91.58% 
2007 51.82% 275.11% 37.91% 54.86% 22.05% 11.90% 25.95% 20.22% 86.64% 32.80% 89.85% 
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) up to 1994 and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
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Table 5.6 GDP per Effective Employee in West Bank and Gaza 1968-2007 






1968 3985 4358 1744 
1969 3704 3556 1274 
1970 3857 3653 1293 
1971 4309 3937 1402 
1972 4712 4088 1433 
1973 4389 4658 1538 
1974 4943 4959 1407 
1975 5134 5974 1439 
1976 5890 6973 1409 
1977 5864 8133 1339 
1978 6379 8978 1235 
1979 6258 10282 1268 
1980 7059 11628 1310 
1981 6606 12889 1320 
1982 6944 13691 1265 
1983 6492 14538 1250 
1984 6570 15130 1268 
1985 6484 16033 1298 
1986 7220 15954 1249 
1987 6565 16064 1290 
1988 6379 17099 1458 
1989 6577 18303 1512 
1990 7376 18275 1482 
1991 7289 19823 1565 
1992 8131 18669 1437 
1993 9088 19814 1493 
1994 9525 20842 1536 
1995 10080 22978 2104 
1996 9495 22871 2419 
1997 9332 21702 2655 
1998 8958 20244 2744 
1999 8997 20523 3085 
2000 8037 22688 3918 
2001 8766 28971 5255 
2002 8048 31451 5693 
2003 7743 26518 4778 
2004 8507 26627 4868 
2005 8418 24377 4179 
2006 8236 25767 4420 
2007 8027 24579 4630 
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) up to 1994 and Palestinian Central Bureau of  
Statistics (PCBS) from 1994.       
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Table 5.7 Detailed Balance of Payments Items 
Item 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Current account (net) -1,285 -950 -572 -435 -931 -1216 -938 -813 -410 
  Goods (net) -2,148 -1,960 -1,305 -1,222 -1,628 -1899 -2,171 -2,519 2600 
    Exports (free on board ) 527 491 392 320 327 355 352 565 538 
    Imports (free on board) 2,676 2,451 1,697 1,542 1,955 2254 2,523 2,619 3139 
  Services (net) -264 -294 -527 -489 -341 -302 -255 -284 -452 
    Exports 203 241 115 98 109 133 185 181 179 
    Imports 467 535 641 587 450 435 440 465 631 
  Income (net) 754 669 326 224 253 229 356 423 547 
    Receipts 776 709 342 232 255 263 392 431 555 
 Compensation of employees 706 620 200 141 204 204 269 310 380 
            Of which  from Israel 687 601 179 106 168 162 221 260 315 
        Investment income 70 89 142 91 51 58 88 122 175 
    Payments 22 40 16 9 2 33 36 9 8 
  Current transfers (net) 374 636 934 1,052 785 756 1,132 1,283 2094 
    Inflows 459 728 1,000 1,115 877 858 1,226 1,389 2202 
       To the government sector 236 240 325 415 662 532 953 1,096 1048 
           Donors transfers 227 234 324 414 660 531 951 1,093 1044 
      To the private sector 223 488 675 700 215 326 272 293 1153 
    Outflows 85 93 66 63 92 102 93 106 107 
Capital and financial account (net) 1,214 1,086 720 414 1,130 1298 1,050 894 228 
   Capital account (net) 271 189 216 291 289 660 388 272 395 
     Capital transfers (net) 270 188 215 291 289 660 388 272 394 
         Inflows 270 188 215 291 289 660 388 272 394 
         Outflows 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
     Acquisition / disposal of non- 
produced 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   Financial account (net) 943 897 504 123 841 638 661 622 -167 
     Direct investment (net) 102 -156 -345 -337 -31 60 6 -121 -16 
  Change in investment abroad (net) -87 -218 -364 -346 -49 12 -40 -139 -44 
        Change in investment in 
Palestine (net) 189 62 19 9 18 49 47 19 28 
     Portfolio investment (net) -57 -1 -65 -79 -25 22 5 -8 -126 
         Assets (net) -72 -13 -79 -87 -38 14 -9 -8 -126 
         Liabilities (net) 15 12 14 8 13 8 14 0 0 
     Other investment (net) 863 1,145 898 553 997 584 625 773 67 
          Assets (net) 661 1,087 902 591 1,074 513 512 775 86 
              Currency and deposits 527 970 769 379 897 415 544 765 67 
          Liabilities (net) 202 58 -4 -38 -78 71 112 -2 -19 
              Loans 119 121 42 43 27 55 52 11 9 
              Currency and deposits 78 -61 -41 -80 -105 16 61 -13 -29 
Net errors and omissions 71 -136 -148 21 -199 -83 -112 -81 182 
Overall balance -35 91 -16 15 101 27 -26 22 91 
Financing 35 -91 16 -15 -101 -27 26 -22 -91 
Change in reserve assets (+  = 
Decrease) 35 -91 16 -15 -101 -27 26 -22 -91 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) from 1994.       
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Table 5.8 GDP by Main Branches in the West bank and Gaza 1968-2007 
                  (percentage of GDP) 
 
 Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) up to 1994 (with a comment that the data for   
 the years 1988-1993 Is based on rough estimates) and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics   








1968 100 33.9 6.7 3.4 18.4 37.6 
1969 100 36 7.4 5.5 17 34.1 
1970 100 32.6 8.3 6.3 17.7 35.1 
1971 100 33.98 8.5 6.6 16.4 34.5 
1972 100 35 7.7 8.9 14.8 33.6 
1973 100 32.2 7.8 11.4 15.8 32.8 
1974 100 39.7 8.3 12.6 15 24.4 
1975 100 28.8 8.7 15.7 15.2 31.6 
1976 100 33.1 7.9 15.4 13.1 30.5 
1977 100 29.3 8.3 15.8 13.7 32.9 
1978 100 33.2 8.4 15.8 13.5 29.1 
1979 100 28.1 8.3 19.1 13.1 31.4 
1980 100 32.9 7.3 15.8 13 31 
1981 100 29.1 6.8 17.9 16.1 30.1 
1982 100 26.1 7 18.6 15.9 32.4 
1983 100 23.7 7.1 18.5 18.1 32.6 
1984 100 18.4 7.7 17.5 20.5 35.9 
1985 100 19.7 8 16.9 17.3 38.1 
1986 100 29.4 8.4 15.2 11.5 35.5 
1987 100 18.8 13.5 22.2 19.8 25.7 
1988 100 20 11 23 22 24 
1989 100 18 11 22 22 27 
1990 100 18 12 19 23 28 
1991 100 18 13 18 22 29 
1992 100 16 12 21 21 30 
1993 100 14 12 22 20 32 
1994 100 13.2 22.1 8.9 18.8 37 
1995 100 13 20.5 6.9 20 39.6 
1996 100 14.7 16.8 8.4 21.3 38.8 
1997 100 11.6 15.3 7.8 20.3 45 
1998 100 11.6 14.8 8.9 19.5 45.2 
1999 100 10.4 14.6 13.7 19.7 41.6 
2000 100 9.8 13.2 8.9 21.1 47 
2001 100 9.1 16.4 5.5 27.5 41.5 
2002 100 7.7 16.4 3.9 28 44 
2003 100 7.9 17 5 27.8 42.3 
2004 100 7.1 17.1 5.7 25.1 45 
2005 100 5.2 17 6.8 24.8 46.2 
2006 100 5.6 15 7.2 26.3 45.9 
2007 100 5.6 13.8 6.2 26.3 48.1 
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Table 5.9 Economic Activity in the West Bank and Gaza, 1994-2007  
                 (percentage of GDP) 
 
Economic Activity 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Agriculture and fishing 13.2 13 14.7 11.6 11.6 10.4 9.8 9.1 7.7 7.9 7.1 5.2 5.6 5.6 
Mining, manufacturing, 
electr. and water 22.1 20.5 16.8 15.3 14.8 14.6 13.2 16.4 16.4 17 17.1 17 15 13.8 
Mining and quarrying 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Manufacturing 19.7 18.4 14.9 13.3 12.8 12.6 11.4 12.5 11.8 12.6 13.2 13 11.7 9.9 
Electricity and water 
supply 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 3.3 3.8 3.8 3.2 3.4 2.8 3.5 
Construction 8.9 6.9 8.4 7.8 8.9 13.7 8.9 5.5 3.9 5 5.7 6.8 7.2 6.2 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 17.9 15.2 10.9 11.4 10.5 11 11.3 9.6 11.9 9.8 9.8 9.4 9.6 9.2 
Transport, Storage and 
Communications 3.4 3.2 3 3.9 4.6 5.1 5.4 5.6 5.6 4.6 6.1 5.8 6.6 7.5 
Financial intermediation 1.2 2 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.7 4.4 3.6 4.2 4.1 3.6 4.4 4.3 5.2 
Other services 23.7 21 20.1 20.6 20.3 19.5 21.8 21.5 23.5 22.8 22.8 23 19.6 22.2 
Real estate, renting and 
business services 12.1 10.5 9.7 10.4 9.8 8.9 11.8 10.3 11 10.3 10.4 10.3 7 7.6 
Community, social and 
personal services 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.5 
Hotels and restaurants 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 
Education 5.6 5.1 5.4 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 7.1 8 7.6 7.8 8.2 7.9 9.6 
Health and social work 3.8 3.5 3.3 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.8 3.3 3.3 3 2.5 2.7 2.8 
Public administration and 
defence 9.4 11.4 12.6 11.9 10.9 11 12.6 17.6 16.7 16.9 14.3 14.1 15.7 13.9 
Households with 
employed persons 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 
Public owned employed 
persons 0 0 1 2.4 2.8 3.5 4.7 2.8 3.6 4.5 3.7 3.4 4.5 5.8 
Less: FISIM -0.7 -1.2 -2 -2.3 -2.5 -2.9 -3.8 -3.1 -3.1 -3 -2.8 -2.6 -3 -5.7 
Plus: Customs duties 0 1.7 5.7 7.1 7.3 4.6 4.8 4.5 2.7 4.4 4.8 5.9 6.7 6.3 
Plus: VAT on imports, 
net 0.7 6.1 6.4 7.4 7.4 5.6 6.7 6.7 6.7 5.8 7.7 7.6 8.1 9.9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 5.10 Destination of Exports and Origin of Imports to West Bank and Gaza,  
                   2000-2007 (million U.S. dollars) 
 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) from 1994. 
 
       
5.5 Conclusion 
The data in this chapter is basically based on the figures of the Israeli Central Bureau 
of Statistics (ICBS) up to 1993 and the data of the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics (PCBS) from 1994 and on. The basic difficulties with obtaining reliable 
macroeconomic' long period (1968-2007) time series data due to the very unique 
situation of West Bank and Gaza were outlined. The main difficulties stem from 
different political issues that are reflected in different actual calculations of the Israeli 
Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) that generated the national accounting data from 
1968 and up to 1993 and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) that 
generated the data from 1994. Examples of such differences are: 
- Who is considered a permanent resident? Residents of East Jerusalem; are they 
citizens of Israel or West bank? What is the residency status of Palestinians who went 
abroad and were not allowed to come back? 
- How should GDP that is generated in the annexed area of East Jerusalem be 
apportioned? 
- Only partial data had been collected by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistic (ICBS) 
at the time of the first Intifada.  
- Data from Gaza are not reliable since 2006-2007 when Hamas replaced the Palestinian 
Authority. 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total Palestinian Exports 401 290 241 280 313 335 367 513 
Total Palestinian Imports 2382 1516 2034 1800 2373 2667 2759 3141 
Palestinian Net balance Trade 1981 1743 1275 1521 2061 2331 2392 2628 
Total National Exports 295 218 178 196 216 235 264 348 
Total Re Exports From Palestine 106 73 63 84 97 101 103 165 
Total Exports From West Bank 323 252 208 234 273 294 333 491 
Total Exports From Gaza 78 38 33 45 35 41 34 22 
Total Palestinian Imports From Israel 1739 1352 1117 1310 1748 1873 2002 2307 
Total Palestinian Exports to Israel 370 273 216 256 281.1 290.6 326.6 455 
Percentage of Palestinian Imports From Israel 73.0% 89.2% 54.9% 72.7% 73.7% 70.2% 72.6% 73.4% 
Percentage of Palestinian Exports to Israel 92.3% 94.0% 89.7% 91.5% 89.9% 86.6% 89.1% 88.7% 
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- Data on labour in Israel and exports and import are not reliable because of the black 
economy and smuggling that occurs and the level of these activities depends on security 
along the border. 
- Unemployed Palestinians build their homes and this activity is not measured. In most 
cases, this activity is done by professionals through the construction market and thus 
contributes to GDP. 
 
 In order to overcome some of these difficulties with the data, the analysis undertaken 
in chapter six was divided into two periods; 1968 to 1993 and 1994 to 2007. All in all 
it seems that at least in terms of consistency over time the data are reasonable to 
consider the very significant political events. Missing data at the time of the first 
Intifada were obtained from Arnon et al. (1997) and the annual accumulated capital 
was estimated according to the standards of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 
(ICBS). 
 
 Two detailed appendices provide an insight on the methodological methods of the 
Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) and the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics (PCBS). 
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Appendix 5.1 Data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) 1968-
1993 (Publication No 1012) 
 
Collection scope 
This publication presents estimates for the national accounts for Judea, Samaria128 and 
the Gaza for the years 1968-1993. The accounts include: expenditure on the gross 
domestic product and its components; disposable national income; estimates of 
domestic product by major economic branches and disposable private income. In 
addition, this publication provides tables which present background data on: 
population, labour force, balance of payments, quantities and value of agriculture 
output; cultivated agriculture area, private building area; wages and data on households 
which own durable goods, have running water and electricity in their dwellings. Most 
of the series cover both region together and each region separately. 
 
Consistency across time periods 
The accounts of gross domestic product relates to Judea and Samaria and to the Gaza 
area, excluding the Israeli localities in these regions. The series of data in the tables 
relating to the Gaza area refer to the region which was under the Israel Defence Forces' 
administration; its boundaries changed during the period under review: in May 1979 
the North Sinai area was ceded to Egyptian control and as was the Rafiah area in April 
1982. In December 1993 control of Gaza area was transferred to the Palestinian 
authority. These controls also included responsibility for official system statistics. 
 
Reliability of the data 
The free movement of residents and goods (without registration at custom stations) and 
the close ties between the Israeli economy and those of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza 
area, make it difficult to measure the volume of transactions between the residents of 
these regions and residents of Israel. Furthermore, there are no comprehensive statistics 
throughout the accounts. Consequently, some of the estimates are based on partial data 
and evaluations. 
 
The low reliability of the following items should be particularly noted: import and 
export of goods and services from Israel; private consumptions of goods and services 
                                                 
128 Judea and Samaria is equivalent to the West Bank. 
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from Israel; payments to employee from Judea and Samaria working in Israel; 
consumptions of services of non-profit institutions; revenue from industry and data on 
the construction branch. 
 
In periods of sharp price rises, the calculation of constant price estimates involves 
difficulties. In such times, certain factors have a greater effect, e.g. selection of the base 
year of weighting, distribution of expenditure over the entire year, using non-weighted 
prices indices and using price indices of similar items for deflating series for which no 
special index was compiled. The only indices for these regions which were compiled 
thoroughly and in great detail are the Consumer Price Index and the price indices for 
Agriculture Output. Other prices indices were usually estimated according to price 
indices of similar items in Israel or by evaluation. 
 
Due to the irregular situation in Judea and Samaria which began in 1988, there have 
been difficulties in gathering data on economic activity; data on trade with Israel were 
not collected and the reliability of some of the other surveys was harmed. 
 
Population background Judea & Samaria129  
In 1968, the population in Judea and Samaria numbered nearly 590,000 residents. 
During the period 1969-1993, the population grew by 86% - an average growth of 2%-
3% per annum and in 1993, there were 1,080,000 residents in the region. 
 
The population growth reflects high birth rates of about 44 per 1000 for most of the 
years. However, there was a negative migration balance for most of the years due to 
emigration to Arab countries. Only in 1990-1993, after the Gulf Crisis, was there a 
positive migration balance; in these years the population's growth reached nearly 5% 
per annum, compared to 2%-3% in prior years. 
 
Population background Gaza 
In 1968 there were 380,000 residents in the Gaza. Between 1969 and 1993 the 
population grew by 98% - an average growth 3% per annum – and in 1993 numbered 
730,000 residents in the region. 
 
                                                 
129 Without Jerusalem. 
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This population growth reflects high birth rates of about 54 per 1000 for most of the 
years. However, there was a negative migration balance for most of the years due to 
emigration to Arab countries. Only in 1990-1993, after the Gulf Crisis, was there a 
positive migration balance; in these years the population's growth reached nearly 5% 
per annum, compared to 2%-3% in prior years. 
 
Sources and Methods , Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) 
 
Value of the Gross National Product 
The value of the product was obtained by the "national expenditure" method, as well 
as by the "national income" method. According to the "national expenditure" method, 
the estimated value of the product is obtained by summing expenditure on consumption 
and capital formation plus the value of goods and services exported, after deduction of 
the value of imported goods and services. The estimate obtained using the "national 
income" method is the sum of the estimated income (net product) derived from each of 
the industrial branches. 
 
In most branches (agriculture, manufacturing industry and construction) the estimate 
of the total income accrued is obtained by deducting the estimate of purchased input 
from the estimate of output. In order economic branches, income is measured directly 
by summing up production factor payments. By definition, the estimate obtained by the 
"national income" method is identical to the estimate obtained using the "national 
expenditure" method after deducting net indirect taxes and depreciation. However, as 
the calculation of the two estimates is mostly based on independent statistical series 
and is made by two different methods, the two results differ – the discrepancy appearing 
on the national income side as "errors and omissions" 
 
Private Consumption Expenditure Estimation 
In the estimates of private consumption expenditure on agricultural produce, separate 
estimates were made for fruit and vegetables and for other agricultural produce. Private 
consumption expenditure on fruits and vegetables was calculated by multiplying the 
quantities of produce consumed by average annual prices. Estimates of quantities are 
based on data on supply of fruit and vegetables to local markets, and the data on prices 
was collected in the framework of the Consumer Price Index in Judea, Samaria and the 
Gaza area. 
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Private consumption expenditure on other agricultural produce consists of expenditure 
on local products plus imports. The net import value of agricultural produce (excluding 
fruits and vegetables), from Israel and from other countries, is based on the foreign 
trade statistics with the addition of "profit margins". The value of consumption of 
agricultural produce from local production (excluding fruit and vegetables) is 
calculated by multiplying the quantities consumed by the average annual prices. 
Quantities are estimated by type in the framework of the "agriculture branch accounts", 
and the prices are based on data collected in the framework of the Consumer Price 
Index, for Judea, Samaria and the Gaza area. 
 
Consumption expenditure on industrial goods locally manufactured is estimated on the 
basis of the average revenue per employed person, obtained in the framework of the 
industrial indices; the number of persons employed in industry was estimated according 
to the Labour Force Surveys. The estimate of consumption of imported industrial goods 
is based on foreign trade statistics, with the addition of "profit margins". 
 
The value of services of non-profit institutions is estimated for education institutions 
according to the total number of pupils and the average expenditure per pupil in 
government and United Nations Relief and Welfare Agency institutions. In health 
institutions, the value of the services is estimated according to the number of 
hospitalization days, and the corresponding average expenditure (per hospitalization 
day) in government institutions. 
 
General Government Consumption Expenditure 
The estimate of expenditure by the Civilian Administration and the local authorities is 
based on a summary of the relevant items which are obtained from an analysis of the 
financial statements or from the budgets of these bodies. 
 
Gross Capital Formation in Fixed assets 
The estimate is based on the following sources: 
Reports or development budgets of the Civilian Administration and Local authorities: 
 
[a] Reports or development budgets of the Civilian Administration and the local 
authorities. 
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[b] Data on works in infrastructure by the Israel Government (the Ministry of Housing, 
Public Work Department, the Ministry of Defence) and the Jewish National Fund.  
[c] Data on area of buildings begun and completed, which are obtained from the 
following reports: 22 local authorities report using a special questionnaire; civil 
administration offices; UN welfare and employment agencies; reports of mukhtars in 
80 small localities in Judea and Samaria, which are a representative sample of hundreds 
of small localities (mostly rural). 
 
Increase in Stocks 
The estimate was made only for olive oil. Due to the periodicity in olive output, changes 
in stocks of olive oil are particularly large. The increase in stocks was calculated as the 
difference between the value of output and the value of domestic consumption and 
exports. The estimate was based on a survey of olive-presses, exports of olive oil and 
the estimates of its consumption by the population. 
 
Imports and Exports of Goods and Services 
The data on trade in goods between Judea, Samaria and the Gaza area and Jordan and 
overseas countries are based on customs registrations. The estimate of imports of 
vehicles is based on the registrations of the licensing offices in Judea, Samaria and 
Gaza area. 
 
The data on trade in goods between Israel and Judea, Samaria and the Gaza area a gross 
evaluation based on a sample enumeration of movement of goods through the main 
transit points.  
 
Estimates at Constant Prices 
The estimates for each year are weighted at the previous year's prices. The quantity 
changes obtained by these estimates are Laspeyres quantity changes. On the other hand 
the implicit price changes (obtained by dividing the nominal change by the quantity 
change) are of a Paasche type. That is, the prices of each component receive weights 
according to the component's share in the expenditure in the current year. 
 
Estimates at 1986 prices were chained according to the quantitative changes which I 
computed annually at the previous year's prices, each expenditure component 
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separately and for the total of the components; thus, the total of the components 
obtained in this way might differ from the summary of the various components: 
 
[a] Private consumption expenditure (excluding consumption expenditure of non-profit 
institutions) 
The consumption of agricultural products and olive oil was estimated by multiplying 
the quantity consumed of every product in fixed prices. The consumption expenditure 
on industrial products (excluding olive oil) and services, by components, was estimated 
by dividing the current values by the changes in the appropriate item of the Consumer 
Price Index. 
 
[b] The consumption expenditure of private non-profit institutions and general 
government consumption expenditure: 
Compensation of employees, at constant prices, was estimated according to changes in 
the number of employees. The expenditure on current purchases of goods and other 
services, at constant prices, was computed by dividing the value at current prices by 
the appropriate price indices for the main components of purchases. 
 
[c] Capital formation in buildings, other construction works, equipment and vehicles 
At constant prices, is based on the change in average wages in the construction branch 
and on input prices in this branch, and on prices of vehicles and equipment imported 
from Israel. 
 
[d] The change in stocks of olive oil 
At constant prices, was calculated by multiplying the current year's quantity by the 
previous year's price. 
 
[e] Imports and exports of goods and services 
At constant prices, were generally calculated by dividing the value by major types of 
goods and services (according to characteristic production branch and group of 
services) by the appropriate price indices. Exports of olive oil and citrus fruit, at 
constant prices, were calculated by multiplying the current year's quantity by the 
previous year's price. 
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[f] Gross domestic product 
At constant prices was obtained as the sum of the estimates, at constant prices, of 
private and general government consumption expenditure, of capital formation and of 
exports, after deduction of imports. 
 
[g] Gross national product 
Was not calculated at constant prices, due to the difficulty in estimating, at constant 
prices, net income of the local production factors from abroad, which is mainly income 
from work in Israel. There is no unique and unequivocal price index by which this 
income can be deflated. From the employer's point of view, this income can be seen as 
the amount of work supplied (under arbitrary assumptions concerning the 
productivity), and the average price per work unit. From the employee's point of view, 
this income should be deflated in accordance with its purchasing power, i.e., according 
to the prices of goods and services which can be bought with his income. 
 
[h] Disposable national income 
At constant prices, includes, in addition to domestic product, financial flows such as 
net income of production factors and net transfers from abroad, that can be divided into 
quantity and price only under arbitrary assumptions. In consideration of specific 
purposes of analysis, for which disposable national income is to be presented in terms 
of purchasing power, at constant prices, national disposable income at constant prices 
was calculated after deflating the value at current prices by a weighted price index of 
the domestic product and of imports of goods and services. 
 
 
[i] Private disposable income, per person 
At constant prices, was calculated by deflating the current value by the implicit price 
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Appendix 5.2  Data from the Palestinian's Central Bureau of Statistics 1994-     
                         2005130 
Collection scope 
This publication presents estimates for the national accounts for the West Bank 
Jerusalem131 and the Gaza for the years 1994-2005. The accounts include: expenditure 
on the gross domestic product and its components; disposable national income; 
estimates of domestic product by major economic branches and disposable private 
income. In addition, this publication provides tables which present background data on: 
population, labour force, balance of payments, quantities and value of agriculture 
output; cultivated agriculture area, private building area; wages and data on households 
that own durable goods, have running water and electricity in their dwellings. Most of 
the series cover both region together and each region separately.   
 
Population background West-Bank132 
In 1993, the population in the West-Bank numbered 1,080,000 residents. During the 
period 1994-2005, the population grew by 87% - an average growth of 5.4% per annum 
and in 2005, there were 2,023,000 residents in the region. 
 
Population background Gaza 
In 1993 there were 730,000 residents in the Gaza. Between 1993 and 2005 the 
population grew by 92% - an average growth of 5.6% per annum – and in 2005 
numbered 1,389,000 residents in the region.  
 
                                                 
130 'Annual National Accounts Tables at Current Prices (2000-2005)' and 'National Accounts Tables at 
Current Prices (1994-2000)'. 
131 That part of Jerusalem, which was annexed after the 1967 occupation by Israel. In this work we 
excluded that data. 
132 Without Jerusalem. 
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Sources and Methods [Palestinian's Central Bureau of Statistics] (1994-2000)133 
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) was established in 1993 under the 
name of the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics. Palestinian's Central Bureau of Statistics 
has right from the outset worked on building datasets for main economic statistics 
necessary for the compilation of National Accounts; consequently, Palestinian National 
Accounts were created in 1994. The publication of such continued on annual basis until 
revised time series covering 1994-2000 in constant and current prices was achieved.  
The Making of the National Accounts: Developmental Stages 
Palestinian's Central Bureau of Statistics took up the responsibility of producing the 
official economic, social, and geographic statistical data using the latest statistical 
systems to attain accurate and sufficient data.  Henceforth, Palestinian's Central Bureau 
of Statistics has ensured utilizing the most modern international standards and 
recommendations in respect of preparation of National Accounts. SNA 93 was 
therefore adopted as a guiding framework of the statistical efforts related to the 
economy. The making of the National Accounts came across a number of 
developmental stages in a relatively short period:  
First: The National Accounts 1994 
The first estimates for National Accounts started from zero. Its cornerstone was the 
Establishments Census 1994, which constituted the sampling method of the entire 
economic surveys that took place for the first time in 1994 as time reference. These 
surveys Industry, Domestic Trade, Services (both market producers and non-profit 
institutions), and Building and Construction Contractors were the statistical databases 
necessary for the compilation of the National Accounts. The National Accounts was 
based on administrative records. The first Palestinian National Accounts emerged in 
1994; however, this experiment encountered many gaps including the following nine.  
First, calculating the net exports and imports by using the residual methodology 
through the economic equation of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on 




                                                 
133 'National Accounts Tables at Current Prices (1994-2000)'. 
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Second, estimating the formal and informal transport activity since there were no  
surveys covering them. 
Third, covering the compensation of employees from Israel only when the Gross  
National Income (GNI) was calculated. Also, the net revenues of foreign investment   
were not covered.  
Fourth, using a sample to cover the data of local government (municipalities and   
village councils). 
Fifth, the difficulty of estimating the government's data since only Gaza and Jericho   
were under Palestinian control at that time; the rest was under the control of the  
Israeli civil administration. 
Sixth, different periods of the Palestinian Household Expenditure and Consumptin 
Survey and the Labour Force Survey were inconsistent with the reference year 1994. 
Hence, we used values deflation to provide that year's estimates. 
Seventh, preparing the National Accounts using accrual basis, could not reveal places 
of internal data inconsistencies of production and expenditure sides. 
Eighth, the experiment of conducting all surveys including the Establishments Census 
1994 was relatively new; henceforth some problems were unavoidable.  
Nine, establishments Census 1994 lacked comprehensiveness with respect to coverage 
since it was an establishments census; population and housing were not included.  
 
    Second: National Accounts 1995 and 1996 
The National Accounts of 1995 and 1996 were prepared together at this stage after 
conducting field surveys using two separate questionnaires for both years. The 1996 
questionnaire was detailed whereas the 1995 questionnaire was abridged. The aim was 
to bridge the time gap in producing more recent National Accounts. The updating of 
the economic surveys of this period was based on the administrative records and a 
number of field visits. Technical advances especially with respect to coverage and 
comprehensiveness marked this stage. Firstly, a Formal Transport Survey was 
conducted to cover transport activities; whereas estimates were used in 1994. Financial 
Intermediation activities were covered through a comprehensive and organized survey 
covering banks, insurance companies, insurance brokers and money exchangers. 
Thirdly, foreign trade statistics of exports and imports were available thus avoiding 
estimates by using the residual methods. Fourthly, preparing the Palestinian Balance of 
Payments for both years (1995 and 1996) enabled the calculation of GDP and Gross 
Disposable Income (GDI). The Palestinian Balance of Payments provided estimates on 
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services from foreign trade. Fifthly, economic surveys were conducted based on the 
Establishments Census 1994; these were updated by including establishments founded 
after 1994. However, this updating did not take into consideration the faults of the 1994 
Census. 
 
Despite the advances made in statistical coverage, the preparation of data remained 
based on accrual basis of the GDP whether by using the output or production approach, 
the expenditure approach, or the income approach. However, the problem of being 
unable to reveal in details the inconsistent data remained. Henceforth, we were unable 
to carry out the required adjustments of the economic activities and dealings in an 
organized methodology. 
 
Third: Supply and Use Tables: National Accounts 1997 and 1998  
Two factors marked this stage, which constituted a significant technical shift for the 
estimates of the National Accounts:  
 
Firstly, it was based on the Population, Housing, and Establishment Census 1997, 
which enabled a better level of coverage and comprehensiveness whether in respect of 
sampling method of economic surveys (establishments' record) or estimates of 
households' expenditure in accordance with the findings of the Population Census.  
 
Secondly, using Supply and Use Tables as a methodology to prepare and construct the 
National Accounts. Such methodology is characterized by achieving full internally 
consistent data even on the disaggregated level. Equilibrium is then established 
between the supply and use sides by adjusting the data of lower quality to be consistent 
with those that are believed to be more reliable. Undoubtedly, this would achieve a 
higher level of quality and data consistency compared to previous years.  
 
This stage revealed a number of data inconsistencies on the disaggregated level and 
sometimes led to important adjustments to some data sources such as foreign trade and 
agricultural statistics. Additionally, better estimates of the informal sector after it 
covered the activities of establishments and transport only were achieved at this stage. 
This contributed to deepening the understanding of those preparing the data of the 
structure of the national economy and its different interactions. 
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Fourth: Revised Time Series in Current and Constant Prices (1994-2000) 
A series of accounts that could not assist in holding comparisons, derivations, or rates 
of growth of the national economy was produced. This inconsistency failed to enable 
data users to benefit from analysing the state of the economy of the country. 
Henceforth, it was unavoidable to carry out a comprehensive review in order to produce 
a revised time series that meets the minimum requirements, which would allow holding 
comparisons of analysing the total economy throughout the years. Producing National 
Accounts in constant prices for the first time marked this stage. It was the actual base 
to judge the level of development in the total economy. The creation of the time series 
for the National Accounts required a number of procedures and technical handling 
including: 
 
1.  Re-weighting of the economic surveys of 1994-1996 based on the findings of the 
Establishments Census 1997 including redefining the limits of Jerusalem according 
to 1997 Census. 
2. Recompiling and processing of the data from sources other than the economic 
surveys including updating administrative records (including mainly local and 
central government data and the data of the United Nations Relief Works Agency .  
3. Making use of the Supply and Use Tables prepared throughout two consecutive 
years to decide the required adjustments to balance values on accrual basis on both 
sides of Production and Expenditure.  
4. Preparing the required price deflators to create the revised time series in constant 
prices. 
 
Fifth: Future Projects and Plans 
 
1. Institutional sectors' accounts: The National Accounts department has currently 
started producing institutional sectors' accounts separately. Such accounts provide 
clear pictures in respect of the growth of each sector and an overview of the 
performance of the economy in general. They also reveal the most widespread sector 
in the national economy and provide detailed description of the various stages of the 
economic production including output calculation, income generation, income 
distribution and utilization, and financial and non-financial accounts. 
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The System of National Accounts divides the economy into five economic sectors, 
these being: Financial sector; Non-financial sector; Non-profit household serving 
sector; Government sector; Family sector In addition the rest of the world account 
shows interactions between the domestic economy and the outside world. 
 
Providing detailed data on the GDP, GNI, GD1 according to economic sector 
provides a clearer picture of the performance of the economy and enables 
researchers and decision-makers to make more accurate decisions with respect to 
the nature of required projects and the type of decisions need to be made. It also 
provides a clearer view for investors concerning the performance of the economy in 
the country. 
 
2. Short term indicators and quarterly accounts: They represent a significant 
shift in the creation of the Palestinian National Accounts. Quarterly accounts aim to 
produce data on the National Accounts on a quarterly basis. They reflect the 
economic growth taking place over short periods in time in order to enable analysts, 
investors, and decision makers to understand the performance of the economy 
throughout each quarter of the year. Quarterly accounts are used for the purpose of 
short-term analysis where annual accounts become insufficient. 
 
Short-term indicators, which are the main tool for the making of the quarterly 
accounts, are represented in the monthly survey, which Palestinian's Central Bureau 
of Statistics conducts on a monthly basis. This survey covers the most prominent 
economic indicators of the industry, domestic trade, services transportation, 
stockpiling, and communication surveys as well as the Establishment Survey and 
other short-term indicators including the Labour Force Survey and the Household 
Monthly Expenditure and Consumption Survey. The last is conducted by 
Palestinian's Central Bureau of Statistics on monthly basis and covers the most 
prominent indicators of the expenditure and consumption of the Palestinian 
households. 
 
3. Time series future estimates: Once the quarterly National Accounts are made, 
time series future estimates follow and provide futuristic view of the economic 
performance.  
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Table A5.1 Sources and Methods (Palestinian's Central Bureau of Statistics)   
                    (2000-2005)134 Data sources for the GDP from the Production side 
Activity Source Notes 
Agriculture and 
Fishing 
- Agriculture Statistics 
- Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey 
- Oil Presses Survey 
- The compensation of employees obtained from 
the Labour Force Survey. 
- Estimates available about the intermediate 
consumption of the Fishing production due to 
lack of data. 
- Oil presses survey provides estimates about 
farmers' production from pressing olives as a 
secondary activity. 
Mining and Quarrying Industry Survey  
Manufacturing - Industry Survey 
- Oil Presses Survey 
- Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey 
 
Electricity and Water Supply - Industry Survey 
- Local government budgets  
- Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey 
 
Construction Contractors’ Survey (Formal Sector) 
Existing building survey (Informal Sector) 
LFS data for the compensation of employees 
were used in estimating them for the informal 
sector. 
Wholesale and Retail Trade Internal Trade Survey  
Hotels and Restaurants Services Survey  
Transport Transport Survey (Formal Sector) 
Informal Transport Survey 
(Informal Sector) 
 
Financial Intermediation Finance Survey  
Real Estate, renting and 
Business services 
- Services Survey 
- Palestinian Expenditure and 
Consumption Survey 





- Central Government Budget 
- Local Government Budget 
- Government abroad Budgets 
 
Education - Services Survey 
- United Nations Relief and Welfare Agency Budget 
- Ministry of Education budget 
 
Health and social work - Services Survey 
- United Nations Relief and Welfare Agency Budget 
- Ministry of Health budget 
 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Services Survey  
Households with employed 
persons 
- Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey  
 
                                                 
134 'Annual National Accounts Tables at Current Prices (2000-2005)' 
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Table A5.2 Data Sources for the GDP from the Expenditure Side 
Transaction Source Notes 
Household Final Consumption Palestinian Expenditure and 
Consumption Survey 
 
Government Final Consumption Administrative records from: 
- Central Government 
- Local Government 
- Extra Budgetary institutions 
- Government Abroad 
- Palestinian Expenditure and 
Consumption Survey 
 
NPISH Final Consumption - Services Survey 
- UNRAWA Budget 
- Palestinian Expenditure and 
Consumption Survey 
 
Gross capital formation For Buildings (Contractors Survey)  
For Non buildings (Imports of capital 
goods from the Foreign trade statistics) 
 
Changes in inventories Economic surveys  
Exports Foreign trade statistics exports of 
goods)  
Rest of the world estimates (exports of 
services) 
 
Imports Foreign trade statistics (imports of 
goods) 
Rest of the world estimates 
(imports of services) 
 
 
Table A5.3 Data Sources for the GNI and GNDI 
Transaction Source Notes 
Income vis-à-vis nonresidents, net Compensation of 
employees (residents) 
receivable abroad 
Compensation of employees (nonresidents) payable 
abroad 
Balance of Payments  
Property Income, net 
Property Income receivable 
Property Income payable 
Balance of Payments  
Current Transfers from abroad, net  
Current Transfers receivable from abroad 
Current Transfers payable for abroad 
Balance of Payments  
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The Main Basis for Revision Process 
During the process of compiling this time series, many economic indicators changed 
and a cumulative process of expertise was achieved. Based on the following it was 
necessary to have a revised time series for the National Accounts covering the period 
2000-2005 based on the following considerations: 
1. The updating process of the data sources when it was possible depending on the 
latest administrative records available from mainly the Government and United 
Nations Relief and Welfare Agency. 
2. Unifying the methodologies from the various data sources based on the latest one, 
such as the methodologies for estimating the government production, imputed rent 
and the gross capital formation. Using the latest methodologies improve the data 
quality for data compilation. 
3. Unifying the data coverage for the data by economic activities. This was 
accomplished by revising the economic surveys data based on the results of the 
Establishments Census 2004 since based on this, it showed that there was under 
coverage in the frames for compiling the economic surveys for the years 2000-2003 
that depended on the 1997 Census. 
4. Improving the consistency of the data by checking the framework of the data, such 
as checking the proportion of the inputs to the outputs, the value added per 
employee, in addition to the logic of the growth rates for the output and value added, 
in addition to the regional distribution for the data. 
5. Balancing the GDP from both the production and expenditure sides at current 
prices. 
6. Re checking for the data at current prices after compiling those at constant prices 
based on the general overview about the performance of the economy.  
 
Revised Time Series at Constant Prices 
The methodology for compiling the National Accounts at constant prices is based on a 
set of price indices and dilators. Mainly Palestinian's Central Bureau of Statistics 
produce three types of indices (Consumer price index, producer and wholesaler price 
index) based on the average of the year 1996 as a base year. 
 
The process for deflating divided into two steps: First step by compiling the necessary 
deflators in format and details of the SUT, while in the second step those deflators were 
used in order to deflate the various transactions in the SUT. 
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Table A5.4 Various Indices used to Deflate Various Transactions 
Transaction Source Notes 
Output 
Output from Goods 





Special Index based on the 
components of the output 
Pal- CPI 
 
Palestinian's Central Bureau of 
Statistics Palestinian's Central 
Bureau of Statistics  
Palestinian's Central Bureau of 
Statistics 
VAT on Imports Pal-WPI Palestinian's Central Bureau of 
Statistics 
Intermediate Consumption 









Household Final Consumption  
Government Final 
Consumption 
NPISH Final Consumption 
 
Pal- CPI  
Special Index based on the 




Palestinian's Central Bureau of 
Statistics  
Palestinian's Central Bureau of 
Statistics  
Palestinian's Central Bureau of 
Statistics 
Gross Capital Formation 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 






Palestinian's Central Bureau of 
Statistics  
Palestinian's Central Bureau of 
Statistics 
Exports of goods and services Pal-PPI Palestinian's Central Bureau of 
Statistics 
 
Institutional National Accounts 
The methodology for compiling the Institutional National Accounts is based mainly on 
the Annual Basic National Accounts, therefore the results of this report as for the 
institutional accounts depend on the annual national accounts for the years 2000-2005 
as a basis for the institutional distribution for institutions and based on the 
recommendations of the SNA’ 93. Two approaches were used to compile the 
institutional national accounts based on the sources of the data and there particularity. 
First Approach consists of: 
Agriculture and Fishing: classified as Household sector. 
Financial Intermediation: Financial Institutions Sector. 
Public owned enterprise: Non-Financial Institutions. 
Public Administration and Defence: Government Sector. 
Household Services: Household Sector. 
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Second Approach consists of: 
All activities where data are collected from the economic surveys, and data classified 
by their institutional sectors based on the legal entities. 
A percentage contribution for each sector was used as a basis for distributing the data 
for each sector. 
 
Quarterly National Accounts 
Before talking about the quarterly national accounts, it is necessary to introduce the 
main sources for the QNA. 
The QNA depend on a set of short-term indicators that serve as a tool for the 
compilation; those indicators must have a periodicity of monthly or quarterly basis.  
 
Table A5.5 Main Data Sources for the Compilation 
 Activity Source Notes 
Agriculture and 
Fishing 
Number of Employees in 
Agriculture 
The recommendations were to use 
the quantity of agricultural 
production. 
Mining and Quarrying Industrial Production Index Within the recommendations 
Manufacturing Industrial Production Index Within the recommendations 
Electricity and Water Supply Quantity of consumed water Within the recommendations 
Construction Number of Employees in 
Construction 
Building Licenses 
Quantity of imported cement 
Within the recommendations 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade 
Number of Employees in 
Trade 
The recommendations to use the 




Number of Bed night Within the recommendations 
Transport Number of licensed vehicles 
Number of Employees in 
Transport 
Within the recommendations 
Financial Intermediation Credit facilities 
PMA assets and liabilities 
Checks clearances 
Within the recommendations 
Real Estate, renting and 
Business services 
Number of Employees in 
Renting service 
The recommendations to use the 
number of new building. 
Public Administration 
and Defense 
Revenues and expenditures 
for central government Budget 
Within the recommendations 
Education Revenues and expenditures 
for the Ministry of Education 
Within the recommendations 
Health and social work Revenues and expenditures 
for the Ministry of Health 
Within the recommendations 
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The QNA methodology: 
The following steps are used for the compilation of QNA: 
 Collecting the necessary short-term indicators for all economic activities in order 
to derive the GDP at constant prices. The data must be monthly or quarterly. 
 From those indicators, indices were derived for each activity based on the format 
of the Supply and Use Tables. 
 Based on the results of the annual national accounts, the value added for each 
activity was distributed based on the derived indices. 
 
Definitions 
National Accounts - The National Accounts System of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza 
area is based on a guidebook of the U.N. Statistical Office: UN, A system of National 
Accounts and Supporting Tables, Studies in Methods, Series F, No.2, Rev. 3, New 
York, 1968, with the exception of the following differences:  
 
[a] Expenditure on general government consumption and on consumption of services 
of private non-profit institutions does not include the imputed expenditure on pensions 
for general government employees, for whom the employers does not set aside special 
funds for this purpose. Furthermore, it does not include the value of depreciation of 
fixed assets which served the Civil Administration, the local authorities and the private 
non-profit institutions.  
[b] Expenditure on services of private non-profit institutions, which were supplied to 
households free of charge, was not itemized separately from expenditure on private 
consumption of households.  
[c] Gross domestic product, at market prices, does not include taxes on imports, but 
does include subsidies on exports.  
 
Below are definitions based on the U.N. guidebook mentioned above:  
 
Gross domestic product, at market prices, is the net value of goods and services, 
prior to deduction of allocations for consumption of fixed capital assets, produced by 
factors of production in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza area, excluding Israeli localities. 
It is equal to the sum of: private consumption expenditure + general government 
consumption + gross domestic capital formation expenditure + net exports (exports less 
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imports) of goods and services. It also equals the sum of gross value added, at market 
prices, of all domestic economic branches.  
 
Gross national product equals the gross domestic product plus net factor incomes 
received from abroad. In Judea and Samaria and the Gaza area, the main addition is the 
income of residents employed in Israel.  
 
Gross disposable national income equals the income of the residents of Judea, 
Samaria and the Gaza area from all sources. It is equal to the gross national product, at 
market prices, plus net current transfers from abroad.  
  
Private consumption expenditure includes the consumption expenditure of 
households together with the value of services of non-profit institutions, without 
distinction.  
 
General government consumption expenditure is the value of current expenditure 
on goods and services undertaken by the local authorities and the Civilian 
Administration in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza area. It includes payments to employees 
and purchases enterprises in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza area and abroad, less current 
sales to enterprises and households.  
 
Gross domestic capital formation represents the gross value of assets added to 
domestic capital inventory in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza area, excluding the Israeli 
localities. It includes expenditure on acquisition of fixed assets and the value of 
physical changes in stocks.  
 
Capital formation in fixed assets includes the free on board value of goods and 
services sold abroad and to Israel plus subsidies. This item comprises: merchandise, 
supply transportation services, insurance and other non-factor services; they do not 
include factor income from abroad and from Israel. 
 
Imports of goods and services comprise the Cost, Insurance and Freight value of 
goods and services purchased from abroad plus taxes. They do not include factor 
payments to abroad. 
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Net factor income payments from abroad are earnings of residents working abroad 
(in Israel, Jordan and other countries), less the corresponding factor payments made 
abroad and income of the residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza area, such as rent, 
interest, dividends and profits of direct investment enterprises.  
 
Net current transfers from abroad are net current income in cash or in kind received 
from abroad, where there is no quid pro quo.  
 
Transfers to abroad mainly include taxes and national insurance payments and 
payments to insurance funds on income from wages of workers in Israel. 
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Chapter 6 - Empirical Findings, Discussion 
of Findings and Policy Implications 
 
6.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to close an empirical gap in the analysis of the economic 
history of the West Bank and Gaza during the occupation period. What is probably the 
most profound and detailed macroeconomic study of the West Bank and Gaza was 
conducted by Arnon et al. (1997). Their analysis began immediately after the Oslo 
Accord, and the optimistic projections of their study reflect the optimism of the Oslo 
Accord. Unfortunately, their study used data collected only until 1994, and their 
optimistic projection was destroyed by the reality of the second intifada. Unfortunately, 
Arnon et al's study completely ignored the effect of foreign aid on the relation between 
endogenous parameters and the GDP. This study intends to incorporate missing 
component. Arnon et al. separated the West Bank from the Gaza Strip. According to 
their analysis, private consumption in a given year is a function of consumption in 
previous years and disposable income in the year under consideration. Governmental 
consumption is a function of direct and indirect taxes. I adopted their assumption that 
the level of exports to Israel is exogenous to the Palestinian economy and contingent 
on the GNP of Israel. Exports to other countries, which are quite small, are contingent 
on the production of agricultural crops (mainly olives) and the exchange rate of the 
Jordanian dinar. Later in this chapter, I will show that the regression analysis of Arnon 
et al. supports my finding that the ration of imports to total uses (β) is fairly constant.  
 
The goal of this chapter will be attained by empirically answering the following 
questions that are not addresses in earlier studies such as Arnon et al'. : 
1. Is the GDP of the West Bank and Gaza almost entirely determined by an exogenous 
foreign currency constraint? If so, then growth is determined according to the two-
gap model of Chenery and Strout (1966) and the analysis of Harms and Lutz (2004) 
with the assumption that the balance-of-payments gap is the effective constraint. 
One should consider that according to the two-gap model, investment and therefore 
growth of the GDP are determined by either the savings gap constraint or by the 
foreign currency gap constraint and not by equilibrium of investment and 
consumption.  
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2. Is the economy of the West Bank and Gaza infected by symptoms typical of Dutch 
Disease? Did the symptoms exist in both periods, from 1968-1993 when foreign 
aid was relatively low but income from work in Israel was relatively high and in 
the post-Oslo period of 1994-2007 when foreign aid was much higher but the inflow 
from work in Israel was much lower? These questions will be answered by 
identifying the correlation between the shocks of aid and political conditions and 
the GDP, exports, imports, and the tradable and non-tradable sectors (see Corden 
and Neary 1982; Matsuyama 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995; Djankov et al. 2006, 
2008; Kang et al. 2013; Rajan and Subramanian 2005, 2008, 2011). 
 
3. If there are positive answers to the previous questions and if the West Bank and 
Gaza economy is infected by Dutch Disease, then what are the sources of this 
infection? To examine these questions, I applied a multiple regression diagnostic 
test that considers only rates of annual change in the GDP while examining the 
direction of causality by considering lags between the dependent and independent 
variables. The classical literature on Dutch Disease identifies the appreciation of 
the real exchange rate (RER) as the intermediate source of Dutch Disease135. 
Namely, the excessive inflow of foreign currency appreciates the RER under 
equilibrium. However, in the case of the West Bank and Gaza, there is no national 
currency, and thus there is no exchange rate. In addition, if in the case of the West 
Bank and Gaza, the two-gap model is valid, all sources of foreign currency are 
exogenous and the ratio of import to total uses (β) cannot be changed in the long 
run, then the GDP is almost entirely determined by exogenous constraints rather 
than by conditions of equilibrium; thus, in the case of the West Bank and Gaza, the 
analysis will not include the element of RER136. Accordingly, I examined only the 
effect of direct sources for the symptoms of Dutch Disease such as firstly, the Israeli 
policy of using low-cost labour from Palestine to develop the economy of Israel 
rather than supporting the development of the Palestinian economy, secondly, the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in times of military clashes and terror and thirdly, 
exogenous constraints on the economy that are imposed by Israel. I would like to 
emphasise at this preliminary stage of the chapter that currently there is no literature 
                                                 
135 See Cordan and Neary (1982), Rajan and Subramanian (2011) and others. 
136 Cali (2011) estimated the RER by comparing the prices of various products in the West Bank to the 
prices of the identical products in annexed East Jerusalem. I do believe that this methodology provides 
only rough estimates of the RER.  
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that analyses the specific and combined effects of multiple individual sources of 
Dutch Disease under conditions that prevailed in the West Bank and Gaza. Thus, it 
is nearly impossible to quantify the contribution of each factor to the phenomenon 
of Dutch Disease in the West Bank and Gaza, and some of the questions that I have 
raised will not have well-quantified, empirical answers. 
 
4. One should examine also the causality direction of the relation between foreign aid 
and GDP because even if there is a negative correlation between foreign aid and 
GDP, it is quite possible that the negative correlation is simply because greater 
poverty leads to more foreign aid. 
 
The next section in this chapter investigates the first question and provides a positive 
answer. Section 6.3 demonstrates the major Dutch Disease symptoms that existed 
before the Oslo agreement and with greater impact than after the Oslo agreement. The 
main symptoms are increased foreign aid, lower growth rates of GDP and exports, an 
increase in the non-tradable sector, increased unemployment and the relation between 
these phenomena and various additional factors such as terror and political constraints. 
Section 6.4 presents statistical limitations of the analysis. This section is presented 
before the application of additional multiple regression analysis related to the sources 
of Dutch disease. In this section, I will analyse various statistical difficulties including 
the difficulty of determining the causality directions of the correlations between the 
independent and dependent variables while eliminating the potential simultaneity 
biases because of endogenous relations between the dependent and independent 
variables. Section 6.5 presents multiple regression analysis to examine the factors that 
possibly caused the symptoms of Dutch Disease. Section 6.6 presents additional efforts 
to diagnose the effect of the political environment on GDP using multiple regressions. 
Section 6.7, the last section of the chapter, concludes the argument. 
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6.2 Is GDP of the West Bank and Gaza Determined Exogenously? 
One of the basic claims in this thesis is that the terms in the bracket on the right  
side of equation (4-7),  
 






are exogenous terms and  , the ratio of import to total uses of the economy, is nearly 
constant. This is most likely because of the inability or low profitability of replacing 
imports by local production. If in the case of the West Bank and Gaza, the above claims 
are justified empirically, then the analysis of growth according to the two-gap model is 
strengthened. To answer the question at the beginning of this section, let me first review 
and analyse the basic related data in the tables in Chapter 5 and then add more 
calculations. 
 
Recall that the term FTR+NTC includes all types of capital and financial transfers from 
abroad such as financial assistance to the public sector, donations to the non-
government sector and all other capital and financial accounts such as foreign direct 
investment, loans, changes in foreign currency reserves and remittances. According to 
Table 5.2, the average annual FTR+NCT per capita from 1994 to 2007 amounted to 
USD 667, approximately 47% of the GDP. The dollar value of average per capita 
FTR+NCT from 1994 to 2007 is more than three times the average from 1968 to 2003. 
Immediately after the two Intifadas, direct foreign investment and investment in 
financial assets and loans, which were previously low, declined even further because 
such investments are negatively correlated with political risk and terror. The average 
currency deposits reserve during the years 1999-2007 were USD 593 million (see Table 
5.7). Such a low level can only finance approximately three months of the balance of 
payments deficit; thus, it is nearly impossible to use foreign currency deposits as a 
sustainable supply source of foreign currency that can respond to endogenous demand 
pressures on foreign currency. 
 
Exports, imports and the demand for foreign currency are normally endogenous factors 
that are determined by supply and demand equilibrium conditions. However, the basic 
claim in the case of the West Bank and Gaza is that these factors are exogenous factors. 
As is evident in Table 5.10, in the years 2000 to 2007, between 87% to 94% of 
Palestinian exports were destined for Israel although approximately 72% of its imports 
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originated from Israel137. Exports to Israel and the rest of the world are administrated 
by Israel, which controls land, air and sea access to the West Bank and Gaza. The main 
reason stated by Israel for exercising this control is security and fear that materials used 
in terrorist attacks will be smuggled into the West Bank and Gaza with civilian goods. 
However, other factors may also play a part in this control. For example, economic and 
public health considerations are used to justify restricting entry from the West Bank 
and Gaza to Israel of both agricultural, fresh and processed products and 
pharmaceutical products to prevent competition with Israeli farmers and 
manufacturers. A detailed presentation of the various constraints and their costs is 
given in the report of the Palestinian Ministry of National Economy (2011). The 
executive summary of this report declared, 
"…. This “exploitative” policy has been coupled by the desire of Israel 
to prevent any Palestinian competition with Israeli economic interests. 
This attitude is summed up by Yitzhak Rabin, while holding the post 
of Israel’s defense minister in 1986: “There will be no development 
initiated by the Israeli Government, and no permits will be given for 
expanding agriculture or industry, which may compete with the State 
of Israel” (UNCTAD 1986). This has been (and still is) reflected in a 
series of Israeli obstacles related to customs, transportation and 
infrastructure which have prevented the development of a competitive 
Palestinian tradable sector and of Palestinian trade with non-Israeli 
partners…The total costs imposed by the Israeli occupation on the 
Palestinian economy which we have been able to measure was USD 
6.897 billion in 2010, a staggering 84.9% of the total estimated 
Palestinian GDP. In other words, had the Palestinians not been subject 
to the Israeli occupation, their economy would have been almost 
double in size than it is today."138 
 
Accordingly, for all intents and purposes, exports from the West Bank and Gaza are 
exogenous. The level of imports to use, which is denoted in the model as β, is the ratio 
of imports to the total national use. The average β for the period 1968-2007 is 42.0% 
(see Table 5.1, p.144), with a standard deviation of only 3.7%. Thus, empirically β is 
virtually constant, and the small changes that do occur are temporary ones and are 
                                                 
 137 Note that the first two years of Al Aqsa Intifada (2001-2002) are exceptions. In 2001, the proportion 
of imports from Israel was 89.2% whereas in 2002, imports from Israel amounted to only 54.9%. It is 
possible that there are errors in the data that shifted imports from 2002 to 2001. However, it is also 
possible that there were real changes in imports from Israel during these abnormal years of intense and 
violent clashes. 
  
138 Without denying the existence of the various constraints, I would like to note that the above 
calculations are debatable because they ignore the immense positive effect of the well-developed Israeli 
economy on the economy of the West Bank and Gaza, at least in the first years that the two economies 
began to interact. 
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primarily because of political events. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the 
Palestinian GDP is determined exogenously by the parameters of Equation (4-7)139. 
The support of the above claim and its implications are exhibited in the following 
analysis.  
 
According to the two-gap model, either foreign currency or the level of savings is the 
crucial constraint on development. Figure 6.1 below presents the simple fact that in the 
case of the West Bank and Gaza, the investment rate was much higher than the savings 
rate. In fact, following the dramatic increase in FTR+NCT after 1990, the savings rate 
decreased and has remained negative since 1994.  
 
Figure 6.1 The Ratios of Savings, Investment and FTR+NCT of GNP, West Bank 




Source: Table 5.5 in Chapter 5, p.151. 
 
Figure 6.1 clearly indicates that even before 1994, investents had to be financed by 
FTR+NCT. Since 1994, savings is negative; however, the average annual investment 
rate is higher and the rate of FTR+NCT of GNP is much higher. The entire 
investment is financed by the exogenous sources of foreign currency. The 
dependency of investment on the available foreign currency can also be observed in 
Figure 6.2 below. 
                                                 
139 Because birth rate is determined mainly by cultural and religious factors and immigration is restricted, 
the per capita GDP is also exogenous. 
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Figure 6.2 The Ratios of (FTR+NCT) to Imports and Investments, West Bank and 




Source: Table 5.1 and Table 5.5 in Chapter 5 p. 144. 
 
Figure 6.2, indicates that after 1994, FTR+NCT financed more than half of imports and 
that the level of FTR+NCT was higher than the level of investments. In some years, 
FTR+NCT are more than twice the investment. Figure 6.2 emphasises the strong 
dependence between imports and investments and the sources of foreign aid post-1994, 
including remittances. It can be observed in figure 6.2 that over the entire period 
(FTR+NCT)/Imports are highly and positively correlated with the ratio of 
(FTR+NCT)/Investment (correlation of 0.96 with p < 0.00). This result is because of a 
positive correlation between investments and imports and the positive correlation 
between imports and FTR+NCT.  
 
I now investigate whether FTR+NCT, EX and W, of Equation (4-7) are exogenous 
parameters. Exports to Israel are exogenous to the Palestinian economy and contingent 
on the GNP of Israel. Exports to other countries are contingent on the production of 
agricultural crops (mainly olives) and the exchange rate of the Jordanian dinar. The 
sum of foreign transfers and net capital transfers (FTR+NCT) represents total foreign 
development aid plus foreign direct investments (FDA+FDI) and remittances to the 
West Bank and Gaza. These terms are estimated as the deficit in the current account of 
the balance of payments minus revenues from workers' compensations from outside 
the West Bank and Gaza, primarily from Israel. In any economy, it is reasonable to 
assume that Financial Transfers (FTR) are determined exogenously whereas the Net 
Capital Transfers (NCT) can be a function, inter alia, of the fluctuating supply and 
demand of foreign currency because of various economic supply and demand factors. 
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Generally, in a "normal" economy, an increase in the level of investment and growth 
of GDP is accompanied by an increase in the demand for foreign currency. This 
demand can be supplied by foreign currency loans, changes in currency reserve and 
changes in the exchange rate. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza, there is no 
national Palestinian currency; thus, induced changes in the exchange rate are not 
possible. As was previously explained, great political risk, including the risk of 
recurring violence, reduces the degree of freedom for endogenous NCT changes; in 
addition, loans are not available. Given the low level of currency reserves both in 
aggregate terms and relative to the trade deficit (see Figure 6.3 below), the margin for 
policy-induced sustainable changes in the currency reserves is extremely slim. 
 
Figure 6.3 The Ratios of Foreign Currency Reserve, Loans and Investment to    
                   Imports, West Bank and Gaza, 1999 - 2007  
 
 
Source: Table 5.5 and 5.7 in Chapter 5 p.151. 
 
Figure 6.3 shows that the ratio of the reserve of foreign currency to imports was volatile 
(45% to 5%). However, these changes were insignificantly correlated with the ratio of 
investments to imports. The balance of loans was quite low relative to imports. Thus, 
we can conclude from the two figures that the level of investments was related to the 
level of FTR+NCT and that the level of investment could not be significantly increased 
or decreased by loans or by a sustainable change in the level of the reserve of foreign 
currency. 
 
Figure 6.4 below shows that over the entire period from 1968 through 2007, β, the ratio 
of imports to XGP EICC   ,was relatively constant. 
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Figure 6.4 (FTR+NCT)/Uses, β, Investments/Uses and Normalised Per Capita   
                   GDP (to 50% in 2007)  
 
 
Source: Tables 5.2 and 5.5 in Chapter 5, p.146. 
 
The average   in the period was 42.0% with a standard deviation of only 3.6%. The 
main decrease in   was in the period of the first intifada (1988-1990). However, in 
that period, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) encountered difficulties 
collecting data; thus, the data from this period is less reliable. Excluding these years 
from the calculations, the standard deviation drops to 3.1%, and in the post-Oslo period, 
the standard deviation drops to only 2.5%. The above results support the basic claim of 
the model that GDP was determined by exogenous parameters in nearly all periods with 
the exception of periods of extreme violence in the region.  
 
Figure 6.4 presents additional significant and relevant phenomena. First, the ratio of 
FTR+NCT to total use was much more volatile than  . Thus, dependence on foreign 
aid increased the risk and the volatility of the economy. Second,   was significantly 
and positively correlated to the ratio of FTR+NCT to total use. Between 1968 and 1993, 
this correlation was only 27.0% (p < 0.12); however, in the period of 1994 to 2007, it 
soared to 0.63% (p < 0.015). These correlations indicate again that the balance of 
payments gap was financed by the various types of foreign aid. Third, there was a 
strong and significant negative correlation between the ratio of (FTR+NCT) to total 
use and the ratio of investment to total use. In the period from 1968-1993, the 
correlation is -73.5% (p < 0.00); and in the period from 1994-2007, this correlation is 
–56.2% (p < 0.04). Namely, (FTR+NCT) support relatively more consumption than 
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investment. These results suggest that relatively, foreign aid and remittances did not 
contribute either directly or indirectly to the share of investments of use. These results 
coincide with what is shown in Figures 1.7 and 1.8, which present the official 
destinations of foreign aid. Whether the flow of foreign currency did indeed induce 
Dutch Disease symptoms will be analysed in the next section of the chapter. 
 
6.3 Are the West Bank and Gaza Infected by Dutch Disease 
Symptoms? 
The basic claim in the literature of Dutch Disease is that a flood of foreign currency 
induces appreciation of the real exchange rate (RER) of the local currency and 
consequently the tradable sectors of the local economy cannot compete with the 
imported products that become relatively cheaper. Corden and Neary (1982) presented 
an equilibrium model of Dutch Disease that described the phenomena that diagnosed 
Dutch Disease. Oomes and Kaclcheva (2007) presented in the abstract of their paper 
the following four symptoms of Dutch Disease: 
(1) Real exchange rate appreciation, (2) Slower manufacturing growth, (3) Faster service 
sector growth, and (4) Higher overall wages.  
 
Corden (1984) added more signs of Dutch Disease such as investment in the non- 
tradable sectors, increased unemployment, and migration from areas in which tradable 
goods are manufactured. The literature regarding the growth of underdeveloped 
countries that analyses the effect of foreign aid on Dutch Disease also considers other 
factors such as unemployment and slower growth of the GDP in addition to the 
appreciation of the RER. This literature also considers the dependency on foreign aid 
and various additional factors (such as politics, governmental control, democracy, 
corruption and more) that generate this dependency and reduce the effectiveness of 
foreign aid (For a review of this literature see this thesis Chapter 3, page 118, Brautigam 
and Knack, 2004 and Jones, 2013).  
 
The following section will demonstrate the effect of foreign aid in various time periods 
in a series of measures and calculations of correlations. In the next section I will further 
present regression analysis in an effort to identify the factors that led to the Dutch 
Disease phenomena in the West Bank and Gaza. 
 
Figure 6.4, presented previously, includes a graph of "normalised GDP in %". This 
graph is simply the per capita GDP in which the actual terms were normalised to 50% 
    
 189 
in 2007. Actual per capita in 2007 is denoted by 50%, and the per capita GDP in any 
other year is simply the per capita GDP of that year times 50% over the per capita GDP 
in 2007. This procedure was conducted only to have a visible exposition of the 
correlations. Figure 6.4 above indicates a strong negative relation between the ratio of 
FTR+NCT to total use and the "normalised" per capita GDP which can be clearly 
observed. From 1968-1993, this correlation was -77.0% (p < 0.00), and after the Oslo 
Accord (1994-2007), the correlation was -68.2% (p < 0.007). These results appear to 
provide a strong indication of Dutch Disease's infection during the two periods, (before 
and after the Oslo Accord). However, from 1968-1994, the most significant political 
event was the first intifada, which began in the autumn of 1987 and continued until 
1990. Figure 6.4 shows that the effect of the first intifada on the per capita GDP was 
much weaker than the effect of the second intifada. During the first intifada, the ratio 
of FTR+NCT to total use decreased dramatically whereas during the second intifada, 
this ratio increased; GDP decreased and the ratio of FTR+NCT to total use increased. 
Thus, at least during the second intifada, it cannot be concluded that FTR+NCT caused 
the decrease in the per capita GDP because it is quite possible that the per capita GDP 
decreased because of military clashes and the economic and military retaliations from 
both sides. The increases in the ratio of FTR+NCT to total use during that period simply 
reflects the international rescue operations intended to avoid a dramatic humanitarian 
disaster. However, although the second intifada actually subsided in 2002, the 
correlation between the ratio of FTR+NCT to total use and GDP in the period of 1992-
2007 is also negative (-0.75 with P<0.08). This last result supports the conclusion that 
the higher the proportion of foreign aid in terms of FTR+NCT of use, the lower the per 
capita GDP. Thus, foreign aid can generate Dutch Disease symptoms. 
 
Figure 6.5 below presents the 1968-2007 annual ratio of FTR+NCT to uses, 
unemployment rates in those years and the weight of the tradable sector (agriculture, 
manufacturing, electricity, water supply, mining and quarrying) during the period of 
1994-2007. The phenomena that are exhibited in Figure 6.5 are striking in the sense 
that "a picture is worth a thousand words". The figure shows that during all the years 
between 1968-2007, unemployment rates were positively correlated with the ratio of 
FTR+NCT to total use. The correlation in 1968-2007 was 0.83 (p < 0.00); however, 
from 1968-1993, it was only 0.28 (p < 0.05) because employment of Palestinians in 
Israel played an important role during this period. However, from 1994-2007, the 
correlation was much greater: 0.46 (p < 0.10). In addition, Figure 6.5 demonstrates that 
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the long-term trend of the share of the tradable sector (industry and agriculture) 
decreased over time during both periods. This decrease is an indication of Dutch 
disease. 
 
Figure 6.5 (FTR+NCT)/Uses, Unemployment Rates and Weight of the Tradable   
                   Sector, 1968- 2007 
 
 
Sources: Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.8 in Chapter 5, p.149. 
 
FTR+NCT was combined with W (the compensation for Palestinian workers who 
reside in the West Bank and Gaza but work abroad, mainly in Israel) to analyse further 
the source of the decreasing level of the tradable sector (see Figure 6.6). I combined 
FTR+NCT with W because according to my claim, W can also generate Dutch Disease 
symptoms140. Figure 6.6 exposes additional striking phenomena that support the claim 
of Dutch disease infection on the West Bank and Gaza. In this figure, whereas the 
weight of the tradable sector is decreasing over time, the alternative sources of foreign 
funds, (FTR+NCT +W) are not decreasing and are nearly stable. From 1968-2007, the 
correlation between the (FTR+NCT)/Uses and the weight of the tradable sector was -
0.41 (p<0.008). Notably, in Figure 6.5 above, the ratio of FTR+NCT to use is quite 
volatile (a mean of 17.1% with a SD of 9.0%) whereas FTR+NCT+W (in Figure 6.6) 
is much more stable (a mean of 30.2% with a SD of only 3.9%). This result simply 






                                                 
140 Recall that previous discussion that the policy of Israel during 1968-1993 to employ Palestinians in 
Israel rather than developing tradable sectors in the West Bank and Gaza was possibly intended to avoid 
competition between the tradable sectors in the West Bank and Gaza and the tradable sectors in Israel. 
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Figure 6.6 The Ratio of FTR+NCT+W to Total Use and the Weight of the  




Source: Table 5.1 and Table 5.8 in Chapter 5, p.144. 
The compensating correlation between FTR+NCT and export and work abroad is also 
clearly exhibited in Figure 6.7.  
 
Figure 6.7 (FTR+NCT)/Uses and (Export + compensation from Work  
                  Abroad)/Uses, 1968-2007 
 
 
Source: Table 5.5 in Chapter 5, p.151. 
 
Figure 6.7 demonstrates that nearly every year, an increase or a decrease in foreign 
currency from exports and compensation from work abroad (mainly in Israel) was 
accompanied by a move in the opposite direction of (FTR+NCT)/Use. The correlations 
between (FTR+NCT)/Use and (Ex+W)/Use are as follows: during the period of 1968-
2007, -91.8% (p < 0.00); and in the sub-periods of 1968-1993 and 1994-2007, the 
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correlation was -77.5% (p < 0.00) and -81.0% (p < 0.00), respectively. It is reasonable 
to assume that FTR and NCT compensated for the reduction in income from Israel and 
not vice versa since both exports and compensation from work abroad were almost  
entirely linked to Israel and change in this policy is definitely related to various security 
and political situations. It appears that increased FTR and NCT are the only possible 
alternatives that can prevent an humanitarian disaster because of the limited free 
mobility of manpower and merchandise across the borders. 
 
In general, an additional important factor in the diagnosis of Dutch Disease is the 
negative effect on exports of the foreign flow of funds. This negative effect is because 
of the appreciation of the RER. However, in the case of the West Bank and Gaza, there 
is no exchange rate; thus, the negative effect of foreign aid on export merchandise and 
labour (EX+W) is because of the dependence on foreign aid, and that foreign aid simply 
compensates for the difficulty of working in Israel and exporting to Israel. It can be 
concluded that the above correlation results indicate the existence of Dutch Disease 
phenomena in the West Bank and Gaza. 
 
The correlations between the ratios of the main variables, which are parts of the national 
macro relatively accounting for GNP141 are analysed in further detail to continue to 
examine the phenomenon of Dutch Disease in the West Bank and Gaza. These 
correlations are presented in Table 6.1 where the index of variables in the table are: 
 
CP- private consumption 
I- Investment 
CG- Governmental consumption 
EX - Export of goods and services 
 IM- Import of goods and services 
FTR- Financial transfers to the private and public sectors 
NCT- Net Capital and Transfers 
W- Salaries of residents from abroad and net income from abroad  
GNP  - Gross national product  
GDP- Gross domestic product  
- Proportion of import out of uses 
                                                 
141 The correlations when the ratios are relative to the GDP or total use rather than to GNP are not 
significantly different.  
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  and the other 
variables in the table. 
 





















































































































































































































































































































 Source: Table 5.5 
 * Less than 10% two-tailed significance level 
 ** Less than 5% two-tailed significance level 
 *** Less than 1% two-tailed significance level 
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. These correlations again indicate that the share in the economy of 
both public and private consumption was positively correlated with the flow of foreign 
currency. It is reasonable to assume that governmental consumption is mainly based on 
non-tradable products (such as labour in education, administration, and security). I have 
not investigated the tradable and non-tradable composition of private consumption. 
Thus, these results at most partially support the previous findings, reflected in Figure 










(-0.545*** from 1994-2007 and -0.219 from 1968-1993). These correlations are 
consistent with the findings in Figure 6.4, in which were it was observed that 
Investments/Uses are negatively correlated with (FTR+NCT)/Uses.  
 
The relation between (FTR+NCT)/GNP and Ex/GNP was positive only in the first 
period but negative in the second. However, because both exports and compensation 
from work abroad are mainly to Israel, it is more reasonable to consider the correlation 
between (FTR+NCT)/GNP and (Ex+W)/GNP rather than with Ex/GNP; similar to the 
results in Figure 6.7, these correlations were significantly negative during both periods.  
As expected, in nearly all periods (FTR+NCT)/GNP was positively correlated with 
imports and . However, only in the first period was Ex/GNP positively correlated with 
. Notably, the ratio of net FTR+NCT to GNP was significant and positively correlated 
with the ratio of net productive capital to the GNP (NPC/GNP). This result appears to 
contradict the negative correlation between (FTR+NCT)/GNP and the ratio of 
investment to the GNP (I/GNP). However, the starting level of NPC/GNP in 1968 was 
so low that even relatively low investments tended to increase it. Figure 6.8 below 
shows that the level of the ratio of net productive capital to the GNP began to increase 
only after the Oslo Accord in 1993. The figure also highlights a surprisingly high fit 
between NPC/ GNP and (FTR+NCT)/GNP. Over the period 1968 and 2007, the 
correlation between the two was 0.833 (p < 0.00): from 1968-1993, the correlation was 
0.790 (p < 0.00), and from 1994-2007, the correlation was 0.673 (p < 0.008). These 
correlations clearly indicate that FTR+NCT positively affected the intensity of 
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productive capital. The overall capital intensity (NC/GNP) also includes non-
productive investments (such as housing). A positive correlation between 
(FTR+NCT)/GNP and NC/GNP of 0.581 (p < 0.000) can be observed for the entire 
period from 1968-2007. However, over the period 1968 to 1993, a negative correlation 
of -0.791 (p < 0.000) was observed. This negative correlation was because of the trend 
in non-productive capital (mainly houses) which increased over all periods, including 
periods in which (FTR+NCT)/GNP declined. 
 
As observed in Figure 6.8, from the seventies to 1988, the unemployment rate was quite 
low. Unemployment began to soar after the first intifada in 1987. From that year on, 
we identify quite a strong correlation between (FTR+NCT)/GNP and the 
unemployment rate of 0.895 (p < 0.000). The causality direction of the above 
correlation was examined by the addition of two lagged correlations142. In the first one, 
I examined the correlations between the unemployment rate in the years t-1, beginning 
in 1987 and ending in 2006 with (FTR+NCT)/GNP at t, in the years 1988 to 2007. In 
this correlation, unemployment is one year before (FTR+NCT)/GNP. In the second 
correlation, the unemployment rate is one year after (FTR+NCT)/GNP. In the second 
correlation (FTR+NCT)/GNP are for the years 1987-1986, and unemployment is for 
the years 1988-1986. If the correlation that is observed in the first calculation is 
significantly higher than the correlation in the second calculation, then we can claim 
that unemployment that presents a difficult economic situation leads to foreign aid. If 
the opposite is true, then foreign aid leads to unemployment, and we can then conclude 
that foreign aid generates Dutch disease. 
  
                                                 
142 In section 6.4 of this chapter (pages 197- 203), I present a detailed discussion of the causality issue 
and possible solutions. 
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Figure 6.8 NPC/GNP, (FTR+NCT)/GNP, 10% of NC/GNP and Unemployment    
                  Rate in the West Bank and Gaza, 1968-2007 
  
 
Source: Tables 5.5 and 5.9 in Chapter 5 p.151. 
 
The results of the two additional correlations in the years 1987-2007 are as follows: 
When the unemployment rate is one year in advance of (FTR+NCT)/GNP, the 
correlation is only 0.769 (p < 0.000). When (FTR+NCT)/GNP are one year in advance 
of the unemployment rate, then the correlation is higher and reaches 0.875 (p < 0.00). 
Thus, it is more reasonable to claim that foreign aid has a stronger effect on 
unemployment than to claim that unemployment leads to foreign aid. However, both 
correlations are quite high and quite close to the correlations without lags. Thus, either 
the two causality directions appears to be true, or more rigorous tests are required to 
determine the direction of causality and the sources of the visible Dutch Disease 
symptoms in the West Bank and Gaza. These additional tests are conducted by multiple 
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6.4 Theoretical Statistical Difficulties 
In addition to the data-collecting difficulties that I confronted, there are also severe 
theoretical difficulties that should be considered while evaluating the robustness of my 
findings. The statistical difficulties are related mainly to the correlations between time 
series of dependent and independent variables. The issues that require investigating are 
simultaneity, causality, serial correlation and multicollinearity. The analysis that 
embodies the proposed statistical solutions relate mainly to GDP as a dependent 
variable and FTR+NCT as one of the independent variables. Recall that the above 
factors are the major terms in equation (4-6) and (4-7), and their analysis is important 
in diagnosing Dutch Disease. During the theoretical discussion of the statistical 
difficulties, I will present some empirical findings that are related to the empirical 
questions of my thesis. 
 
6.4.1 Simultaneity 
The first problem that I discuss is the potential simultaneity between the parameters on 
the right hand and left hand sides of Equations (4-6) and (4-7). Unlike a single equation 
model in which there is one endogenous variable that is a function of one or more 
exogenous (independent) variables, simultaneity occurs when there is more than one 
endogenous (dependent) variable that is determined simultaneously. An example is the 
supply and demand equations, in which both quantity and price are endogenous variables 
appearing in the supply equation and in the demand equation and are determined jointly 
in equilibrium.  
The equations (4-6) and (4-7) that express GNP (Y) and GDP (Yd) are rewritten as follows: 
(4-6)      WNCTFTREY X  

1**
1    





   
In general, variables on both sides of these equations are determined endogenously and 
simultaneously. In general, under equilibrium, variables on the right side of the 
equations such as IM, which is the numerator of β and EX, and on the left, Y and Yd, 
are determined jointly143. The other variables are basically exogenous and include 
foreign aid (FTR and NCT) and work in Israel (W) that is a function of the political and 
                                                 
143 Recall that regarding the West Bank and Gaza, I claim that all the terms on the right side of (4-6) and 
(4-7) are nearly exogenous and their level represents a constraint. However, because the terms are not 
entirely exogenous, I must consider the simultaneity issue. 
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terror conditions. In other words, the problem arises because the dependent variables Y 
and Yd as well as the independent variables EX and IM are both at least partially 
endogenous144. This indicates that a change in the disturbance term will not only change 
the dependent variable but also change the independent (explanatory) variables. 
Simultaneity causes the ordinary least square (OLS) estimated coefficients and standard 
errors to be biased. That is, if simultaneity is ignored and the OLS method is applied to 
estimate the unknown parameters in the regression model, then the estimates will be 
biased and inconsistent. Therefore, predictions and tests of hypotheses that are based 
on the biased estimates will also be biased and invalid. 
 
There are three alternative methods to correct for simultaneity:  
The Indirect Least Squares (ILS), Instrumental Variable (IV) and Two Stage Least 
Squares (TSLS). 
 
The Indirect Least Squares (ILS) method is used for estimating exactly identified 
equations. The procedure involves rearranging the structural form equation into a 
reduced equation and substituting the estimates of the reduced form to receive estimates 
for the structural forms.    
 
The Instrumental Variable (IV) technique allows consistent estimation when there is a 
correlation between the explanatory variable and the error term of the regression. The 
instrumental variable substitutes for the endogenous variable and must be an exogenous 
variable that is correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable but not correlated 
with its error term.  
 
The Two Least Squares (TSLS) technique is used to render the independent endogenous 
variables exogenous. This is the technique used here to solve the simultaneity problem 
and estimate IM and EX. The TSLS technique is quite similar to the previous method of 
IV. In this technique, I also use an instrumental variable replacing the problematic 
variable; however, the TSLS technique is applied using the following two stages: 
 
                                                 
144 In general, exports and imports are endogenous supply and demand variables and components of 
GDP. Equilibrium indicates that both prices and quantities are determined simultaneously by supply and 
demand . Thus, their error terms can be correlated with GDP. To avoid dependence between their error 
term and the level of the GDP, I estimated the levels of exports and imports from exogenous regression 
models. 
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Stage 1: Replacing the endogenous independent variable (in our case EX and IM) with 
an exogenous estimated independent variable that are obtained as dependent variable of  
other exogenous variables. Consequently, I receive an estimation of EX and an 
estimation of IM that are correlated with the actual EX and IM but not correlated with the 
disturbance terms of the actual EX and IM because they are functions of exogenous 
variables. 
 
Stage 2: Estimating the model using the new exogenous variable observed in stage 1  
generates consistent estimates.  
Estimating EX and IM from the regressions, replaces the actual exports and actual 
imports in the main regression to determine GDP of the West Bank and Gaza. The 
estimated expected values of exports are determined by regressing the exports of the 
West Bank and Gaza (EX) on the GNP of Israel (YIL), and the expected imports are 
determined by regressing imports of the West Bank and Gaza (IM) on investment (I), 
private (CP) and public (CG) consumptions. The results of the regressions are
145 as 
follows: 
For the period 1968-1993: 
ˆ
XE = 161***+ 0.0031***YIL and R
2=0.56.  
ˆ
MI =561.8***+0.615***CP -5.281***CG+0.934***I and R
2=0.93 (F=93.9) 
For the period 1994-2007: 
ˆ





The above regression reflects the large difference between the two periods. In the first 
period, exports are indeed a positive function of GNP of Israel; however, in the second 
period, most likely because of the second intifada and the implied security restrictions 
on exports, this dependence is insignificant. Thus, I do not expect that in the second 
period, employing the regression model in Eq. (6-1) below, ˆ XE  instead of actual 
exports XE , will be beneficial. Imports during the period before Oslo are positively 
related to private consumption and investment. However, during this period, imports 
                                                 
145 Note again that *** indicates a significance level of less than 1%. **  indicates a significance level 
of less than 5%. * indicates a significance level of less than 10%. If there are no *, then the 
significance level is greater than 10%.  
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are significantly and negatively correlated with government consumption. This 
negative coefficient is quite strange and not reasonable in any normal economy. 
However, government expenditures were administered during this period by the Israeli 
Military Governmental Authority; thus, any unreasonable correlation may be because 
of such governance. In fact, after 1994, the administration of the government budget 
was transferred to the Palestinian Authority, and indeed, from 1994-2007, the 
coefficient of CG is quite high and reaches 1.73. This strong positive coefficient 
between imports and governmental expenditures during the second period is a typical 
Dutch Disease symptom. Conversely, however, it should be remembered that following 
the Oslo Accord, the Palestinians made substantial efforts to build their new-born, self-
controlled, independent government system. Note also that during the second period, 
private consumption did not significantly affect imports. This result is most likely 
because of the effect of the second intifada and the periodical blocks on imported 
products because of the periodical sieges by Israel during periods of clashes and terror 
attacks. Thus, from a statistical point of view, the use of the coefficients of the 
regression above to project imports and exports in other periods can be quite misleading 
and lead to strange and unreliable results. 
 
6.4.2 Causality 
The second issue that must be discussed in the context of my hypothesis of Dutch 
Disease is the notion of causality. It is not clear whether financial aid (FTR and NCT) 
affects the GDP and incentives to manufacture local products or whether poverty and 
misery in a given year attract more aid in the years following. Both directions are 
reasonable. 
 
I use Granger ideas of comparing lag regression (see Tables 6.4 and 6.4 below) to test 
whether changes in the GDP influence FTR+NCT or whether FTR+NCT influence 
GDP. If financial aid affects the distribution of future values of GDP then we would 
expect to observe an increase in the explanatory coefficient R2 when (FTR+NCT)t-1 is 
regressed against GDPt relative to R
2 when (FTR+NCT)t or (FTR+NCT)t+1 is regressed 
against GDPt. Conversely, if GDP is assumed to affect future values of FTR+NCT, we 
would expect to observe an improvement in the regression's results when (FTR+NCT)t 
is regressed on GDPt-1. If the lagged regressions do not yield better R
2, then we are not 
able to determine causality, and both directions are most likely correct. 
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Note that even when I identify a correlation and direction of causality, this is the overall 
"net" combined effect of FTR+NCT. Even if I identify either a negative or positive 
causality affect, it is a net effect of two possibly conflicting effects. For example, when 
there is a positive correlation between (FTR+NCT), it is possible that on the one hand, 
FTR+NCT increase consumption, investment and the GDP; conversely, FTR+NCT 
lower the motivation to produce locally. In that case, FTR+NCT just lowers the positive 
growth rate but does not reverse it.   
           
6.4.3 Serial Correlation 
An additional problem relates to difficulties in time series regression analysis because 
of serial correlation. When a model involves time series data, problems may arise 
causing violation of assumptions behind the procedure. Serial independence is when 
error terms of different time periods are independently distributed. When analysing 
time series data, this assumption may be violated. This violation is called serial 
correlation (or autocorrelation), meaning that error terms of different observations may 
be correlated. Serial correlation often occurs during close periods of time; for example, 
if one is predicting the change in stock prices over the year, an overestimate in one year 
will likely to lead to an overestimate in the succeeding year. Serial correlation does not 
bias the predictions and does not lead to inconsistency of the OLS estimators, however, 
it reduces the efficiency of the estimations.  
 
Before using these tests, I will simply identify the correlations between our variables 
and the years. In the first period of 1969 to 1993, there is a significant linear relation 
between GDP and years. I identify in the first period that 
 GDP=-5869***+30.17***Year, R2=0.83 and F=118.2*** 
 
In the second period of 1994-2007, the linear relation between GDP and years is not 
significant. There is no significant linear relation in either period between per capita 
GDP or the year. The most popular way to eliminate serial correlations is to consider 
the logs of the variables or, in other words, to regress rates of change of dependent 
variables over the independent variables. The cost of this solution is the loss of the 
information and insights that can be developed from viewing the absolute figures (see, 
for example, Figures 6.1- 6.9, which are based on absolute data). This approach was 
adopted to reduce the serial correlations in all periods, both for GDP and per capita 
GDP. The dependent variable in the regression is GDP growth (GDPG) rather than 
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GDP in the ensuing multiple regressions models that are based on Equations (6-1) and 
(6-2) and their variants. Then the possible serial correlation in the multiple regression 
model in Equation 6-1 and its variants is examined by applying the Durbin-Watson (D-
W) and Breusch-Godfrey (B-G) tests for serial correlation (see Tables 6.3- 6.5 below). 
For the D-W, we use the value of the statistic, and for the B-G tests, we use the p-value 
of the test. A D-W value that is close to 2 indicates no autocorrelation. The value of 
(D-W) is always between 0 and 4. A D-W statistic that is substantially less than 2 is 
evidence of a positive serial correlation. Generally, if the D-W value is less than 1.0, 
there may be cause for concern. Small values of D-W indicate successive error terms 
that are, on average, close in value to one another, or positively correlated. If D-W > 2, 
successive error terms are, on average, much different in value from one another, i.e., 
negatively correlated. In regressions, this can imply an underestimation of the level of 
statistical significance. 
 
The value of the results of the D-W statistic on all of the regressions in Tables 6.3 and 
6.4 is close to 2, indicating that there is no indication of a positive or negative serial 
correlation. To be more confident, I compare the p-value B-G test to 0.05 levels; if the 
p-value is above 0.05, I reject the null hypothesis that there is a serial correlation. The 
p-values in all of the regressions in Tables 6.3 the 6.4 are above the 0.05 level. This 
indicates that there is no serial correlation in the data that are used in the regressions. 
 
6.4.4 Multicollinearity   
Perhaps the most difficult problem in regression analysis is multicollinearity among 
the explanatory variables. When using several variables in a model, some of the 
explanatory variables may be highly correlated. This property is known as 
multicollinearity and can severely change the coefficients’ estimates. Multicollinearity 
does not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the entire model; however, it 
affects calculations regarding individual predictors.  
 
Multi-collinearity analysis for the two time periods was conducted to obtain initial 
estimates on the level of multicollinearity. Table 6.2 below presents correlations 
between annual changes in the factors stipulated in Equations (4-6) and (4-7) both in 
absolute and per capita terms. According to Table 6.2, there are no significant 
correlations between the explanatory variables in the period before the Oslo Accord. In 
the second period, there are negative correlations between changes of (FTR+NCT) and 
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change in W. This negative correlation reflects our previous finding that the decrease 
in income from work in Israel is compensated for by an increase in foreign aid (see also 
Figure 6.7 on page 191). 
 
Table 6.2 Correlations between Major Explanatory Variables in Equations 4-7, 









   
Source of Data for the calculations: Tables 5.1 and 5.2, p.144. 
 
Thus, if both factors tend to increase GDP, then the negative correlation may tend to 
reduce their effect on GDP. During the second period, there is also a significant 
negative correlation between β and the changes in per capita income from work in 
Israel (W). The empirical results that will be presented later in Tables 6.3-6.5 clearly 
show that β is negatively associated with the growth of per capita GDP. Thus, this 
negative correlation tends to increase the positive statistical relation between W and 
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6.5 Multiple Regression Diagnosis of Dutch Disease in the West Bank 
and Gaza 
This section of the chapter includes two basic tests. First I introduced multiple 
regression analysis while endeavouring to solve well-known statistical problems that 
are related to regression analysis (multicollinearity, serial correlation, simultaneity and 
causality). 
The main regression model whose results are expressed in Table 6.3 below is 
(6-1) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
ˆˆ ( )t t t t t t t t
t
GDP
NC NPC Ex NCT FTR W UR
GDP
         

           
in which the definitions of the variables and their potential effect are presented below: 
 i is the regression coefficient of the i
th independent variable, 
NCt is net capital in year t.  
tNPC  is net productive capital in year t.  
 ˆ tEx is the estimated exports in year t, based on the external model as explained in the 
previous section.  
( )tNCT FTR is net capital transfers and foreign transfers in year t. 
tW  is the compensation for work abroad. 
ˆ
t  is the ratio of imports to use in year t in which imports are estimated by an external 
model as explained in the previous section. 
URt is the unemployment rate in year t. 
 t is the error term of the regression equation in year t. 
Also note that (6-1) has two versions. In the first version, all relevant macro figures are 
in absolute terms; in the second version, all relevant terms (GDP, NC, NPC, Ex, 
FTR+NCR, and W) are in per capita terms. 
In additional variations of (6-1), I will also consider lag ratios 1( )tFTR NCT   and 
1( )tFTR NCT   rather than ( )tFTR NCT  as in Equation (6-1). I will also use the 
actual tEx  and actual t  rather than the estimated values, ˆ XE  and 
ˆ
t  in (6-1). 
The expected sign of the coefficients of the variables in equation (6-1) depends on 
whether Dutch Disease exists. If Dutch disease does not exist, then according to 
Equation (4-6) and (4-7), all the coefficients should be positive. I expect that Dutch 
Disease will reduce or even reverse the signs before all the parameters in addition to 
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that of ˆt  because in Dutch Disease infection, foreign aid discourages production and 
exports and discourages employment at least in the tradable sectors. In addition, 
because importing is more feasible and cheaper because of the flood of foreign 
currency, the coefficient of imports should be higher. If the lag version of equation (6-
1) is considered and Dutch disease exists, I expect that because of the causality 
direction, the coefficient of (FTR+NCT)t-1 will be much lower (and even negative) 
relative to the coefficient of (FTR+NCT)t+1.  
 
 
Table 6.3 below presents the results of multivariate regression analysis in which serial 
correlation is reduced by considering yearly GDP growth rather than GDP, and the 
simultaneity problem is reduced by replacing the annual data of EX and   with 





Table 6.4 below presents the regression analysis of the annual macro-economic 
variables taken from the data in Chapter 5 while applying actual βs and actual exports 
rather than the estimated imports and exports that are used to obtain the results that are 
presented in Table 6.3. 
 
The causality relation is examined in both cases (Table 6.3 and Table 6.4) using pre- 
and post-empirical regression analysis, measuring the effect of FTR+NCT of the 
previous year (t-1) or the next year (t) GDP147.  
 
  
                                                 
146 In general, exports and imports are endogenous supply and demand variables and components of 
GDP. In equilibrium, both prices and quantities are determined simultaneously by supply and demand. 
Thus, their error terms can be correlated with GDP (to avoid the dependence between their error term 
and the level of GDP). The levels of exports and imports were estimated from exogenous regression 
models. 
 
147 If, for example, a change in FTR+NCT in a given current year negatively affects GDP in the following 
year but is not correlated with a change in GDP for the previous year, then it can be claimed that change 
in FTR+NCT causes change in GDP. If the opposite is true, then it can be claimed that change in GDP 
causes the change in FTR+NCT.  
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Table 6.3 The Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis Considering Yearly  
                 GDP Growth and Estimated Data, ˆ XE  and 
ˆ
t   
 
 
Timing of Foreign Aid 
1969-1993 1994-2006 
Timing of FTR+NCT Timing of FTR+NCT 
t-1 T t+1 t-1 T t+1 
Intercept 
Per capita 0.0960 0.0076 -0.0571 2.476 1.962* 4.3291 
Total 0.6230 -0.5355 0.2166 8.1275* 2.894 14.0709** 
NC 
Per capita 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0017 -0.0009* -0.0019 
Total 0.0000 -0002* -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002** 0.0001 
NPC 
Per capita -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0054* 0.0027** 0.0049* 
Total -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0012 0.0011 0.0007** 0.0003 
ˆ
XE  
Per capita 0.0030 0.0046 0.0045 0.0129 0.0068** 0.0058 
Total 0.00015 0.0074* 0.0051 -0.0092 -0.0002 -0.0248** 
FTR+NCT 
Per capita 0.0005 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0009*** 0.0003 
Total 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0003*** -0.0025* 
W 
Per capita 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0008 0.0008*** 0.0003 
Total 0.0003 0.0000 0.0002 0.0012** 0.0009*** 0.0016* 
β^ 
Per capita -2.1704** -2.6093** -2.2192** -4.5140 -5.7288*** -3.0137 
Total -2.177** -1.9858* -2.7548** -5.8891** -5.6638*** -4.1593** 
Unemployment 
Per capita 1.3432 1.5061 1.6113 1.2359 1.1721*** 0.60196 
Total -2.1171** 1.9820* 1.80994 1.2084** 1.0311*** 1.2038** 
R Square 
Per capita  0.460 0.380 0.404 0.773 0.963 0.768 
Total 0.460 0.469 0.423 0.864* 0.988 0.911 
F 
Per capita 2.0639* 1.4878 1.643 2.4288 18.828*** 2.368 
Total 2.0659* 2.14* 1.782 4.552* 29.098*** 7.271** 
Durbin-Watson  
Per capita 2.469 2.052 2.443 1.713 2.158 1.741 
Total 2.357 1.945 2.394 1.839 1.843 1.546 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Per capita 0.277 0.838 0.264 0.612 0.734 0.719 
Total 0.409 0.966 0.327 0.774 0.932 0.493 
Observations 25 25 25 25 13 13 13 
  
The seven main conclusions from Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are as follows: 
1. According to both tables in the period of 1994 to 2007, (FTR+NCT)t had a positive 
effect on GDPt. This result is obtained both in the regression with per capita terms 
and in absolute terms. The identical result is obtained for the period from 1968 to 
2007. However, when I correlated FTR+NCT for the year before (or after) with 
GDP, then in nearly all sub periods there was no significant effect of FTR+NCT 
in the previous year on GDP of the following year and no correlation between GDP 
of one year later on FTR+NCT in the following year. The insignificant effect of 
both a change of (FTR+NCT)t-1 on changes in the GDPt and the insignificant 
correlation between changes of the GDPt-1 on (FTR+NCT)t together with the 
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significant correlations between (FTR+NCT)t and the GDPt implies that one 
cannot determine which affects which, and possibly both causality directions are 
correct. Namely, (FTR+NCT) increase the current GDP but possibly reduce the 
incentive to produce at home.  
 
  Table 6.4 The Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis Considering Yearly  
                   GDP Growth and actual, XE  and t   
 
 
Timing of Foreign Aid 
1969-1993 1994-2006 
Timing of FTR+NCT Timing of FTR+NCT 
t-1 T t+1 t-1 T t+1 
Intercept 
Per capita 0.0960 0.0076 -0.0571 2.476 1.962* 4.3291 
Total 0.6230 -0.5355 0.2166 8.1275* 2.894 14.0709** 
NC 
Per capita 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0017 -0.0009* -0.0019 
Total 0.0000 -0002* -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002** 0.0001 
NPC 
Per capita -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0054* 0.0027** 0.0049* 
Total -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0012 0.0011 0.0007** 0.0003 
EX 
Per capita 0.0030 0.0046 0.0045 0.0129 0.0068** 0.0058 
Total 0.00015 0.0074* 0.0051 -0.0092 -0.0002 -0.0248** 
FTR+NCT 
Per capita 0.0005 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0009*** 0.0003 
Total 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0003*** -0.0025* 
W 
Per capita 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0008 0.0008*** 0.0003 
Total 0.0003 0.0000 0.0002 0.0012** 0.0009*** 0.0016* 
Β 
Per capita -2.1704** -2.6093** -2.2192** -4.5140 -5.7288*** -3.0137 
Total -2.177** -1.9858* -2.7548** -5.8891** -5.6638*** -4.1593** 
Unemployment 
Per capita 1.3432 1.5061 1.6113 1.2359 1.1721*** 0.60196 
Total -2.1171** 1.9820* 1.80994 1.2084** 1.0311*** 1.2038** 
R Square 
Per capita  0.460 0.380 0.404 0.773 0.963 0.768 
Total 0.460 0.469 0.423 0.864* 0.988 0.911 
F 
Per capita 2.0639* 1.4878 1.643 2.4288 18.828*** 2.368 
Total 2.0659* 2.14* 1.782 4.552* 29.098*** 7.271** 
Durbin-Watson  
Per capita 2.469 2.052 2.443 1.713 2.158 1.741 
Total 2.357 1.945 2.394 1.839 1.843 1.546 
"Breusch-Godfrey 
Per capita 0.277 0.838 0.264 0.612 0.734 0.719 
Total 0.409 0.966 0.327 0.774 0.932 0.493 
Observations 25 25 25 25 13 13 13 
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The positive effect of an annual change in FTR+NCT and an annual change in 
GDP is reasonable according to a simple interpretation of equations (4-6) and       
(4-7). However, the data of Figure 6.4 clearly demonstrate that during the two 
periods, there is a negative correlation between the ratio (FTR+NCT)/Uses and per 
capita GDP. Are these two results contradicting one another? My answer is no. It 
is possible that (FTR+NCT) increase GDP only slightly because the incentive to 
produce at home is also reduced. In such circumstances, perhaps a higher ratio of 
(FTR+NCT)/uses is negatively correlated with GDP.  
  
2. In the two models in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 and in all time periods, with or without 
lags, β is negatively correlated with the growth of GDP. These results support the 
claim that imported products replace local ones. Importing is supported basically 
by FTR+NCT; in the period from 1994 to 2007 FTR+NCT were much higher than 
from 1968 to 1993 and were significantly negatively correlated. This result 
supports my claim of Dutch Disease infection.  
 
3. In nearly all cases, there is a positive correlation between unemployment and GDP 
growth. This result is quite strange. Most likely high unemployment leads to higher 
FTR+NCT in which then increases GDP.  
 
4. In general, a significant coefficient was not identified for Net Capital (NC). Only 
in the first time period and only according to Table 6.3, did NC tend to negatively 
affect GDP growth. However, and as expected, net productive capital had either a 
positive significant or a positive insignificant effect on GDP growth. 
 
5. I identified a positive relation between the growth of exports (Ex) and GDP growth 
only in the first time period and only in Table 6.3, which considers the actual and 
not the estimated exports ( Eˆx ). The reason for the insignificant correlation between 
exports and growth of the GDP during the second time period was the low level of 
exports during the second period, in which exporting was much more volatile 
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6. According to both tables, growth of work abroad (W) had either an insignificant 
or a positive effect on the growth of the GDP. This result neither supports nor 
refutes the claim that work in Israel hinders the development of the economy of 
the West Bank and Gaza. 
 
7. The R2 in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are quite high. In Table 6.3, in which exports and 
imports are estimated and there are no lags, the value is 0.998; however, in all 
other cases, the R2 are quite high (between 0.589 and 0.787 in Table 6.4 and 
between 0.998 and 0.460 in Table 6.3). 
 
Thus, the two main results of Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are as follows: First, growth of 
FTR+NCT positively affects GDP growth; however, this result neither confirms nor 
denies the potentially negative effect of (FTR+NCT) on the incentive to produce at 
home. In addition, this result is not necessarily in conflict with the previous finding that 
a high proportion of (FTR+NCT)/Uses has a negative correlation with GDP. 
The second important finding is that we were not able to explain the causality direction 
between growth of FTR+NCT and GDP growth because only in the case without lags 
were there significant coefficients between changes of FTR+NCT and GDP growth.  
Thus, it can be concluded that both causality directions may be valid and an increase 
in (FTR+NCT) only partially increases GDP because it also reduces the incentive for 
domestic production. 
 
6.6 The effect of the political environment on GDP  
Throughout this thesis, I have presented arguments and data that strongly support the 
claim that the political environment has a strong effect on the symptoms of Dutch 
Disease in the West Bank and Gaza. The main periods of political crisis were during 
the first Intifada (December 1987 to October 1991) and the second Intifada (September 
2000 and to end of 2005). Figure 6.4 shows that the only periods in which per capita 
GDP decreased significantly were the periods that followed the breakouts of the two 
intifadas. According to Table 5.2, in 1986 per capita GDP was USD 1375, and it 
declined to USD 1225 (-11%) in 1989. The effect of the second intifada was much 
more devastating for the West Bank and Gaza. In 1999, per capita GDP was USD 1375, 
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and between 1999 and 2002, the GDP decreased to USD 1132 (-17.7%)148. This per 
capita GDP is nearly at the identical level as GDP in 1979. 
 
It was possible to quantify the relation between political tension and GDP growth by 
running an additional regression using the number of Israeli civilian and military 
casualties in a given year as a proxy for political tension (PPT). The data for this proxy 
are exhibited in Figure 6.9  
 
Figure 6.9 Number of Israeli Civilians and Soldiers Killed by Palestinians in  
            1988- 2007 
 
 




Figure 6.9 demonstrates that the riot of the second Intifada at the end of 2002 was 
much more brutal than the first intifada and the toll for Israel in terms of fatalities was 
much higher. The second intifada began at the end of 2000, peaked in 2002 and then 
subsided by 2005.   
 
The regression model in Equation (6-2) extends the model in Equation (6-1) to 
include this proxy of political tension.  
 
(6-2) 
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148 In addition, per capita GDP in Israel decreased during the second intifada. According to the data of 
the World Bank in 2000, per capita GDP of Israel in current USD was 19,859, and it decreased to USD 
17,740 (-10%) in 2003. Only a small portion of this decline may be attributed to the world economic 
crisis of those years. 
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The results of this regression for the period 1994 to 2007 are presented in Table 6.5 
below. 
 
Table 6.5 Regression Analysis of Annual Macro-Economic Variables with the 
Additional Proxy for Political Tension (PPT) 
 
 1994-2007 1994-2007 
Intercept 0.074024** 1.86158* 
NC -- -0.00009 
NPC -- 0.00010 
Ex -- -0.00017** 
FTR+NCT -- 0.00049 
W -- 0.00031 
Β -- -4.99530*** 
Unemployment -- 0.81068 
PPT -0.000678* -0.00036 
R Square 0.202463 0.643 
F 3.300194* 4.352** 
Durbin-Watson  1.393814 1.956 
"Breusch-Godfrey 0.252665 0.967 
Observations 15 13 
 
The results in Table 6.5 do not show the direct effect of PPT on GDP growth. Only  
when GDP growth is regressed on PPT while ignoring the other explanatory variables 
is a significant negative correlation identified. However, this result is only because of 
the other missing but most likely connected independent variables. Nevertheless, 
because of previous results such as those that are expressed in Figure 6.4, it is quite 
clear that political tension negatively affects GDP. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented an empirical analysis that examines the main claims 
and hypothesis of my thesis. First, I examined whether the hypothesis that the right-
hand side of Equations (4-6) and (4-7) are exogenous and that the foreign currency 
constraint is the effective constraint on investments and growth. The empirical results 
that are identified in Figures 6.1 through 6.4 and the implied correlations and additional 
analysis of the data provide support for the above claim. Second, I provided diagnostic 
tests for Dutch Disease symptoms in the West Bank and Gaza. According to Figure 6.4 
and my calculations of correlations, there is a negative correlation between GDP and 
foreign aid in terms of the ratio of (FTR+NCT)/uses. In addition, (FTR+NCT)/uses is 
positively correlated with the ratio of consumption/uses and negatively correlated with 
investment/uses. Figure 6.4 also exposes a positive correlation between the ratios of 
imports over uses (β) and (FTR+NCT)/uses. Figure 6.5 and my calculations present 
positive correlations between the unemployment rate and (FTR+NCT)/uses and 
negative correlations between (FTR+NCT)/uses and the weight of the tradable sector. 
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show that the reduction of exports and work abroad are mainly 
compensated for by (FTR+NCT). Further correlation calculations in Table 6.1 
regarding the ratios of the main macro vaiables to GNP demonstrate that 
(FTR+NCT)/GNP is positively correlated to the proportions of GNP of private 
consumption, public consumption and imports. Conversely, (FTR+NCT)/GNP is 
negatively correlated with the ratios of investment and export to GNP. All these results 
reflect symptoms of Dutch Disease. However, one should not claim that (FTR+NCT) 
does not contribute to potential development. According to Figure 6.8, for example, 
there is a strong positive correlation between the ratio of net productive capital to GNP 
and (FTR+NCT)/Uses. The main difficulty in interpreting the results that apparently 
diagnose Dutch Disease is the direction of causality because it is quite possible that the 
economic disaster in the West Bank and Gaza led to additional foreign aid, and we 
cannot claim that the foreign aid generated deterioration of development. Although the 
first and second intifadas clearly negatively affected GDP, it is nevertheless difficult to 
quantify the separated effect of the harsh political situation on the apparent phenomena 
of Dutch Disease. Multiple regressions analysis was used to more accurately evaluate 
the direction of causality and the effect of a harsh political environment and causality 
many statistical difficulties were considered. The results were provided in Tables 6.3 
to 6.5. This did not identify any evidence to support one causality direction over the  
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other because there is a significant correlation between GDP growth in a given year 
and FTR+NCT during the same year. However, when (FTR+NCT) is compared with 
GDP growth in the succeeding year or the previous year, the correlations vanish. Thus, 
either direction is possible; additional foreign aid only partially increases the GDP 
because it also decreases the incentive to produce at home. The effect of political 
tension on GDP is analysed in Figure 6.5. No significant correlation was identified 
between a proxy for the political tension (number of Israeli soldiers and civilians killed 
by Palestinians) and GDP growth (see Table 6.5). Separating the data and its analysis 
of the more violent Gaza from the data of the West Bank may enable comparison and 
analysis that provide better answers to the causality direction and the effect of terror. 
No previous studies on the economy of the West Bank and Gaza have analysed the 
Dutch Disease phenomena during the two long periods of 1968 to 1993 and 1994 to 
2007. The effect of the accumulated Dutch disease symptoms is overwhelming, and I 
do not know if there is any worldwide precedent for it.   
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Chapter 7- The Effect of Palestinian-Israeli 
Conflict on their Financial Markets 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the impact of continued conflict in the region on the impact of 
terrorism on the Israeli and Palestinian stock exchanges. It uses a unique data set for 
Palestinian and Israeli financial markets to examine the effects of terror149 attacks on 
both sides of the conflict. The main contribution of this study to the literature is to 
provide both sides of the barricade, the Palestinian and Israeli stocks markets, with a 
perspective of the impact of terrorism on their markets and its relationship to the 
economy. This, to the best of my knowledge, has never been investigated before150. 
During the Intifada period, share prices declined significantly reflecting economic 
slowdown in both markets. There are bi-directional causality effects of returns in the 
two markets, and both markets are affected by the US market. The severity of the terror 
attack negatively affected share prices in both financial markets. The main finding is 
that the more fatal the terror attack, the larger the negative effect in the two markets. In 
the more severe terror attack events (i.e. more people were killed and injured or if it 
was suicide attack), share prices on the TASE declined significantly by 0.63% 
compared to a decline of 0.16% in less severe attacks. The same pattern is revealed on 
the Palestinian side. In the more severe terror attacks, share prices on the Palestinian 
Securities Exchange declined significantly by 0.21% compared with -0.07% in less 
severe attacks. 
 
Eldor and Melnick (2004), Eldor et al. (2009), and Melnick and Eldor (2010) have 
documented that terror attacks adversely affect expectations of firm profitability, 
causing share prices to decline, and predicting a slowdown in economic activity. Terror 
                                                 
149 The wording of "Terror" in the relevant literature is related to the incidents in which either Israeli  
soldiers or citizens were attacked by Palestinians. The connotation of the word "terror" is clear. However, 
this word is also used in this work only because this word is used in the relevant literature while the 
reader should determine his own opinion whether these terror actions are in fact legitimate uprising 
actions. 
 
150 Eldor et. al. (2009) also investigated the effect of targeted killings of some Palestinians and found 
that their effect on the Israeli stock market is marginal. 
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attacks have an impact on investors’ time preferences and their willingness to invest. 
Chen and Siems (2004) [see also Cheseny, Reshetsr and Karaman (2010)] argue that 
prices of individual stocks reflect investors’ hopes and fears about the future, and, taken 
in aggregate, stock price movements can generate a tidal wave of activity. Terrorist 
attacks, military invasions and other unforeseen disastrous occurrences can have 
serious implications for stocks and bonds because of their liquidity. Decisions to buy 
and sell can be reversed quickly, easily, and inexpensively. When information becomes 
available about a cataclysmic event—like a terrorist or military attack—investors often 
flee the market in search of safer financial instruments and panic selling ensues. This 
initial panic has the potential to turn into chaos and a long-term bear market or it can 
be reversed if investors’ hopes return. Eldor and Melnick (2004) have estimated this 
impact from terrorism to cause a 30 percent decline in the value of the Israeli stock 
market.151 
 
The impact of terrorism on general economic activity has been estimated as well. 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) found that terrorism reduced per capita GDP in the 
Basque Country of Spain by some 10 percent, while Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) 
estimated a 5 percent decline in GDP for Israel. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) 
attribute the possible large economic cost to the diversion of net foreign direct 
investment in an open economy model152. Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2007) provide 
a survey of the different ways that terrorism may affect economic activity. 
 
The analysis in this chapter is also related to Chen and Siems (2004) study that analysed 
fourteen cases of terror- or war-related events that had taken place in the US since 1915. 
They found that financial markets became more stable over time and that recovery 
became increasingly more rapid. However their study was based on data from markets 
where terror attacks are rare. The analysis in this chapter of the effect of terrorism on 
financial markets in Palestine and Israel, contrasts with Chen and Siems because in 
Palestine and Israel terror attacks are committed “routinely” and are not expected to 
stop153.  
 
                                                 
151 For an estimate of the cost of terrorism in terms of utility, see the survey by Frey, Luechinger and 
Stutzer, 2007. 
 
152 See special issue of the European Journal of Political Economy (2004). 
153 See also Berrebi C., Klor, F. E. (2005), Drakos, K. (2004), Fleischer, A. and Buccola, S. (2002), 
Garfinkel, M. R. (2004), Jain, S. and Mukand, S. W. (2004), Johnston, B.R. and Nedelescu, O.M. (2005), 
and Sandler, T. and Enders, W. (2004). 
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Unlike previous research, this study uses a unique data set of stock markets in the West-
Bank and in Israel that allows examination of the effect of terrorism on the financial 
markets of both sides of the barricade of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A sample of 
four hundred and sixty terror attacks that took place in Israel during the Intifada period 
(September 2000 to June 2003) was used to estimate the effects of terror attacks in both 
economies. Also Eldor et al.'s (2009) pessimism index (Terror Index - TI) was used to 
investigate the effect these terror attacks had on share prices.  
 
The hypothesis presented regarding share prices response to terrorism relates also to 
the Bruck and Wickstrom (2004) argument that the extent of losses depends on the 
attack’s characteristics – the number of killed and wounded people and the level of 
property damage. These arguments are also explored in this chapter. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows: in section 7.2, Israeli and the Palestinian financial 
markets are described along with a comparison of the economies and the stock 
exchanges of both markets. In section 7.3, the data and the methodology are described. 
Section 7.4 reports the results. Section 7.5 summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
 
7.2 The Two Stock Markets 
The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) was established on 1953. The market value of 
the stocks listed on the TASE is in general more than one half of Israel’s GDP. The 
TASE, which is an important market for financial intermediation and an important 
source of financing for the business sector, is quite sophisticated and includes 
derivatives such as stock index options (the trading volume of which relative to the 
underlying assets is the world’s highest). The unusually highly developed derivatives 
sector adds critical liquidity to the market (more on the TASE see Eldor and Melnick 
(2004).  
 
The Palestinian Securities Exchange started operation in 1997 following the Oslo 
Accord. The Palestinian Securities Exchange was founded following the creation of the 
Palestinian Authority. One of its key objectives from its inception was to facilitate 
foreign investment by providing a platform for securities trading, which conformed to 
international standards and rules for conducting business. The Palestinian Securities 
Exchange opened its doors in 1997, launching equity trading on eighteen listed 
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companies. The number of listed companies has since grown and as of the end of 2012 
came to forty-eight firms engaged in manufacturing, services, banking, investment and 
other financial services. Table 7.1 provides further details about these firms. It was 
established as a privately-owned exchange rather than an entity mutually owned by its 
members. This form of organization enables the exchange to be publicly floated and 
facilitates strategic partnering or merger with other exchanges. The Palestine 
Development and Investment Company (PADICO), the largest Palestinian holding 
company, was the founder and the developer of the Palestinian Securities Exchange 
and continues to be its main controlling shareholder. The Palestinian Securities 
Exchange became a public shareholding company in February 2010. As of the end of 
2008, the Palestinian Securities Exchange reported a total market capitalization of 
approximately US $2.1 billion, a more than four-fold increase since its inception in 
1997154. Acquiring software from the Canadian software company, EFA Software 
Services, trading on the exchange is solely electronic. Transactions are executed by 
accredited exchange members, which as of the end of 2012 were nine in number. In 
2007 the exchange launched e-trading over the Internet as well, primarily to facilitate 
infrastructure to foreign investors. Average daily volume, which initially was less than 
$400,000 in 1997, has risen to about $1.1 million by the end of 2012. Order flow has 
grown from approximately 2,000 transactions to 41,442 transactions. Transactions are 
cleared and settled in-house through the Clearing, Depository and Settlement Centre, 
which acts as a central depository and clearing house. Registration of shares is 
paperless and the clearing house operates with a T+3 settlement, which conforms with 
that employed by many major foreign exchanges. The Palestinian Securities Exchange 
has contracted with the Arab Bank to serve as settlement bank conducting transfer and 
payment between counterparties. In 1999 the HSBC Bank Middle East was the 
designated custodian bank, which, rather than the member brokerage firms, holds the 
securities on behalf of investors. 
 
                                                 
154 Palestinian Securities Exchange, Monthly Statistics December 2008, 
 http://www.p-s-e.com/PSEWEBSite/publications/12-%202008.xls 
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Table 7.1 Forty-Eight Companies Listed on the Palestinian Securities Exchange   








1 Al Shark Electrode                                                                                   2,062,764 
ELECTRO
DE  Industry        
2 The Arab Hotels 21,509,164 AHC Service 
3 Arab Islamic Bank 43,858,685 AIB 
Bank Finance 
Services 
4 Al-Aqariya Trading Investment                                                                        5,037,717 AQARIYA Investment      
5 Ahliea Insurance Group. 8,000,000 AIG Insurance 
6 Al-Takaful Palestinian Insurance                                                                     8,755,000 TIC        Insurance       
7 
Arab Company for Paints 
Products 5,331,452 APC Industry 
8 Arab Investors 13,198,594 ARAB Investment 
9 
The Arab Real Estate 
Establishment 575,490 ARE Service 
10 Palestine Poultry 46,632,432 AZIZA Industry 
11 Bank of Palestine 400,660,000 BOP 
Bank Finance 
Services 
12 Birzeit Pharmaceutical 58,900,461 BPC Industry 
13 Palestine Commercial Bank 22,819,803 PCB 
Bank Finance 
Services 
14 Golden Wheat Mills 14,598,023 GMC Industry 
15 Grand Park Hotel and Resorts 6,000,000 HOTEL Service 
16 Al-Wataniah Towers                                                                                   11,220,000 ABRAJ Service         
17 Jerusalem Cigarette 14,668,545 JCC Industry 
18 Jerusalem Real Estate Investment 7,600,000 JREI Investment 
19 Palestine Plastic Industrial 3,949,224 LADAEN Industry 
20 AL Mashriq Insurance 2,496,000 MIC Insurance 
21 The National Carton Industry 2,750,000 NCI Industry 
22 National Insurance 46,440,000 NIC Insurance 
23 Nablus Surgical Center 5,064,779 NSC Service 
24 
Palestine Development and 
Investment 225,000,000 PADICO Investment 
25 Palestine Telecommunication 956,091,166 PALTEL Service 
26 Palestine Electric 82,800,000 PEC Service 




Palestine Investment and 
Development 6,827,106 PID Investment 
29 Palestine Industrial Investment 31,470,376 PIIC Investment 
30 
Arab Palestinian Shopping 
Centers 5,430,182 PLAZA Service 
31 Palestine Real Estate Investment 62,953,079 PRICO Investment 
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Table 7.1 Forty-Eight Companies Listed on the Palestinian Securities Exchange  








33 Trust International Insurance 26,000,000 TRUST Insurance 
34 
Union Construction and 
Investment 19,520,000 UCI Investment 
35 The Vegetable Oil Industries 28,772,915 VOIC Industry 
36 
Palestinian Distribution and 
Logistics Services 7,792,664 WASSEL Service 
37 
Wataniya Palestine Mobile 
Telecomm 327,660,000 WATANIYA   Service         
38 Palestine Securities Exchange 51,000,000 PSE 
Bank Finance 
Services 




Palestine Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation  17,000,000 PMHC       
Bank Finance 
Services 
41 The National Bank 45,000,000 TNB 
Bank Finance 
Services 
42 The Ramallah Summer Resorts 12,693,933 RSR Service         
43 Palestine Insurance 7,000,000 PICO Insurance       
44 
Palaqar For Real Estate 
Development and Management 2,907,750 PALAQAR    Service         
45 
National Aluminum and Profile 
Napco 7,590,972 NAPCO      Industry        
46 Global United Insurance 6,600,000 GUI        Insurance       
47 Globalcom Telecommunication  1,790,587 GCOM Service         
48 Jerusalem Pharmaceuticals 33,765,862 JPH Industry        
 Total 2,859,140,376   
Source: Palestinian Stock Exchange. 
The representative share price index is entitled the AL-QUDS Index (‘Jerusalem’ in 
Arabic). Launched in July 1997, this index, which originally comprised of ten shares, 
currently tracks fifteen companies drawn from all sectors listed on the exchange Table 
7.2 provides further details about these companies. The AL-QUDS Index is calculated 
using a market-value weighted method, based on the changes in stocks prices of 
companies included in its calculation. A sample comprising ten listed and active 
companies from all existing economic sectors was taken at its’ inception. The closing 
prices of the 07/07/1997 trading session were used as a base date, represented at 100 
points. The sample companies used to calculate AL-QUDS Index are changed at the 
beginning of every year in order to include the most active companies, using several 
criteria for evaluation. Such criteria include the value of traded stocks throughout the 
previous year, the amount of traded stocks, total number of transactions, number of 
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trading days, the stock turnover, and the companies’ market value at the end of the 
previous year of changing the sample. 
 
In the eleven years since the Palestinian Securities Exchange opened, the price 
volatility has been significant with annual fluctuations more often than not being well 
into the double digits. By the end of 2008, the AL-QUDS index closed at 441.66, 
representing a more than fourfold increase since its inauguration. However, this upward 
trajectory has been far from smooth or monotonic. In 2005 the index soared more than 
300% (from a level of 278 to 1129). After peaking in 2005, it lost close to 50% the 
following year155. The index gained in 2007 and 2008, 13% and 16% respectively. The 
extreme price volatility is attributed in large part to the thin trading156 as well as to the 
dramatic political and economic events taking place in the Palestinian Authority over 
the past decade. 
 






Palestine Development and Investment 225,000,000 PADICO Investment 
Palestine Industrial Investment 31,470,376 PIIC Investment 
Palestine Real Estate Investment 62,953,079 PRICO Investment 
Union Construction and Investment 19,520,000 UCI Investment 
Arab Islamic Bank 43,858,685 AIB 
Bank Finance 
Services 
Bank of Palestine 400,660,000 BOP 
Bank Finance 
Services 
Palestine Islamic Bank 48,115,651 ISBK 
Bank Finance 
Services 
The National Bank 45,000,000 TNB 
Bank Finance 
Services 
Ahliea Insurance Group. 8,000,000 AIG Insurance 
Palestine Telecommunication 956,091,166 PALTEL Service 
Palestine Electric 82,800,000 PEC Service 
Wataniya Palestine Mobile Telecomm 327,660,000 WATANIYA   Service         
Birzeit Pharmaceutical 58,900,461 BPC Industry 
Jerusalem Cigarette 14,668,545 JCC Industry 
Golden Wheat Mills 14,598,023 GMC Industry 
Source: Palestinian Stock Exchange 
                                                 
155 Which also coincides with the rise of Hamas in Gaza. 
156 It is difficult to assess the effect of "thin trading". In spite of this seemingly difficulty, since I use    
indices and not individual stocks, the impact of thin trading is marginal in the long run.  
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Another dimension of the Palestinian Stock Exchange is the ownership of shares in the 
companies. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 indicate the share ownership and shareholders by 
Nationality and Type in the Palestinian Securities Exchange. 
 
Table 7.3 Shares Ownership on the Palestinian Stock Exchange by Nationality  
                 and Type at the End of 2012 
 
 Nationality and Type Shares  
 All 100.00% 
local individuals  23.90% 
local Companies  39.64% 
Foreign individuals  1.15% 
Foreign Companies 22.49% 
N/A 0.82% 
Source: Palestinian Stock Exchange. 
 
Table 7.4 Share Holders on the Palestinian Stock Exchange by Nationality and  
                 Type at the end of 2012 
 
 Nationality and Type Shares 
All 100.00% 
local individuals  95.27% 
local Companies  0.71% 
Foreign individuals  3.31% 
Foreign Companies 0.29% 
N/A 0.60% 
Source: Palestinian Stock Exchange. 
Recall that one of the main goals of the Palestinian Stock Exchange was to attract 
foreign capital in order to develop the economy. However according to Table 7.3, in 
2012 which was fifteen years after the inauguration, only 23.64% (USD 676 Million) 
of the volume of shares were owned by foreign individuals and companies. This 
amount is negligible relative to the foreign capital needs of the Palestinian economy 
over these years. In addition, Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show that though local individuals 
were 95.27% of the equity holders, local individuals held only 23.9% (USD 683 
Million) of the shares. This indicates that the Palestinian Stock Exchange has not 
become a market place for long-term equity saving for the Palestinians. 
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Finally, we can consider the main features of both countries economies and stock 
exchanges, identifying major differences. Table 7.5 presents the main features of the 
two economies and the two stock markets. As of 1997, the GDP of Israel was 29.7 
times the GDP of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the per capita GDP of Israel was 
12.5 times that in West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the Intifada period (2000-2002) the 
GDP of Israel increased by 7.8% and the per capita GDP increased by 0.5%, while the 
GDP of West Bank and Gaza Strip decreased by 27.7% and the per capita GDP 
decreased by 34.0%. During these years, both stock exchanges experienced decreases 
in all three aspects of activity: market cap decreased by 35.1% at TASE compared to 
32.1% at the Palestinian Securities Exchange; Annual trading volume decreased by 
38.3% on the TASE compared to 70% on the Palestinian Securities Exchange; TA-25 
index decreased by 30.5% and the AL-QUDS Index decreased by 36.2%.  
 
 
Table 7.5 Main Figures of the Two Exchanges and Economies 1997-2008 
 Israel Palestinian Authority 



































1997 46.4 14.0 26.4% 129.3 0.53 0.03 39.1% 4.36 
1998 40.9 14.3 -5.2% 134.8 0.59 0.07 11.4% 4.88 
1999 65.4 20.9 62.2% 139.1 0.85 0.15 52.8% 5.31 
2000 66.7 28.4 0.3% 151.6 0.77 0.19 -12.3% 4.85 
2001 57.1 15.0 -7.9% 151.0 0.72 0.07 -6.1% 4.43 
2002 42.3 12.9 -24.8% 150.0 0.58 0.05 -22.5% 3.84 
2003 69.7 20.4 58.4% 152.7 0.65 0.06 19.0% 4.41 
2004 87.1 37.1 16.2% 160.4 1.10 0.20 54.4% 4.94 
2005 112.8 54.0 29.7% 168.6 4.46 2.10 306.6% 5.27 
2006 140.8 84.6 5.9% 177.3 2.73 1.07 -46.4% 5.09 
2007 198.1 134.2 18.9% 188.2 2.47 0.81 -12.9% 5.34 
2008 106.7 128.5 -46.2% 195.7 2.12 1.19 -16.2% 6.02 
Source: Palestinian Stock Exchange, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange (TASE), Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) 2009 and annual reports.  
    
 223 
As noted above, the economies are affected by the political and security situation over 
time, and particularly during the Intifada. In the next section we provide an in depth 
causality analysis of the impact of terror attacks on the two markets and exchanges. 
 
7.3 Data and Methodology 
7.3.1 Data 
The data includes characteristics of four hundred and sixty terror attacks which 
occurred during the period of the Intifada (September 2000 - June 2003). Since an event 
study analysis is used, I am forced to compile the data in the following way. Whenever 
more than one terror attack occurred on the same day, the attacks were considered as a 
single event. This reduces the number of terror events to two hundred and eighty. 
Excluding terror events that occurred on dates when the Palestinian Stock Exchange 
halted its trade for security reasons, further reduces terror events to one hundred and 
sixty-eight. Daily share prices TA-25 index and AL-QUDS index are used on days 
surrounding each date of the one hundred and sixty-eight terror events. The data on the 
characteristics of the terror attacks were obtained from the databank of the 
Interdisciplinary Centre in Herzliya. 
 
Also used are share prices of the TA25, AL-QUDS and SP500 indices to examine the 
causal relation among them and their volatilities. The GARCH (1,1) model is used to 
generate daily standard deviation of rates of returns using the following model: 






  ttt             (7-1) 
 
Where: ttt rr   110 , rt is the index rate of return. The results displayed in Table 
7.6 provide the model estimates157. 
 
 
                                                 
157 Also used are EGARCH models and additional lags in these models. The results for the estimated 
variance were similar. 
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Table 7.6 Daily Standard Deviation Using GARCH 
 
 
0  1  1  
TA25 0.00051 0.1038 0.8120 
P-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AL-QUDS 0.00109 0.1368 0.8497 
P-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SP500 0.00006 0.1057 0.8953 
P-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 






  ttt    
where ttt rr   110 . AIC is an Akaike Info Criterion. P-values in parenthesis 
signify the significance of the coefficients158. 
 
The results provide evidence that the GARCH (1,1) can be used to estimate the 
volatility. Indeed, although not tabulated in this chapter, when a different model of 
GARCH was used, the results were very much the same, indicating that the volatility 
estimated by GARCH (1,1) is valid. The volatility estimated with these models are 
highly correlated with VIX (on the TASE and on the CBOE). 
 
Based on the GARCH model estimates and share prices data, Table 7.7 provides 
summary statistics of the variables used in this study to test the causal relationships 
                                                 
158 The lag length p and q of a GARCH(p, q) process is established in three steps: (1) Estimate the best 
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And (3) the asymptotic, that is for large samples, standard deviation of  is  . Individual values 
that are larger than this indicate GARCH errors. To estimate the total number of lags, use the Ljung-Box 
test until the value of these are less than, say, 10% significant. The Ljung-Box follows  distribution 
with n degrees of freedom if the squared residuals  are uncorrelated. The null hypothesis states that 
there are no ARCH or GARCH errors. Rejecting the null thus means that such errors exist in the 
conditional variance. 
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between the Israeli and Palestinian capital markets. The US market is used as a control 
variable that is assumed to have possible effects on the two markets. Table 7.7 provides 
a description on the data characteristics (in-%). TA-25 and AL-QUDS during the 
sample period, for the same days all exchanges are open. 
 
Table 7.7 Descriptive Statistics 
 RTA25 RAL-QUDS RSP500 SIGTA25 SIGAL-QUDS SIGSP500 
 Mean 0.000446 0.000960 -0.000125 0.017697 0.021092 0.014947 
 Median 0.000471 -0.000099 0.000564 0.015542 0.018291 0.012603 
 Maximum 0.084159 0.124893 0.102457 0.057356 0.074790 0.061587 
 Minimum -0.155385 -0.172717 -0.134612 0.008484 0.008931 0.006108 
 Std. Dev. 0.018473 0.022565 0.016785 0.007338 0.009863 0.008170 
 
Note: RTA25, RAL-QUDS and RSP500 are the rates of returns of the TA25, AL-
QUDS and SP500 stock indices. SIGTA25. SIGAL-QUDS and SIGSP500 are daily 
standard deviations of the three indices estimated by the GARCH (1,1) model. 
 
7.3.2 Methodology 
We start with an event-study analysis based on daily data (closing prices) of the TA-
25 and Al Quds indices to examine share prices behaviour in response to terror attacks. 
Based on the daily data, rates of return were estimated of both indices on the day of the 
event (-1,0), and the days following the event (0,+1) and (+1, +2).  
 
Using the Terror Index (TI) developed by Eldor et al. is used to investigate the effect 
of investors' pessimism on the stock market. The Terror Index (TI) is constructed as 
follows: 
 
(7-1)  TI = D1 + D2 + D3 + D4 + D5 
where: 
D1 = 0 if the attack was beyond the green line and 1 if it was within the green line; 
D2 = 0 if the attack was not a suicide attack and 1 if it was; 
D3 = 0 if there were no deaths and 1 if there were; 
D4 = 0 if there were no injured and 1 if there were; 
D5 = 0 if the event was not reported on a newspaper's front page and 1 if it was. 
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The TI index average is 2.97 and it's median is 3.00. The number of observations in 
each dummy variable is as follows: D1 = 35; D2 = 74; D3 = 79; D4 = 49; and D5 = 43. 
 
The sole purpose of the TI is to investigate the effect of severity of a terror attack on 
share prices. It was not meant to redo Eldor and Melnick's (2004) work, rather to use 
their findings as a benchmark. 
 
Next, the causal relationships among the variables are investigated using the common 
testing procedure for causal relationship between variables - the VAR (vector auto-
regression)159 or VEC (vector error-correction) model. The latter requires that the time 
series in the tests be non-stationary or integrated of order greater than zero. Violation 
of either one of, or both of, these two conditions would suggest implementation of the 
VEC model. For this reason, the properties of stationary of each time series used in this 
study and probable order of integration is first examined. 
 
The testing starts with the unit root tests using two models of the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller methods (ADF).  
 
  Model 1:   ttt yy   111
                      
(7-2) 
  Model 2:  ttt yty   1222            (7-3) 
 
The ADF test involves decisions on selecting the optimal lag length. The statistical 
inferences about the stationary properties of each time series are presented in Table 7.7 
using two models and for different lag lengths. The results indicate that the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected for the levels of the TA25, AL-QUDS and 
SP500 and is rejected for the levels of the time series of volatility of each of the three 
indices. The null hypothesis is also rejected for stock indices time series when they are 
                                                 
159 The VAR model was developed as an alternative empirical model to simultaneous models with 
hundreds of variables in some cases in light on the latter. The departure from simultaneous equation 
approach is not that radical. The advantages of the VAR model are: (1) it is a reduced form where 
contemporaneous variables are not included on the right-hand side; (2) all the included variables are 
treated as endogenous. Each variable depends on all the others; (3) it is widely used in the literature 
because it allows a more efficient estimation of causality effects. See Engle and Granger (1987) for 
discussion. 
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differenced once. Since the six time series, three stock indices (rates of return), and 
their volatilities, are stationary, we use the VAR model and not the VEC model. 
 
Table 7.8 reports the ADF tests for Model 1: ttt yy   111 ; Mackinnon p-values 
appear in parenthesis. We use log of the stock indices. Rates of returns are obtained by 
differencing them once. The models are tested for 3, 5 and 7 days lag length. 
 
Table 7.8 ADF Tests for Unit Root Tests 
 Model 1 
Variable 3 5 7 
Level    
Ln(ta25) -1.622 -1.662 -1.739 
 (0.477) (0.450) (0.411) 
Ln(AL-QUDS) -1.208 -1.249 -1.289 
 (0.908) (0.899) (0.865) 
Ln(sp500) -1.239 -1.340 -1.289 
 (0.654) (0.613) (0.637) 
2 5T A  
-4.567 -4.441 -4.433 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Al quds  
5.203 -4.595 -5.627 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
500SP  
-18.289 -15.927 -13.498 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1st Difference    
Ln(ta25) -19.964 -15.819 -13.082 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(AL-QUDS) -18.602 -14.536 -11.840 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(sp500) -18.289 -15.927 -13.498 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Model 2 is not tabulated since its results are similar. Based on the results reported in 
Table 7.8, the VAR model is used to test the causal relationships between the 
Palestinian and Israeli stock markets. The analysis includes share prices behaviour of 
the two markets and their volatilities in addition to the SP500 index and its volatility as 
control variables, The data used for the VAR included only observations on days all 





































             
(7-4) 
  
Where Y is the dependent variable: TA25 or AL-QUDS, SP500 is US SP500 index, 
SIGTA25. SIGAL-QUDS and SIGSP500 are daily standard deviations of the three 
indices estimated by the GARCH(1,1) model.  
 
The VAR model enables investigation of the causality effects of different markets on 
share prices. If Y=TA25 and 
jjjjj gfedc ,,,,  are significantly different from zero for 
some j, it would indicate that the independent variable has significant effect on the 
TA25 variable. If Y=AL-QUDS and 
jjjjj gfedb ,,,,  are significantly different from 
zero for some j, it would indicate that the independent variable has significant effect on 
the AL-QUDS variable. The coefficients are examined to identify causality. Causality 
is said to exist if one of these coefficients is significant. Bi-directional causality effects 
exist if the coefficient is significant in both equations. One-way causality effects exist 
if it is found that one of these coefficients is significant in only one equation. 
 
The findings displayed in Table 7.9 indicate that when Y=TA25, some 
jjj edc ,, are 
significant the share prices on the TASE are significantly affected by AlQuds, SP500 
and the volatility of the TA25. When Y=AlQuds, some 
jjj edb ,,  are significant, then 
the AlQuds is significantly affected by changes of share prices on the TASE, SP500 
and the volatility of the TA25.  
 
Using the VAR methodology also confirmed that the volatility on the Palestinian 
Securities Exchange was significantly affected by the volatility of share prices in New 
York and in Tel Aviv. 
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7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Share Prices Behaviour on the TASE and Palestinian Stock Exchange 
Figure 7.1 and Table 7.9 describe share prices behaviour in the Palestinian and Israeli 
markets during 1997-2007, a period that includes the Intifada period 2000-2003. The 
first observation that comes out of Figure 7.1 is that share prices soared in both markets 
but more so in the Palestinian markets. Two years following the Intifada, the markets 
were characterized by economic boom when share prices multiplied themselves, on 
average, by seven. While during this period share prices increased in Israel too, 
consistent with most financial markets around the globe, in the midst of 2005, West 
Bank share prices (Palestinian Stock Exchange) fell dramatically from 1300 level to 
400 level. In that period share prices in Israel continued to increase like many financial 
markets around the globe. The main explanation for this decline in share prices on the 
Palestinian Securities Exchange is that at that time the Hamas movement took power 
in Gaza. 
 
Figure 7.1 Share Prices in the Palestinian and Israeli Stock Markets 
 
Note: The sample period covers the slow-down period in 2000-2003 and in 2008 - credit crisis period. 
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There was a significant slowdown in the global economy that has been well reflected 
in share prices. The Intifada in the Middle-East also affected other markets around the 
globe as evidenced in the SP500. Table 7.9 provides general information on share 
prices in the West Bank, Israel and the US during the Intifada period and the period 
before and after the Intifada. This table presents figures on annual rates of return (CR) 
on stocks represented by the TA25, SP500 and AL-QUDS indices for different periods, 
where: 365)(
n
ntt PPCR   and n indicates the number of trading days in the period in 
which CR is calculated 
 
Table 7.9 Share Prices in the West Bank, Israel and US during the Intifada  
                 Compared with Other Periods 
 
Prior to examining the effect of terrorism on both markets, we examined the 
causality relationship between share prices on the TASE and those on the 
Palestinian Securities Exchange. We also include in our tests the effect of US 
market as control variable, represented by the SP500, on both markets.  
 
The following Vector Auto Regression model (VAR)160: was used to test the 
relationship between share prices in the West-Bank, Israel and US, using  

















0 50025  















50025   
 
                                                 
160 The VAR model is argued to assume that all endogenous variables are observed and that one way to 
tackle this issue is to use bootstrapped standard errors. This chapter, however, concludes that the 
bootstrapped standard errors will not change the conclusions of the VAR model, given the robustness of 
the results reported for the different VAR models examined. 
Period AL-QUDS TA25 SP500 
The whole period:   2101008-302773  0.171 0.139 0.046 
Prior to the Intifada: 7/1997-9/2000 0.345 0.202 0.149 
Intifada: 10/2000-6/2003 -0.093 -0.086 0.017 
Following the Intifada: 7/2003-12/2007 0.244 0.253 0.096 
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Where Y is the dependent variable: TA25 or AL-QUDS, SP500 is US SP500 index, 
SIGTA25. SIGAL-QUDS and SP500 are daily standard deviations of the three indices 
estimated by the GARCH(1,1) model. Table 7.10 displays the results of these tests. 
 
Table 7.10 Share Prices Causality between TA25 and AL-QUDS 
 Dependent Variable 
Coefficient TA25 SIGTA25 AL-QUDS SIGAL-
QUDS 
 A0 0.000897 0.000609* 0.000321* 0.000794* 
TA25 B1 -0.036872* -0.009223* -0.007964 -0.009959* 
TA25 B2 -0.018975 0.000775 0.032178 -0.003186 
TA25 B3 -0.025435 -0.003952 -0.066157*** -0.003456 
TA25 B4 -0.031831 -0.001315 -0.00672 0.004135 
TA25 B5 0.009006 -0.004716** 0.016611 0.002368 
AL-QUDS C1 0.062176* -0.002174 0.163826* 0.001218* 
AL-QUDS C2 -0.030394*** 0.001447 -0.01568 0.004708 
AL-QUDS C3 0.042865** -0.000513 0.020022 0.003278 
AL-QUDS C4 -0.009289 0.004433*** 0.010321 0.004265 
AL-QUDS C5 -0.043301** 0.000609 0.026273 -0.001411 
SP500 D1 0.465451* -0.029472* 0.083388** -0.014577 
SP500 D2 0.130577* -0.001714 0.047450 -0.002115 
SP500 D3 0.067412** -0.006944** 0.069726** 0.004452 
SP500 D4 0.100819* -0.002943 0.042056 0.004796 
SP500 D5 0.041705 -0.004053 -0.017646 -0.00144 
SIGTA25 E1 0.436250* 0.915004* 0.246334 -0.010548* 
SIGTA25 E2 -0.24867 0.003933 -0.251071 0.030750 
SIGTA25 E3 -0.174319 0.052792 -0.324227 -0.011641 
SIGTA25 E4 -0.03354 -0.035054 -0.2253 0.048881 
SIGTA25 E5 0.187348 0.020671 0.578643*** -0.034091 
SIGAL-QUDS F1 -0.179644 -0.010059 0.033254 0.961265* 
SIGAL-QUDS F2 0.120898 -0.007706 0.048681 -0.044579 
SIGAL-QUDS F3 0.125202 0.003988 -0.039594 -0.01541 
SIGAL-QUDS F4 0.037212 0.018408 0.022262 0.042382 
SIGAL-QUDS F5 -0.139200 -0.006239 -0.02472 0.017894 
SIGSP500 G1 0.119648 -0.039617 0.362930 0.001058 
 
    
 232 
Table 7.10 Share Prices Causality between TA25 and AL-QUDS continued 
 Dependent Variable 
Coefficient TA25 SIGTA25 AL-QUDS SIGAL-
QUDS 
SIGSP500 G2 -0.414259 0.041804 0.020297 0.011398 
SIGSP500 G3 0.012226 -0.014957 0.368758 0.037254** 
SIGSP500 G4 -0.291416 0.046978 -0.299627 -0.119723 
SIGSP500 G5 0.405237 -0.02157 -0.502428 0.042406 
 R-squared  0.216759 0.938452 0.048081 0.925006 
 Adj. R-squared  0.201735 0.937271 0.029822 0.923567 
 F-statistic  14.42767 794.9005 2.633221 643.0305 
 Log likelihood  4304.063 7798.031 3851.666 7176.476 
 Akaike AIC  -5.358072 -9.739224 -4.790804 -8.959844 
 Schwarz SC  -5.253613 -9.634764 -4.686344 -8.855385 
Note: *, **and *** signify that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
There are two main findings regarding returns. Firstly, both markets were significantly 
affected by the US market. However, it appears that the Palestinian Securities 
Exchange was affected to a lesser extent than that of the TASE. One possible 
explanation is that Palestinians investors are generally less sensitive to the information 
from the US markets than the Israeli investors. Secondly, in both markets there was a 
significant causality effect. Surprisingly, share prices behaviour on the TASE seemed 
to be significantly affected by those on the Palestinian Securities Exchange. This 
finding may be due to the fact that positive (negative) returns on the Palestinian 
Securities Exchange were a reflection of positive (negative) economic atmosphere on 
the West Bank side which was significantly correlated with positive (negative) 
expectations of the Israeli investors. 
 
There are two main findings regarding volatility. Firstly, only the Israeli market 
volatility was significantly affected by the US market volatility. It appears that the 
Palestinian Securities Exchange was not affected by the US market volatility. 
Secondly, in both markets there was a significant causality effect in volatility. 
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7.4.2 Share Prices Behaviour on the TASE and Palestinian Stock Exchange   
         Around Terror Attacks 
This section focuses on the Intifada period (2000-2003). The results are displayed in 
Table 7.11. The results in Table 7.11 indicate that share prices in both markets declined, 
and more so on the TASE. There was an average significant decrease of 0.43% in share 
prices on the TASE (-p-value=0.006) and an insignificant decrease of 0.23% on the 
Palestinian Securities Exchange (p-value=0.595). It appears that in both markets, 
investors responded almost immediately when the terror attack occurred. The decline 
of share prices on the Palestinian Securities Exchange may be explained by the fear of 
retaliation of the Israeli Defence Forces to the terror attack. The insignificance of that 
decline may indicate that in many cases such retaliation was not expected. One possible 
explanation for these findings is that investors' expectations on the Palestinian side are 
affected to a lesser extent since they perceive terror attacks in Israel as positive 
information. The fact that it still decreased may be explained by their fear of retaliation 
by the Israeli Defence Forces. These results are reinforced by the finding that the effect 
did not disappear over time  
 
Table 7.11 Effect of Terror Attacks on Stock Prices on the TASE and Palestinian    
                   Stock Exchange 
 
Returns TA-25 AL-QUDS 
CR(-1,0) -0.203 -0.203 
(p-value) (0.077)  (0.188) 
CR(0,1) -0.293 -0.077 
(p-value) (0.039)  (0.575) 
CR(1,2) -0.082 -0.013 
(p-value) (0.736)  (0.952) 
CR(-1,2) -0.431 -0.230 
(p-value) (0.006)  (0.595) 
Note: CR(-1,2) signifies cumulative rates of return on the 3 days – day of the attack 
CR(-1,0)+CR(0,+1)+CR(+1,+2). CR(-1,0) is the day of the attack, CR(0,+1) and CR 
(+1,+2) are the two days following the attack. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. 
 
Finally, the effect of the severity of the terror attack on share prices in both markets 
was examined. The findings are displayed in Table 7.12. The main finding is that the 
more fatal the terror attack, the greater the negative effect in the two markets. In the 
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more severe terror attack event (i.e. more people were killed and injured, if it was a 
suicide attack or if it was within the green-line border), share prices on the TASE 
declined significantly by 0.63% compared to a decline of 0.16% in less severe attacks. 
The same pattern is revealed on the Palestinian side. In the more severe terror attack, 
share prices on the Palestinian Securities Exchange declined significantly by 0.21% 
compared with -0.07% in less severe attacks. Most likely, this is due to the fact that 
Palestinians expected retaliation by the Israeli Defence Forces on days the results of 
terror events were more fatal. Indeed, the effect was insignificant in the “low” category 
and much smaller in the “high” category. It is consistent, again, with the notion that 
investors' expectations on the Palestinian side are affected to a lesser extent since they 
perceive terror attacks in Israel as positive information. Again, the fact that it still 
declined may be explained by the Palestinians fear of retaliation by the Israeli Defence 
Forces. Such retaliations appeared to occur when the outcome of the terror attack was 
more severe in the eyes of the Israeli public. The more severe the outcome of the terror 
attack, the greater the probability of retaliation.  
 
Table 7.12 Effect of Attack’s Severity on Stock Prices on the TASE and  
                   Palestinian Stock Exchange 
  TA25 AL-QUDS 
  N Average (%) N Average (%) 
Terror Index 
(TI) 
High 267 -0.627 92 -0.208 
 Low 223 -0.159 76 0.068 
 p-value  (0.065)   (0.375) 
Note: CR(-1,1) signifies cumulative rates of return on the 2 days – day of the attack 
CR(-1,0)+CR(0,+1). P-values signify the significance level using ANOVA. In this 
Table, TI receives a value 1 if its score is higher than 3 and 0 otherwise. 
 
It appears also that over time people do get "more used" to it. Yet, there is a still a 
significant effect that does not disappear over time, The findings are displayed below 
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Table 7.13 Effect of terror attacks on Stock Prices over time on the TASE and   
                   Palestinian Stock Exchange 
 
   CR(-1,2)- TASE  CR(-1,2)-PSE 
  N Average (%)  N Average (%) 
       
Period 901001-701000  252 0.579-   70 0.780-  
 2101007-501001  217 0.163-   98 0.265-  
 p-value  (0.219)    (0.277)  
       
Note: CR(-1,2) signifies cumulative rates of return on the 3 days – day of the attack 
CR(-1,0)+CR(0,+1)+CR(+1,+2). CR(-1,0) is the day of the attack, CR(0,+1) and CR 
(+1,+2) are the two days following the attack. P-value signifies the significance level 
using ANOVA.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the continued conflict in the region and the impact of terrorism 
on the Israeli and Palestinian stock exchanges. It used a unique data set of Palestinian 
and Israeli financial markets to examine the effects of terror attacks on both sides of 
the conflict. During the Intifada period, share prices declined significantly reflecting 
economic slowdown in both markets. There are bi-directional causality effects of 
returns in the two markets, and both markets were affected by the US market. The 
severity of terror attacks negatively affected share prices in both financial markets.  
 
The main finding is that the more severe the terror attack, the more the Israeli as well 
as the Palestinian markets suffered economically. Specifically, in both markets, the real 
economy suffered during the Intifada period and share prices declined. A statistically 
significant decline of 0.43% on average followed each terror event in the TASE, 
compared with an insignificant decline of 0.23% in Palestinian Securities Exchange. 
These findings indicate that the effects of terrorism are negative on all markets 
involved.  
 
An analysis of the links between the Israeli and the Palestinian markets was conducted. 
The main finding regarding returns was that in both markets there were significant 
causality effects. Surprisingly, share price behaviour on the TASE seems to be 
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significantly affected by those on the Palestinian Securities Exchange. This finding 
may be due to the fact that positive (negative) returns on the Palestinian Securities 
Exchange were a reflection of positive (negative) economic atmosphere on the West 
Bank side which was significantly correlated with positive (negative) expectations of 
the Israeli investors. 
 
The results of this research appear to indicate that both sides of the barricade suffer 
economically and otherwise. Unlike the presumption that only one side suffers from 
terror attacks, the findings in this chapter support the notion that nobody really wins at 
the market place. However, the Palestinian side seem to suffer to a lesser extent perhaps 
due to the fact that in the first place the Palestinians were in an inferior economic 
position. 
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Chapter 8- Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis analysed a complicated, worldwide unique economic case of the West Bank 
and Gaza, a small and economically under-developed state that has been under military 
control by Israel since 1967. Under such situations, various types of constraints are 
levied on the country, primarily by Israel, while, at least in the last decade, there has 
been unprecedented international aid awarded to the West Bank and Gaza. This thesis 
analyses these complex situations from an economic perspective. The conclusion of 
this thesis begins with a presentation of the general scope of the thesis, the main 
questions and the main hypotheses. In section 8.3 of the conclusion, the methodology 
and empirical statistical difficulties are presented. The main findings are discussed in 
section 8.4, and in section 8.5, the contribution of the study is highlighted as well as 
the limitations of the research, finishing with suggestions for future research.     
 
8.2 General Scope, Goal, Main Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The thesis examines the sources of the economic ordeal of the West Bank and Gaza 
following the Six Day War of 1967 and Israeli up to 2007 when Hamas took control of 
Gaza. During this turbulent period, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza lived 
in deep poverty. According to an October 31, 2013 update of the CIA World Fact Book, 
the 2008 GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms of the West Bank and Gaza 
is only USD 2900, and the area is ranked 173rd among 228 countries. According to 
Wikipedia, in 2010, the per capita GDP (2004 USD prices) is US $1924 in the West 
Bank and only US $876 in Gaza.   
 
Since 1967 and up to the first intifada, which began in autumn 1987, the Israeli 
economic policy toward the West Bank and Gaza was to employ increasingly more low 
cost Palestinians in Israel to develop the economy of Israel rather than to develop the 
economy of the West Bank and Gaza. There is a strong indication that this employment 
policy of Israel together with limitations on both physical mobility and merchandise 
was intended to prevent fair competition of Palestinians' producers with Israeli 
producers. Following the Oslo Accord of September 1993, which was the first major 
step toward an independent Palestinian state, the West Bank and Gaza received the  
    
 238 
highest per capita foreign aid recorded for any country. Despite, or perhaps because of, 
this heavy foreign aid of various types and remittances, the economy of the West Bank 
and Gaza remained poor in comparison to almost all the rest of the world and to the 
majority of all neighbouring countries. The policy of Israel to deter Palestinian products 
from competing with Israeli products and to employ Palestinians in Israel, the periods 
of military clashes and terror, and the unprecedented heavy foreign aid since the Oslo 
Accord, prompted the main questions of the thesis. First, is the level of GDP 
exogenously determined in the main because of the extreme political situation of being 
a state under occupation? Second, and more importantly, is the economy of the West 
Bank and Gaza infected by Dutch disease symptoms? Dutch disease denotes the 
seemingly anomalous phenomenon by which large amounts of foreign currency that 
are injected into an economy lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate of the 
local currency. Thus, rather than stimulating growth, foreign currency (aid) leads to the 
contraction of the tradable sectors of the economy.  
 
Dutch disease is one of the explanations for the ineffectiveness of foreign aid to 
generate economic growth in developing countries even though the inflow of foreign 
currency can close the deficit gaps on balance of payments and the gap between the ex-
ante savings and investments that are necessary to obtain a minimal required 
sustainable growth rate. 
 
Eight main hypotheses with respect to the previous questions were presented in the 
thesis: 
 
First, under the specific constraints on the economy that restricts the ability to replace 
imports, the exogenous supply of foreign currency out of exports, compensation from 
work abroad, and the financing of the foreign currency gap, determine GDP of the West 
Bank and Gaza. 
 
Second, under the aforementioned constraints, GDP of the West Bank and Gaza is 
determined by the corner solution of the two-gap model rather than by conditions of 
equilibrium. 
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Third, though there is no official local currency in the West Bank and Gaza, in both 
periods - before the Oslo Accord (1968 to 1993) and after it (1994 to 2007) - the West 
Bank and Gaza are affected by symptoms of Dutch disease. 
 
Fourth, on the one hand, high levels of foreign aid resolved the severe foreign currency 
constraints and solved economic humanitarian hardships, but on the other hand, given 
the economic and political constraints of the West Bank and Gaza, minimised its’ 
ability to generate growth. 
 
Fifth, the policy of Israel up to Oslo Accord, or more precisely up to the first intifada 
that also included the employment of Palestinians in Israel rather than to develop the 
economy of West Bank and Gaza, lead to the deterioration of economic development 
of the West Bank and Gaza and generated Dutch disease symptoms. Various clauses 
of the Oslo Accord attest to this policy stance. 
 
Sixth, the physical and administrative constraints on internal and external trade and 
free movement, not only by Israel but also by Jordan and Egypt, considerably reduced 
the effectiveness of foreign aid to stimulate economic growth. 
 
Seventh, the lack of a well-established financial sector inhibited long-term savings and 
investments in the West Bank and Gaza. 
  
Eight, terror activity negatively affected the economy of the West Bank and Gaza, 
primarily during the period of the second intifada. 
 
This thesis did not investigate other potential factors for Dutch disease, such as the lack 
of governmental experience, the level of democratic governance, corruption, level of 
human capital, lack of industrial infrastructure and experience, and scarcity of water 
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8.3 Methodology and Statistical Difficulties 
The theoretical literature analysed the impact of Dutch disease on the economy through 
analysing the impact of the inflow of foreign currency on the expected equilibrium real 
exchange rate (RER), expected growth rate, and expected equilibrium sector structure 
of the economy (see, for example, Cordan and Neary 1982). Empirical investigation 
was then conducted through a descriptive statistical analysis to determine whether such 
expected changes accrued following the foreign currency inflow shock. 
  
The two-gap model of Harm and Lutz (2004), which extends the Harrod-Domar model, 
was identified as the closest relevant theoretical framework in this thesis because, based 
on the case of West Bank and Gaza, all sources of foreign currency are exogenous and 
the constraints on the economy disable the option for the long-term competitive 
replacement of imports by local production. 
 
This thesis developed an expression of GDP and GNP in total terms and in per capita 
terms as a function of the available foreign currency. 
The general form of this function was: 
  







where   is the ratio of import to total uses. XE is exports, FTR NCT  are  foreign 
transfer and net capital transfer in the balance of payment, and W is the compensation 
for work outside the West Bank and Gaza (mainly in Israel). In most economies, all 
terms in this equation, except FTR+NCT, are endogenous and are determined in 
equilibrium according to demand and supply. This thesis claimed and proved 
empirically that in the case of the West Bank and Gaza,   which is the ratio of import 
to total uses is almost constant and all the terms in the bracket of the above equation 
are almost entirely exogenous and thus they determine almost entirely the level of GDP. 
 
The two-gap general model was then extended by me to analyse the optimal proportion 
between tradable and non-tradable activities of the economy. It is determined and 
shown that under the exogenous foreign currency constraint, increasing the proportion 
of the non-tradable sector, such as the public sector, relative to the tradable sector may 
increase GDP because the non-tradable sector has a lower   relative to the tradable 
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sector. However, this increase may not increase the total welfare of the economy. Thus, 
the general model together with the profitability index (PI) and NPV rule of investment 
was used to analyse the optimal investment path in tradable and non-tradable sectors 
of the economy. This indicated that straying from this path lowered GDP. These results 
are consistent with those of Harms and Lutz (2004).  
 
The entire period of 1968 to 2007 was divided into two distinct sub-periods, 1968 to 
1993 the pre-Oslo Accord period and 1994 to 2007 period the post-Oslo Accord and 
pre-Hamas in the Gaza period, to test the eight main hypotheses. These two periods 
differ considerably from each other in that since 1994, there has been independent 
Palestinian internal governmental control and foreign aid has significantly increased, 
while the military clashes and terrorism peaked during the second intifada, which 
erupted six years after the Oslo Accord.  
 
 A few studies have claimed that foreign aid led to Dutch Disease in the West Bank and 
Gaza such as Petri (1997) and Astrup and Dessus (2002). While Cali’s (2011) working 
paper provided a partial methodological analysis of the symptoms of Dutch Disease in 
the Palestinian economy since 1994, the methodological approach used in this thesis 
was more comprehensive as it included many more factors and employed more 
advanced statistical tools for the extended period 1968 to 2007. In the advanced 
analysis of this extended period however, statistical theoretical and practical difficulties 
had to be confronted. The theoretical issues related to serial correlation and 
autocorrelations problems of simultaneity within the regression models, and problems 
relating to identifying the direction of causality. The practical difficulties related to the 
lack of data for the period of the first intifada including the methodological and political 
differences between the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) and the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistic (PCBS), which replaced the Israeli Central Bureau of 
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8.4 The Empirical Findings 
The five main findings of the thesis are summarised here and then a more detailed 
presentation of these main findings is provided. 
 
First, as GDP of the Palestinian economy was determined almost entirely by the 
exogenous constraint of foreign currency, the foreign currency gap determined growth 
as projected by the two-gap model, in other words a corner solution. 
 
Second, and most likely the most important finding, in both time periods (before the 
Oslo Accord of 1994 and after the Accord) there were multiple indications that the 
economy of the West Bank and Gaza was infected by Dutch disease-like symptoms. 
 
Third, a multiple regression analysis that considered lags indicated that only the 
exogenous annual finance of the balance of payment gap for given years was correlated 
with the changes in GDP in current years. However, there was no significant correlation 
between changes in GDP for given years and the finance of the balance of payment gap 
in previous years or in subsequent years. This result indicated that the direction of 
causality between foreign aid and GDP growth cannot be determined and that both 
directions most likely hold. 
 
Fourth, it was found for both periods, 1968 to 1993 and 1994 to 1997, that foreign aid 
complemented the income derived mainly from Israel’s exports and from compensation 
from work abroad. The proportion of income from Israel through exports and work 
abroad plus foreign aid remained almost constant over the years studied in this thesis. 
 
Fifth, terror attacks and military clashes, primarily during the second intifada but also 
during the first, served as significant negative instruments for the Palestinian economy. 
However, the Dutch disease-like phenomena prevailed also in periods other than the 
intifada periods, and the multiple regressions did not identify a significant negative 
impact of the terror attacks in terms of Israeli causalities and GDP growth. 
 
The more detailed discussion of these five main findings and their accompanying 
details are presented in the following discussion. 
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First, GDP of the West Bank and Gaza was almost entirely determined by exogenous 
factors. The empirical data indicated that the ratio of imports to total uses was 
approximately unchanged. Foreign aid, exports through Israel, and work in Israel are 
all exogenous. Thus, GDP of the West Bank and Gaza was determined almost solely 
by exogenous factors. Over the two time periods, very high positive correlations 
between the ratios of investments to GNP and of foreign aid to GNP were found, while 
the ratio of savings to GNP was negatively correlated with the previous ratios, and 
following 1994, savings was also negative, as expected from the two-gap model  (see 
Figure 6.1). Thus, it can be concluded with confidence that the saving gap did not 
determine GDP and the balance of payment was the relevant determinant. Thus, it was 
not surprising to find an almost perfect correlation between the ratio of foreign aid to 
imports and the ratio of investments to imports (see Figure 6.2). The inability of the 
West Bank and Gaza to obtain FDI and loans is due to the political risk, as reflected in 
the very low reserve of foreign currency (see Figure 6.3). The inability to compete with 
imports due to the constrained local production supports this premise and was reflected 
in the almost stable ratio of import to total uses (see Figure 6.4). Thus, two conclusions 
were made: GDP of the West Bank and Gaza was determined almost solely by 
exogenous factors that finance the balance of payment deficit and the level of GDP was 
almost entirely determined by an effective balance of payment constraint rather than 
by a demand and supply macro-economic equilibrium model.  
 
Second, the diagnosis of symptoms reflecting Dutch disease, before and after the Oslo 
Accord, was demonstrated by multiple phenomena. The major symptoms included: 
 
- A negative correlation between the ratios of foreign aid to GNP and saving 
to GNP over both time periods, the dramatic decrease and negative savings 
and the large increase of foreign aid (observed in Figure 6.1) supported the 
hypothesis of Dutch disease. 
 
- Figure 6.4 exposed significant negative correlations between the ratio of 
foreign aid/uses and per capita GDP both before and after the Oslo period. 
These negative correlations existed also during periods of relatively low 
military tensions and during the periods of the intifadas. Thus, it could not 
be concluded that foreign aid compensated for the decrease in GDP only due 
to the intifadas.  
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-  Figure 6.5 exposed the positive correlation between foreign aid/uses, the   
 unemployment rate, and the weight of the tradable sector over the entire    
 period. 
 
- Support for the hypothesis that Israeli policy constrained the economic 
development of the West Bank and Gaza was found in the result that foreign 
aid mainly compensated for the decrease in work available in Israel (see 
Figures 6.6 and 6.7). In general, the major cause of Dutch Disease is the 
appreciacition of local  RER. Thus,f the signs of Dutch disease is a negative 
correlation between foreign aid and exports due to an appreciation of the 
local RER of tradable local products. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza  
the local currency is mainly the Israeli shekel and exports are 
overwhelmingly to Israel and thus constraints on trade (physical and goods) 
with Israel rather than an appreciation of RER caused the symptoms of 
Dutch disease. However, again the direction of causality could not be 
definitely determined.  
 
-  Tests of correlation (Table 6.1) indicated that in both periods the ratio of 
foreign aid to gross national product was positively correlated with the ratios 
of private and public consumption and imports to gross national product 
while it was negatively correlated with the ratio of investments, exports plus 
compensation from work abroad (mainly in Israel) to gross national product. 
These correlations reaffirmed previous correlations that diagnosed 
symptoms of Dutch disease. 
 
- The intensity of productive capital in terms of the ratio of net productive 
capital to GNP was extremely low and decreased during the period 1968 to 
1993 (see Figure 6.8). This result is consistent with the claim that during this 
period, Israel caused the Palestinian economy to deteriorate by using 
Palestinian workers in Israel rather than generating work options in the 
tradable sectors within the occupied territories. The intensity of the 
productive capital  rose only after the Oslo Accord. The two-gap model 
predicts that this will be the case, that is only exogenous finance of the 
balance of payment deficit can increase the level of capital required for 
sustainable growth. 
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- The ratio of non-productive capital (mainly in the construction sector) to 
GNP increased in almost all years (see Figure 6.8) In addition, after the Oslo 
Accord, the ratio of non-productive capital to GNP was positively correlated 
with the unemployment rate And unemployment rate was positively 
correlated with foreign aid. This correlation indicates that either economic 
difficulties or unemployment was the basis for attracting foreign aid, or vice 
versa.  
 
- The significant high positive correlation between the unemployment rate and 
the ratio of foreign aid to gross national product that is exhibited in Figure 
6.8 is one of the major indications of Dutch disease. Given the positive 
correlation between the ratio of unemployment and the ratio of non-
productive capital to GNP, it is reasonable to conclude that this high 
correlation is due to the reduction in exports and work abroad (see Figure 
6.7). The direction of causality between the unemployment rate and 
(FTR+NCT)/uses could not be definitely determined. 
 
-  Statistical difficulties and the direction of causality were investigated using 
multiple factors regression analysis with and without lags. The dependent 
variable in this analysis was the annual growth of GDP in absolute and per 
capita terms, and independent variables were the level of the main macro 
annual figures in absolute and per capita terms. The regressions well 
explained the growth of GDP and serial correlation was not found. (see Table 
6.3 and 6.4). The direction of causality could not be definitely determined. 
 
GDP growth was found to be negatively correlated with the ratio of imports 
to uses (consistent with infection by Dutch disease). GDP growth was found 
to be positively correlated to the unemployment rate. It is reasonable to 
conclude that foreign aid only provided financial support for consumption 
and investments in the West Bank and Gaza. After 1993, no positive 
correlation between GDP growth and exports was found. This was explained 
as arising because of the low level of exports and the periods of constraint 
on the mobility of merchandise and people within and outside the borders of 
the occupied territories. A positive correlation between GDP growth and 
capital intensity was not found most likely because excess capacity of capital 
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arose with the political constraints imposed on the West Bank and Gaza. No 
significant correlation between GDP growth and the political environment 
was found. The impact of the political environment on annual GDP growth 
was considered by using the annual Israeli casualties as a proxy for political 
tension (Table 6.5). However, the basic data clearly indicated that the only 
periods of decline in GDP and per capita GDP were during the break between 
the intifadas (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2 and  Figure 6.4).   
 
It therefore has as to be acknowledged that while multiple results point to symptoms of 
Dutch disease, the direction of causality between foreign aid and the economic 
symptoms could not be determined definitively. It is likely that both directions hold, 
and foreign aid had simultaneously both negative and positive impacts. However, it is 
clear and well reflected in the findings that the harsh political situation in the region 
strengthened the negative impact of foreign aid to the West Bank and Gaza.  
 
Finally, the impact of terror attacks on the Israeli and Palestinian security markets was 
examined by adoption of the Eldor et al. index of terrorism. This analysis indicated that 
the negative reaction to terror in the Israeli security market was much stronger than that 
in the Palestinian security market. This may indicate that the nascent and very small 
Palestinian security market did not well reflect the economic and political events. 
 
8.5 The Contributions and Limitations of the Study and Suggestions 
for Future Studies 
 
The original contribution of this thesis to research is three-fold. First, for the first time 
in almost forty years, empirical macro-economic data of the West Bank and Gaza were 
collected and analysed. The collection of the data under academically acceptable 
standards was not an easy task because of the Intifada periods as well as the widely 
different statistical methods and standards employed by the Palestinian and Israeli 
bureaus of statistics. Second, expressing and analysing GDP in terms of foreign 
currency constraints provides unique insight into the Palestinian economy as almost all 
foreign trade and exports of labour are conducted through Israel, and thus, almost all 
sources of foreign currency are exogenous to the Palestinian economy. Third, for the 
first time, the symptoms of Dutch disease of the Palestinian economy and its factors 
were theoretically and empirically analysed for the period 1968 to 2007. According to 
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my best knowledge, this thesis is the first to provide a comprehensive presentation 
related to the impact on economic outcomes of the external finance of the balance of 
payment that are typically identified with infection by Dutch disease. Such an approach 
can contribute to the analysis of Dutch disease in other developing countries, such as 
the Sub-Sahara countries.  
 
The primary limitations of this study are the low reliability of the data due to the 
Intifada periods and the different statistical methods of the Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics (ICBS) and Palestinian's Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). In addition, 
due to the separation between Gaza, which is controlled by Hamas, and the West Bank, 
which is controlled by Fattah, my data collection ended in 2007. No doubt a longer 
period is needed to examine the effectiveness of foreign aid under the 1994 post-Oslo 
Palestinian authority regime. 
 
Future studies may consider the following suggestions to overcome the difficulties 
encountered in this dissertation. First, collect separate data for the Gaza and West Bank. 
This separation may improve interpretation of the results as the level of economic 
activity of Gaza is much lower than that of the West Bank. In addition, the political 
relationship with Israel and the economic infrastructure of the West Bank is very 
different from that of Gaza. Second, it is suggested to extend the analysis by comparing 
the impact of foreign aid to the West Bank and Gaza to the impact of foreign aid on the 
economies of other developing countries. Adding cross-country analyses may 
compensate for the limitations of the time-serial analysis conducted in this study, as 
this suggested extension was beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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